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To make society sustainable our institutions must also become 
sustainable.  As an institution, health care contributes to environmental 
degradation.  While unsurprising, contributions to environmental degradation 
increase risk factors for disease and illness, effectively frustrating the goals of 
medicine.  To find ways to make health care sustainable I begin by reviewing the 
literature on sustainability from within environmental ethics and two previous 
attempts at envisioning sustainable health care in order to learn what to include 
in a vision of sustainable health care.  Then I examine problems specific to 
making medicine sustainable by investigating how sustainability might affect the 
principles of medicine.  Next I develop ways to address the concerns of 
upholding the principles of medicine under a system of sustainable health care, 
centering on inequality and its negative impact on the sustainability of society 
and health care.  Finally I envision ways to make health care sustainable by 
applying a schematic definition of sustainability adopted from the work of John 
Nolt that is consistent with the key strategy of reducing inequality.   
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CHAPTER I  
1.1 HEALTH CARE AND ENVIRONMENTAL HARM  
 
Health care is at a crossroads.  For the past several decades, bioethicists have 
noted that health care is economically unsustainable.  The rising cost of health care, they 
argue, has been outstripping our ability to pay for it for quite some time.  Similarly, 
environmentalists have warned us for decades that human activity, anthropogenic 
activity, was causing ecological degradation and leading to climate change.  The 
bioethicists and the environmentalists were right, and still are.  Yet health care remains 
largely untouched amidst the warnings, especially here in the United States. 
The practice of modern medicine is in tension with commonly cited goals of 
medicine—healing the sick, improving health, and avoidance of a premature death.  On 
one hand, there seems to be overwhelming concern for individual welfare.  Presented 
with the sick and dying, doctors and nurses attempt to heal our various illnesses.  In the 
field of medical ethics, the concerns rarely ever reach outside of the medical setting and 
very often focus on individual issues.  When larger contexts are considered, issues are 
expanded to the organizational or institutional level, and even concerns of social justice.  
But there is little consideration of the environment present in the literature of the field, or 
in the actions of medical professionals within the clinical setting.  On the other hand, 
medicine can no longer afford to remain divorced from broader environmental concerns.   
N. Ole Nielsen notes that “most of our society defines health in terms of freedom 
from disease” (1999, 65).  There are, however, other aspects to health that are not as well 
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recognized by society at large.  Well-being is recognized by many organizations as 
another aspect of health that includes social and mental wellness.  Nielsen writes, “This 
distinction between coping with disease on the one hand and promoting well-being and 
productivity on the other is not a new issue.  It was recognized by the Greeks who had 
deities for both healing (Panacea) and health or well-being (Hygeia)” (1999, 65).  
Doctors are currently more likely to fall into the category of panacea, as they intervene 
during an individual’s illness and attempt to make them better.  Patients want to be 
healed, and demand healing from their doctors.  Public health is the realm of hygeia, 
where health or well-being is maintained through such practices as water filtration and 
sanitation.   
Our desire is often for another panacea.  To be healed from infirmities, though 
beneficial in the short-term, is not necessarily beneficial over the long-term, and is 
possibly even harmful to the health of the population in general.  In our quest for healing, 
we have often forgotten to take care of our own well-being, both collectively and 
individually.  Modern life in the developed world is potentially unhealthy unless a special 
effort is made to exercise and eat correctly—the artificial environment we surround 
ourselves with is unhealthy, while human activities such as consumption harm the 
environment.  We don’t have to be as active as we have in the past in order to survive 
because so many services are available so long as we can afford them.  The professionals 
trained within the dominant medical establishment treat the patient they see, but seldom 
look for environmental factors—outside of individual lifestyle--that may have led to or 
contributed to the illness.  Such work is for the work of public health specialists such as 
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epidemiologists and pathologists, many of whom are proponents of expanding our view 
of health to include the world around us as well. 
How this might occur may still seem a mystery.  Let’s start with the current 
conception of health.  The current dominant conception of health is expressed by the 
definition given by the World Health Organization: “Health is a state of complete 
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or 
infirmity” (WHO 1948).  One merit of the definition is that it does recognize the 
necessity of social interaction for health.  Note that this definition focuses on the 
individual, specifically the human individual, and does not mention nonhuman health or 
the environment.  In some ways this makes sense: doctors are healing patients, not their 
surroundings.  However, there is no consideration for the ways in which medicine might 
affect the environment surrounding the individual in negative ways that contribute to the 
presence of disease and infirmity, save until disease and infirmity are already present in 
the individual.  The WHO definition is exemplary of how our medical system operates 
because, definitionally, the focus is on the individual patient, without wider regard for 
how important environmental factors are for health.  The WHO definition also nicely 
highlights how one might not have a disease, but still not be in a state of well-being.  
Health is not merely physical, but also mental and social.  Medicine tends to focus on the 
physical aspect of the definition, and less on the mental, social and environmental 
aspects. This focus is to the benefit of services aimed at treating the individual, but it is to 
the detriment of public health.  
 Unfortunately, with the dominant concept of health reinforcing a narrow focus on 
individual treatment, the dominant definition of health also serves to reinforce the notion 
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that we are separate from the environment.  Practicing physicians learn this definition, as 
well as researchers, nurses, and other health care professionals.  But our health cannot be 
understood properly in isolation.  That is, to understand our health without consideration 
of the environments we inhabit yields an incomplete picture of what affects our health 
and may hinder the ability of doctors to heal infirmities and illness.  Alternatively, though 
doctors may still be able to heal the individual, the opportunity to prevent similar 
illnesses of environmental origin is sometimes lost because the definition of health 
employed focuses on the individual, but does not often look to environmental factors.  
Once the individual is healed, the job of a doctor is largely complete, and other factors 
like environmental impact remain secondary.  Even if considered by a doctor, there are 
few mechanisms in place to change environmental problems identified as leading to 
disease and infirmity. 
 The editor of the British Medical Journal notes the recent backlash against the 
WHO definition, stating that a state of complete well-being is absolute, and therefore 
unattainable by most of the population.  By itself, this may not be a problem because the 
WHO definition of health could be considered an ideal to strive for.  However, insofar as 
the goal is unattainable, it contributes to the medicalization of society as more human 
characteristics are recruited as risk factors for disease (Godlee 2011).  Because we 
continue to strive for the ideal of health like that found in the WHO definition, we find 
more problems to diagnose in individuals, but spend far less time looking at the 
environmental factors that affect the health of all individuals.  We consume more drugs 
and perform more procedures in an effort to attain an ideal of health that seems 
impossible.  Our focus on the individual is reductionist insofar as the causes of disease 
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are not so easily separated from the environment, even though we may find instances of 
disease in individuals. 
If health is viewed reductionistically in health care practice—if when people are 
sick, we’ll try to make you well and leave it at that—we’ll focus less on how one became 
sick before pathology was present in the body, or why there are trends in pathologies and 
epidemics.  Such a simplistic view limits the effectiveness of medical treatment because 
of its scientific incompleteness.  Self-evidently, we are obligated to operate health care 
nonreductionistically because doing so will lead to better health outcomes.   
Already, approximately 24% of the disease burden is environmental in origin, and 
23% of deaths worldwide are attributable to environmental factors (WHO 2006).  This 
number will only continue to rise as long as current measures to stem the tide of 
environmental degradation remain inadequate.  Medicine, as part of health care, 
contributes to this ecological degradation.  Pharmaceuticals leech into our water supplies 
and scarce resources are mined for the production of medical equipment, all while 
medical waste contributes to pollution, the cost of healthcare rises, and we use more 
resources than ever before—all in the name of saving life.  As more people get sick, we 
use more treatments.  Health care as it is currently practiced is not only economically 
unsustainable, but socially and environmentally unsustainable as well. 
We have largely failed to practice health care in ways that demonstrate concern 
for the environment.  Part of the problem is scale: according to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), health care accounts for 16% of the economy (EPA 2014). 
World Bank figures calculating health care expenditures in the United States from 2009-
2013 report that the United States spent 17.9% of its gross domestic product on health 
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care compared to the global average of 10.2% (World Bank 2014).  As such a large part 
of the economy, health care is also a large contributor to various kinds of environmental 
degradation, but difficult to deal with because of its size.  Reporting only on hospitals, the 
EPA reports that hospitals significantly impact the environment by: 
 Generating approximately 7,000 tons per day of waste, including infectious waste, 
hazardous waste, and solid waste. 
 Using mercury in medical devices, equipment, light bulbs, etc. 
 Using materials that may have toxic effects:  PVC, DEHP, cleaning materials, 
heavy metals in electronics, pesticides, batteries. 
 Consuming large amounts of energy in buildings and car fleets, and generating 
significant greenhouse gas emissions. 
 Consuming large amounts of water for domestic use and heating/cooling as well 
as landscaping (EPA 2014). 
But the environmental impacts of health care don’t just end with hospitals and the 
materials listed.  The effects are not limited to the EPA’s list, and the effects of health 
care should arguably be expanded to include activities that require the use of services 
whose origins are in health care and health care research. 
We can expect the percentage of human health problems caused by the 
environment to increase.  The effects of ecological degradation due to climate change on 
our health are already perceivable, but will become worse with further ecological 
degradation.  Widespread negative effects on health are possible, partially due to how 
“the very young and the elderly, those with preexisting cardiovascular and respiratory 
disorders are at particular risk for heat exhaustion and heat stroke” as global temperatures 
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rise and become more apt to extremes (Patz and Wolfe 2002, 168-169).  The World 
Health Organization reported in 2005 that “abnormally high temperatures in Europe in 
the summer of 2003 were associated with at least 27,000 more deaths than the equivalent 
period in previous years” (WHO 2005).  The fatality rate among crop workers has risen 
from 15 deaths per every 100,000 workers per year from 1992-1996 to 35 per every 
100,000 in the period from 2002-2006 (CDC 2008).  One may strongly infer from such 
data that despite heightened awareness of the dangers of working in the heat, climate 
change has already contributed to an increased amount of heat related death. 
Increasing solar radiation together with the emission of nitrogen oxides from the 
continued burning of fossil fuels will also result in higher concentrations of ozone in the 
lower atmosphere.  For allergy sufferers, this will increase “the sensitivity of asthmatics 
to allergens and impair lung function, particularly in children and the elderly… in 
addition, the combination of high temperatures, sulfur dioxide, and particulate pollution 
may result in higher mortality than that caused by pollutants alone” (Patz and Wolfe 
2002, 169).   
The most destructive sort of ecological degradation is arguably the reduction in 
biodiversity because such reductions in biodiversity are largely irreversible.  Scientific 
breakthroughs in medicine are often a result of discoveries in nature.  The loss in 
biodiversity is then two-fold, as a reduction in biodiversity causes damage to ecosystems 
but also limits our ability to find cures and treatments for disease (Chivian and Sullivan 
2002, 182-183).  We may be better able to synthesize new compounds in the laboratory, 
causing one to consider that the loss in biodiversity may not be as acute a loss for 
medicine as once thought.  However, very often it is the observation of the effect a 
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compound has in its native environment that inspires us to investigate the use of the 
compound for medicine.  In many cases, the compound is found in nature and only later 
produced in the lab.  The widely prescribed cancer drug Taxol followed this path of 
development (Guerra-Bubb et. al., 2012).  In a study authored by David Newmann and 
Gordon Cragg, seventy percent of all new drugs produced in the United States in the last 
twenty five years come from nature (Newman and Cragg 1, 2007).  In an even more 
telling statement, they surmise that “although combinatorial chemistry in one or more of 
its manifestations has now been used as a discovery source for approximately 70% of the 
time covered by this review, to date, we can find only one de novo new chemical entity 
reported in the public domain as resulting from this method of chemical discovery and 
approved for drug use anywhere” (Newmann and Cragg 1, 2007).  Observing nature and 
mimicking its processes is still essential for the discovery of useful medical compounds, 
even if we might replicate it in the lab later. 
A loss of curative medicine from decreased biodiversity is not the only direct and 
immediate danger from ecological degradation, however.  We know that healthy 
ecosystems have greater biodiversity.  As the effects of ecological degradation worsen, 
biodiversity—and the ability of the ecosystem to resist and bounce back from 
perturbance—decreases.  Joshua P. Rosenthal and Trent Preszler write that there are four 
broad areas where biodiversity significantly contributes to biomedical science: 
1. Biological models for biomedical research have been provided by thousands of 
diverse species. 
2. Naturally occurring compounds found in plants, animals, and microorganisms 
form the basis for almost half our pharmacopoeia historically. 
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3. Diverse organisms play a significant role in the ecology of infectious diseases, 
primarily as vectors and reservoirs, and as control agents for these organisms. 
4. Bacteria, algae, plants, and terrestrial and marine vertebrates, among others, 
play an increasingly important role as indicators of environmental quality for 
human health (Rosenthal and Preszler 2002, 328). 
This list points to the ways in which medicine comes into tension with its own principles 
by contributing to ecological degradation.  Human health is dependent upon ecological 
health insofar as we need a healthy environment in order to be healthy or flourish.   
A loss in the functionality of ecosystems is a much greater problem than usually 
appreciated because when the functionality of an ecosystem is compromised, so too are 
the services that an ecosystem provides.  Ecosystems provide a long list of services, 
including but not limited to: the regulation of such things as oxygen concentration, 
carbon dioxide, atmospheric water vapor, water filtration, temperature and precipitation 
regulation, soil formation and fertilization, pollination, and act as provider of food and 
fuel (188).  Rectification of ecological degradation via restoration, policy, and societal 
change is often the only viable option if the functionality of a degraded ecosystem and 
the services it provides is to be restored.   
C.L. Soskolne and R. Bertollini point out that there are three basic points with 
respect to the relationship between ecological integrity and human health: 
1. Human population and individual health ultimately depend on the integrity of 
ecosystems and the ecosphere. 
2. Healthy populations can exist in local environments that have lost their 
ecological integrity—such as most urban regions—only if healthy ecosystems 
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exist elsewhere to support them.  This component may be termed interregional 
dependency. 
3. It is unlikely that increasing “footprints” are sustainable in the long run. 
All of these concepts and measures are related to public health by virtue of the link 
between the sustainability of human health as a function of the sustained health of 
ecological life support systems (Soskolne and Bertollini 373, 2002).  Note that the second 
point, interregional dependency, does not seem to account for dependencies that exist 
between regions even when the relevant ecosystems are not healthy.  For example, urban 
areas depend upon agricultural areas, but neither is largely considered to be healthy.  The 
third point concerning unsustainable footprints is true; however, the point is leading.  
While there is a possibility that sustainability measures may decrease footprints despite a 
burgeoning population, the possibility is remote.  Nonetheless, the three points are 
worthy of consideration because they pinpoint ways in which declining ecosystem health 
is related to human health. 
Moreover, Soskolne and Bertollini ask what adaptations are feasible in the face of 
progressive declines in ecosystem health.  Is it necessary to be concerned about 
environmental health, or are there ways to skirt the effects of a deteriorating 
environment?  There are three primary approaches.  Other approaches are derivations of 
the three insofar as the primary approaches are broad ideas from which we may draw 
more specific solutions.  The list is not exhaustive and is only indicative of the items that 
Soskolne and Bertollini choose to identify. 
1. We hope that humans will be able to adapt to coming environmental changes. 
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2. We could implement remedies through approaches to currently perceived 
problems. 
3. We could proactively promote substantive policy reforms designed to restore, 
maintain, and protect the ecosystems upon which human and other life forms 
depend (Soskolne and Bertollini 374, 2002). 
Adaptations to changes that occur due to ecological degradation and affect long term 
environmental health are certainly possible, but such adaptations are unlikely due to the 
scale of the changes involved with mechanisms like global climate change.  We cannot 
expect evolutionary adaptions on such a short time scale, as evolutionary adaptations 
happen over many thousands of years.  The current rate of extinction is tribute to the 
inability of many previously successful species to adapt to the current changes in our 
environment.  Adaptations that are feasible must be cultural or technological in nature.  
Technological and cultural changes, however, tend to be reactive rather than proactive.  
Reactive change is good for addressing current environmental crises, but the prevention 
of environmental crises in the future requires a more proactive approach. 
Soskolne and Bertollini note that “presently, adaptation to ecological disintegrity 
has meant high levels of disease and unemployment among most of the world’s poor” 
(374, 2002).  Superficial remedies have worked with some success, but treat the 
symptoms of ecological degradation rather than the causes.  This falls short of what is 
necessary to make our lives sustainable.  Carbon emissions from automobiles may be 
curbed by building hybrid and electric cars, while coal plants may be replaced in some 
areas by massive solar arrays.  However, further measures are necessary because 
sustainability arguably requires real lifestyle and societal changes necessary for human 
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life to be sustainable on Earth.  Our current rates of consumption, combined with an ever 
growing global population, require us to deeply consider whether treating the symptoms 
of ecological degradation is enough.  We must also consider the causes.   
Health and human flourishing require a healthy ecosystem.  One strategy for 
theoretically approaching environmental problems in health care is to combine the often 
separate fields of environmental and biomedical ethics.  This view of bioethics hearkens 
back to the early days of bioethics when Van Rensselaer Potter first coined the term in 
1971.  He intended a deeper, more holistic view of bioethics instead of the estranged 
marriage now seen between the specialized fields of environmental and biomedical 
ethics.  At its inception, Potter intended bioethics to include animals and their 
communities as well. His vision was for an ethic that could inform a postmodern 
industrial future that will have problems on a scale not seen before in human history 
(Potter, 1971).  Sustainable medicine is a return to these roots.  In bridging the gap 
between environmental ethics and biomedical ethics, sustainable medicine is an attempt 
at addressing problems in medicine from a holistic standpoint.   
If long term environmental health is dependent upon a network of healthy 
ecosystems, and human health is dependent upon environmental and ecosystem health, 
then medicine should cease contributing to environmental decline and is, at the very least, 
obligated to mitigate and limit its contributions.  We have seen that long term 
environmental health is dependent upon a network of healthy ecosystems and that 
humans are dependent upon those ecosystems.  If medicine contributes to environmental 
decline, then medicine is harming human health.  If medicine is to avoid harming human 
health via contributions to environmental degradation, then medicine must change by 
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incorporating a truly holistic conception of health that includes nonhuman life.  By 
including nonhuman life, moral considerations properly encompass the relevant 
considerations that play into human health more completely.   
This is not to say that medicine must entirely drop current treatments just because 
the approach to health needs to change.  But methods and ideology will need to be 
revisited.  The place to start is at the foundation, with our concept of health.  Practical 
fixes, while a step in the right direction, will do little to curb our expectations for 
medicine.  We need an approach that encourages not only practical fixes, but also a re-
envisioning of the concept of health to one that is inclusive, rather than exclusive, of the 
environment.  So long as we view ourselves as entities independent from the 
environment, we will be likely to undervalue the ecosystems we depend on. 
Just where might we begin to change the concept of health to something that more 
accurately reflects what we know about human health?  To best figure out how to 
proceed, we must understand how the current conception of health may put us at odds 
with the natural environment.  First, we fight natural processes such as aging and death 
that are necessary parts of ecological cycles of renewal and death.  Without the cycle of 
renewal and death, i.e. a process of constant renewal, ecosystem resources fueling the 
renewal will not be replenished. 
The side effect of fighting these natural processes is increased health care cost and 
resource consumption.  The average person in the U.S. spends more on health care during 
the last two years of life than at any other point (Social Security Advisory Board 
September 2009, 5).  So, while end of life care continues to cost more, it costs more 
because of how we approach care at the end of life.  Following the dominant definition of 
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health, each individual is entitled to as much care as possible because each individual is 
considered independently from the environment and the population in general.  We 
proceed as though all resources are available to each patient.  The result is that, although 
for each individual patient there is little wrong with pouring resources into their care, 
when the same approach is used for everyone, the trend created is unsustainable.  If 
medicine is to become sustainable, we must learn to consider the individual patient within 
the context of the social, environmental, and economic resources available to all. We 
must also find a definition of health that is better equipped to address the tension between 
our obligations to individuals and our obligations to current and future generations, as 
well as the environment. 
  Second, we maintain individual health without regard for the wider societal and 
environmental effects, even aside from care at the end of life.  For example, technological 
solutions often disregard environmental impact or have unintended negative 
consequences for the environment.  Ours is a time of unsustainable expectations: age is a 
disease to be cured and treated.  Health care degrades the environment disproportionately 
compared to other institutions.  We are all too willing to accept this side effect of care 
because medicine can serve to excuse us from irresponsible habits, as an enabler to an 
alcoholic.  In reconceiving our conception of health, we need to change it in such a way 
as to alter our expectations for medicine, and some of that starts with our own habits.  If 
we maintain our own health better, we may come to expect less from health care at the 
end of life, and we will arguably use less health care per year lived.  By viewing our 
health and environmental health as part of a nonreductionistic whole, we may more 
clearly see the obligation to care for ourselves as one that we owe not only to ourselves 
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and loved ones, but to the population and the environment in general as well.  A more 
efficient use of health care resources will lessen environmental impact, but there is little 
motivation to do so when our health is considered independently from the health of our 
environment.   
Chapter two discusses different theories of sustainability, beginning with a brief 
synopsis of the history of sustainability before leading into a critical discussion of 
particular sustainability theories.  The chapter is divided into two main sections; in the 
first section, particular theories of sustainability from the literature of environmental 
ethics are discussed, including theories from J. Baird Callicott, Bryan Norton, and John 
Nolt.  The second section is dedicated to a review of the two main theories of sustainable 
medicine already in existence, with the first originally authored by Andrew Jameton and 
Jessica Pierce, and the second by Daniel Callahan. 
The focus of chapter three shifts to a discussion of the principles of medicine.  
The aim is to explore the relationship between the principles of medicine and sustainable 
health care.  In particular, questions arise as to whether the principles of medicine are 
consistent with the ideas of sustainability and whether or not the special problems that 
arise in making a valued institution sustainable may be resolved.  Particular attention is 
paid to the principles of autonomy and justice, as each plays a central role in both 
medicine and sustainability with respect to individual goods versus the good of the many, 
and with regard to justice between current and future generations within a theory of 
sustainable medicine.  Concerns over autonomy focus on the tension between the 
implementation of sustainable medicine as a public health measure and reduced 
autonomy.  To address this tension, I examine literature on inequality and outline the 
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relationship between sustainability, inequality, health, and the environment.  I then argue 
that a reduction of inequality would make medicine more sustainable and help to offset 
the diminishment of autonomy that would likely result from the implementation of 
sustainable medical practices. 
Chapter four develops a positive vision for a theory of sustainable medicine based 
upon John Nolt’s schematic definition of sustainability.  I delineate adequate health care 
from luxury care and develop criteria for determining whether any particular health care 
good or service is sustainable.  Moreover, I outline why there is a baseline of care that 
adequate health care cannot fall below.  This baseline of care is based on the equality of 
opportunity account of health care developed by Norman Daniels.  Finally, I suggest 
options for dealing with desired levels of care and the tension between those desired 
levels and limited resources coupled with burgeoning populations.  
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CHAPTER II  
2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In order to assist in the formulation of a theory of sustainable medicine, it is 
prudent to learn what one can from previous theories of sustainability, particularly the 
existing theories on sustainable medicine.  In the process of envisioning a theory of 
sustainable medicine, I will examine various theories on sustainability and sustainable 
medicine with the intent to critique said theories, take the positive contributions from 
many different ideas of sustainability, and examine how each may help to inform my 
theory of sustainable medicine.  First, I will offer a brief history of the concept of 
sustainability, followed by an examination of some prominent theories of sustainability. 
 
2.2 Literature on Sustainability from Environmental Ethics 
 
Today, sustainability is a trendy buzzword, but our trendy buzzword has hundreds 
of years of history behind it.  There are traces of sustainability found at least as early as 
the eighteenth century, though the concept of sustainability as we currently use it does 
not mature until approximately the early mid-twentieth century.  The idea of 
sustainability arguably begins in 1713.  Hans Carl von Carlowitz, a Saxon tax accountant, 
was worried about the disappearing forests (Mcelroy and van Engelen 2012).  Timber 
was used to support a burgeoning ore industry in Europe, but the forests could not 
support the usage; Carlowitz proposed that the forestry industry should only log trees at 
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the rate at which they grow.  Carlowitz’s single usage of the term occurs in the following 
passage: 
Therefore the highest level of art, science, industry and institutions in this country 
will have to make every effort to achieve conservation and cultivation of wood for 
continuous and sustained utilization [nachhaltende nutzung], because it is an 
indispensable matter, without which a country cannot continue in its esse (Von 
Carlowitz 1732 69). 
Later in the eighteenth century are the better known writings of Thomas Malthus.  His 
Essay on the Principle of Population famously argued that human population growth 
would soon exceed the upper limits of food production.  Again we find recognition of the 
limits of our planet: the idea that, in a finite world, we must be wiser if we want to 
maintain well-being.  The idea that there is a limit to how many people may live on the 
planet later becomes the idea of carrying capacity. 
 The end of the earliest phase of sustainability literature may be marked by the 
writing of John Stuart Mill, who in 1848 wrote about the stationary state.  In book IV 
chapter VI of the “Principles of Political Economy,” Mill argued that unlimited growth 
would not only result in environmental degradation, but also a reduced quality of life.  He 
writes: 
I cannot, therefore, regard the stationary state of capital and wealth with the 
unaffected aversion so generally manifested towards it by political economists of 
the old school.  If the earth must lose that great portion of its pleasantness which it 
owes to things that the unlimited increase of wealth and population would 
extirpate from it, for the mere purpose of enabling it to support a larger, but not a 
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better or a happier population, I sincerely hope, for the sake of posterity, that they 
will be content to be stationary, long before necessity compel them to it (Mill 
1848, IV.6.8). 
Mill keenly observed the danger of growth for the sake of growth at the sacrifice of 
quality of life in his role as a prominent social reformer of the industrial revolution.  His 
worry over growth has only become more relevant with the passage of time. 
In the twentieth century, we find a maturation of the idea of sustainability that 
continues to the present day form.  In the early part of the twentieth century, economists 
began discussing the beginnings of what we would come to talk about as natural capital.  
That is, the notion of capital began to be more broadly defined to include nonmonetary 
forms of equity.  In 1906, Irving Fisher defined capital as "a stock of wealth existing at 
an instant in time” and income as “a flow of services through a period of time" (Fisher 
1906, 52).  In this way, capital began to be defined in ways that were at least potentially 
inclusive of other forms of wealth, like natural or social wealth, even though Fisher does 
not reference such wealth directly.  He does, however, discuss the railroads as a source of 
capital for the country, and the services provided by the railroad as the income they yield 
(Fisher 1906, 53).  This definition is not quite the same thing as we mean by natural 
capital in contemporary terms, where the term natural capital refers to the stock of natural 
resources a specific region, such as a country or state contains.  Definitions of natural 
capital do not come for well over fifty more years.  Some contemporary definitions of 
natural capital include as capital ecosystem services as well, and discussions of natural 
capital often coincide with discussions of ecosystem services (cf. Costanza et. al, 1997). 
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 To find something more focused on natural resources, we might turn to the 
writings of Gifford Pinchot, who advocated a conservation ethic as a means to gain 
wanted production from the land.  Natural resources could be managed, he argued, in 
such a way as to maximize production.  Once taken to market, those resources would 
yield a higher profit year after year than the same natural resources would yield under an 
unmanaged approach.  Pinchot’s version of conservation meant "the greatest good to the 
greatest number for the longest time" (Pinchot 48).   According to Pinchot, the forest 
should be useful to humans, but also sustainably used. 
The recognition that different forms of capital are producers of income insofar as 
they contribute to human well-being is the basis for much of modern sustainability.  
These ideas of sustainability and the way the previous thinkers relate the human position 
to the environment are anthropocentric, or human centered.  Anthropocentric approaches 
couch doing right or wrong to the environment in solely human centered terms.  By 
contrast, nonanthropocentric approaches to environmental ethics use an approach 
centered on nonhumans, though exactly what that means is a matter of intense scrutiny 
due to the variety of nonanthropocentric ethics developed today.  A nonanthropocentric 
ethic has different practical implications than an anthropocentric ethic, largely due to how 
each ethic shapes our attitudes toward nature.  An anthropocentric ethic may undermine 
many of the attitudes toward nature that we wish to encourage, including love, respect, 
and awe (McShane 2007).  Nonanthropocentric ethics may be preferable to 
anthropocentric ethics because they tend to foster an attitude toward nature that is more 
likely to reflect respect, awe, and love for the natural world.   
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The most well-known modern definition of sustainability is from the Bruntland 
Report. This definition differs from the definitions of sustainability discussed so far 
because it concerns sustainable development.  Sustainable development is defined in the 
Bruntland Report as “development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (United Nations 
1987, 16).  There are several virtues to this definition of sustainable development.   
First, the Bruntland definition focuses on needs.  The goal is not to meet the wants 
or desires of the present, but to meet the needs of the present.  These are real needs like 
the need for shelter, food, or water, as opposed to what people sometimes think they 
need, especially in areas with luxury income, i.e. enough income to fulfill the very basic 
needs and spend more money/resources to consume goods fulfilling wants or desires.  
This is perhaps the most important virtue of the Bruntland definition because it allows us 
to draw sharp contrast between luxury development that might be justifiable, e.g. luxury 
development that does not compromise the ability of future generations to meet their 
needs, and luxury development that is not justifiable, e.g. development that clearly does 
compromise the ability of future generations to meet their needs.   
However, even the Bruntland Report’s definition of sustainable development is 
not without criticism.  For our purposes, it is notable in the history of sustainability, but it 
pertains only to development and isn’t meant to be a complete theory of sustainability.  
The following reviews are about current theories of sustainability, beginning with the 
theory of sustainability developed by J. Baird Callicott. 
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2.2.2 J. Baird Callicott 
 
Callicott labels his theory of sustainability as nonanthropocentric.  The label is 
true, insofar as Callicott’s theory is oriented toward ecological conservation.  However, 
there are many principles of ecological conservation that anthropocentrists would have 
little or no disagreement with.  In the end, it may be more accurate to label Callicott’s 
conception of sustainability as ecological rather than strictly nonanthropocentric.  
Callicott’s theory is also monistic, in that all things morally considerable may be 
considered under one theory instead of a plurality of theories.  In particular, Callicott’s 
theory is based on a monistic metaethic and view of moral psychology borrowed from 
Hume, arguing that morality is based on social sentiment (Callicott 1985, 1986, 1987, 
1990).   Callicott’s use of Hume is highly debated, because Hume’s theory of sentiment is 
largely relational (between people) and not directed toward nature.  Although similar to 
Hume’s theory of sentiment, Callicott’s use of that theory is considered divergent from 
the original.  For Callicott, we are part of a single community—the land.  The advantage 
of monism, according to Callicott, is that one avoids different and sometimes conflicting 
duties and obligations that are a result of membership in a plurality of moral communities 
(Callicott 1994). 
Sustainability, as Callicott views it, should be a guiding principle for conservation 
(Callicott and Mumford 1997, 33).  Callicott’s version of sustainability includes both 
ecological and economic factors.  In particular, Callicott situates human activity within 
ecological parameters in an attempt to show how human activity is confined within the 
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finite boundaries of natural limitations, though confining human activities within 
ecological boundaries is common among contemporary theories of sustainability.  
Callicott defines sustainability as a “property of an activity or complex system of 
activities capable of going on and on indefinitely, if not forever” (2010, 59).  In an earlier 
work, Callicott defines sustainability as “meeting human needs without compromising 
the health of ecosystems” (Callicott and Mumford 1997, 32).  The earlier definition is 
still operative in Callicott’s more recent account of sustainability insofar as human usage 
of the environment is constrained by natural limitations.  
Callicott’s definition looks potentially valuable as a definition of sustainability for 
envisioning a sustainable medicine because, if we want to minimize the environmental 
impact of medical practice, then we must necessarily recognize the limitations of the 
natural world.  We must further recognize when those limitations are exceeded and what 
the effects are on human and nonhuman health whenever those limitations are exceeded. 
A large part of achieving the sustainability of certain human activities lies in 
making certain that human activities are not disruptive of ecological processes and 
functions (Callicott 2010, 62).  Callicott sees the human economy as a “subset of the 
economy of nature” (2010, 60).  This is an attempt to recognize that the overriding factor 
of economic stability is nature and that nature has an economy made of natural capital 
exchanged between ecological systems.  Ecosystem services are the foundation for all 
life.  We depend upon these services for food and the raw materials for many different 
products.  If we lack the necessary resources, or if the ecological systems that we depend 
upon collapse, then the human economy collapses.  Clearly, if the human economy is 
dependent upon the natural economy, then the human economy is subsumed within the 
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economy of nature.  If we recognize that the human economy is but a component of the 
natural economy, then wholesale changes in the way we live are called for due to the 
limited amounts and rapid use of natural capital.   
The human economy must depend upon the natural economy, but the dependence 
must be sustainable.  That is, resources from the natural economy cannot be used for the 
human economy at such a pace that the natural economy is compromised.  In order to 
change the harmful nature of our relation to the natural economy, Callicott believes that 
we need to re-envision the good life “from consumerist values to those of association, 
environmental aesthetics, education, and vegetarianism” in order that we may “increase 
standards of living without inevitable adverse impact on the natural environment” (2010, 
59).  Examples of such actions are found in the “reduce, reuse and recycle campaign,” the 
simple living movement, and various environmental activist groups around the globe.   
One promising idea from Callicott for a theory of sustainable medicine involves 
this re-envisioning of the good life as well as a propagation of the re-envisioned good life 
to others.  Any change that is to become permanent must in some way become the “new 
normal,” both legally and culturally.  A propagation of sustainable principles of any sort 
must be passed on to the remainder of the current generation and future generations.  
Otherwise, such change will face even more resistance than it already does or become 
merely temporary.  A re-envisioning of the good life will be necessary if a vision of 
sustainability is to gain widespread adoption, either generally or with particular regard to 
sustainable medicine.  For example, if people continue to expect expensive technological 
solutions to disease, then those expectations will undermine efforts to realize some form 
of sustainable medicine that might focus on cost effective public health projects.   
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  Although Callicott includes future generations as part of his theory to the extent 
that they play a role in the propagation of the good life, he does not find future 
generations morally considerable.  Many environmental philosophers, including myself, 
will find this point highly contestable.  Callicott rejects making future persons the object 
of moral considerability because of the non-identity problem.  The non-identity problem 
concerns future directed acts.  If I perform some act harmful to future people, then it 
seems I commit a moral wrong.  But could I harm that person if my actions cause that 
future person who would otherwise be harmed to not exist?  Normally, our actions are 
only considered harmful to those who exist or will exist.  Callicott applies the non-
identity problem to question whether future generations can be the object of moral 
considerability for sustainability ethics.  He writes,  
If business goes on as usual, my grandson and other members of his generation 
will meet, mate, and have one set of children.  But if radical changes in the human 
economy are effected, with attendant lifestyle changes, my grandson and other 
members of his generation will meet, mate, and have a set of children different 
from the set of children they would have had had business gone on as usual 
(Callicott 2010, 68-69). 
According to Callicott, future generations are indeterminate, and so cannot be the object 
of moral considerability for sustainability ethics.  When Callicott refers to future 
generations as indeterminate, he makes the metaphysical claim that it is not now 
determined who will exist in the future.  The thing that we can most accurately say will 
continue on into the future, and that future generations will also engage in, is human 
activities necessary for the survival of human civilization—including art, literature, 
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science, poetry, philosophy, and music—despite the indeterminacy of exactly who will be 
part of the composition of future generations (Callicott 2010, 69).  
I find it problematic that Callicott argues that future generations cannot be the 
object of moral considerability for sustainability ethics.  The possibility that future 
generations are indeterminate does not necessarily entail that future generations are not 
morally considerable.  It is also unclear that the indeterminacy of an object means that it 
cannot be the basis for sustainability ethics.  First, let’s examine the more general claim 
concerning the moral considerability of future generations.  The idea that the 
indeterminacy of future generations makes it impossible for them to be objects of moral 
considerability is contestable.  The inability to harm future generations, it is thought, rests 
upon the idea that one cannot harm distant future people.  Usually the argument goes 
something like this.  If we change our ways and stop harming the environment, then the 
people in the distant future who we would be harming with environmentally destructive 
behavior will not be born.  Different people will be born into a world with less 
environmental damage.  The people who would be harmed if we do not change our ways 
then have no reason to complain, for if we change our ways they will have no life at all. 
 I find it unclear whether the two options mentioned are the only options.  It is 
clear that we could change our ways, or not.  Another alternative is that we could also 
partially change our ways, and we could change them within the scope of a myriad of 
possibilities.  We could still grant the premise of the argument anyway and question a 
more integral part, however.  The argument’s flaw rests upon the idea that people are 
harmed by an action only if it makes them worse off than they would have been without 
that action (Nolt 2014, 200).  Suppose that we do not change our ways, and so the people 
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who would be born in the distant future are actually born.  Our actions might still harm 
them: weather events resulting from climate change could kill or cripple many of them.  
Increased environmental risk factors for health could harm them.  People may be harmed 
by many of our actions, even though our actions may not make them worse off than they 
would have been without our actions.  That is, the non-identity problem is the product of 
unsound reasoning (Nolt 2014, 200).  
Nonetheless, Callicott sees human activities important to human civilization as 
the object of sustainability.  This raises a natural question—how long might these 
activities endure, and how does the longevity of human activity affect his vision of 
sustainability?  The temporal scale of sustainability, as Callicott argues, is tied to how 
long human activities might continue.  It is not infinity because human activities will not 
continue forever.  We simply cannot be sure how long human activity will continue, in 
the same way that we cannot foresee how long any particular human activity will 
continue.  The most we can say, according to Callicott, is that human activity will 
continue on indefinitely, and so there is no known temporal limit for sustainability 
(Callicott 2010, 69).   
Callicott argues that the proper focus or scope of sustainability is a global scope 
“because of the indistinct ontology of the Earth’s many ecosystems in comparison with 
the robust ontology of the Earth itself considered as a systemic unit” (Callicott 2010, 68).  
Here Callicott is pointing to the interdependencies between ecosystems, how difficult it is 
to know just what those ecosystems are, and how they affect one another.  As I 
understand Callicott, the spatial unit of sustainability must be global first because it 
cannot be any one ecosystem or group of ecosystems.  Not only is it difficult to tell where 
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the boundaries of any particular ecosystem lies, but similar difficulties occur when we 
attempt to determine which ecosystems might be the most relevant for human existence.   
Much can be gleaned from this analysis of Callicott’s vision of sustainability.  
Callicott proposes that sustainability should be global in scope, focusing on an indefinite 
period of time.  Human activity is a possible object of moral considerability for 
sustainability, but, contrary to Callicott’s position, there is little reason to believe that 
future generations are not a good candidate for moral considerabilty as well.  Regardless 
of one’s theory of sustainability, I think Callicott is correct to point out that sustainability 
requires, in some way, a re-envisioning of the good life and a propagation of that re-
envisioned good life; otherwise, efforts focused on sustainability will encounter increased 
opposition from those who disagree with that particular vision of the good life.  Finally, 
because human activity is dependent upon various ecosystems and ecosystem services, 
human activity must operate without compromising the natural economy that supports the 
human economy.  
Next, I’ll consider the influential theory of sustainability developed by Bryan 
Norton.  Norton has long been influential on the topic, but his theory of sustainability is 
particularly notable for its applicability as a decision making resource for communities 
trying to envision a sustainable future. 
 
2.2.3 Bryan Norton   
 
Whereas Callicott advocates a more globally focused idea of sustainability, 
Norton advocates an idea of sustainability focused on individual communities.  Callicott 
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argues that sustainability has an implicit spatial and temporal scale within it due to the 
openness and interdependence of the world’s ecosystems.  Norton’s focus for the spatial 
scale of sustainability is the local community, and is sometimes characterized (as by 
Callicott) as an implicit bioregionalism (Callicott 2010, 62).  Bioregionalism, roughly 
defined, is the notion that naturally defined areas or bioregions should determine 
economic and political boundaries.  Norton’s idea is arguably close to bioregionalism, but 
instead of focusing solely on naturally defined areas as a determinant of political 
boundaries, Norton focuses on individual communities, broadly construed, as the 
appropriate spatial scale for sustainability.  There is no one particular solution for 
achieving sustainability under Norton’s approach—communities and the values they 
decide to instill shape what Norton’s theory of adaptive ecosystem management looks 
like as a theory of sustainability enacted by a community.  Based on Norton’s theory, our 
policies should take the form of adaptive strategies based upon the values of individual 
communities.  This high level of autonomy may allow communities to shape health care 
policy to best suit their needs while attaining some implementation of sustainable 
medicine.  An evaluation of Norton’s philosophy of adaptive ecosystem management and 
its definition of sustainability is necessary to determine whether his philosophy may 
prove useful for the management of not only the relationship of humanity to the 
environment, but also of humanity’s institutions, including medicine.  Given the complex 
considerations necessary, a system of adaptive management may be well suited for 
evaluating and ensuring the long term sustainability of various institutions. 
Norton’s theory is schematic because a schematic approach allows him to account 
for a complex array of variables.  This is accomplished by dividing ecosystem 
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management into tiers representing various considerations that go into ecosystem 
management.  The two tiers (or phases) of Norton’s strategy for adaptive management 
include an action tier and a reflection tier. 1 In the action tier, criteria such as cost benefit 
analysis, safe minimum standard of conservation
2
, or even a maximum sustainable yield 
criterion (and more) are applied to environmental problems.  The reflection tier involves 
judging the impact of certain policies and examines or re-examines courses of action.  
Both tiers alternate depending on whether reflection or action is needed to manage an 
ecosystem at a given time.  Norton observes that theories which include only economic 
concerns and theories which include only ecological concerns are not only too exclusive, 
but faulty.  By focusing on merely one aspect, such theories reduce the complex 
interplays present in considerations of sustainability too far to be practically useful.  Such 
an approach cannot sufficiently appreciate concerns which may more appropriately be 
approached from another, or additional, vantage points.  Norton approaches the problem 
of sustainability in this way in an attempt to address both ecological concerns and 
economic concerns without reducing both to a common metric in order that both types of 
concern receive the appropriate consideration.   
Just how an ecosystem is managed using Norton’s strategy depends on the values 
and preferences of the community managing the ecosystem.  Norton writes that all value 
“is explained by reference to satisfaction of some felt preference of a human individual or 
                                                 
 
1
 Note that in some places Norton refers to these tiers as phases.  On page 167 of Searching for 
Sustainability he writes that he has come to prefer the word “phases” over “tiers.” 
2
 Norton defines a safe minimum standard of conservation as “a presumption of species protection, 
provided that the cost of protection is bearable; species will normally be saved, but interest groups have a 
right to challenge this presumption if important interests are at stake” (2003, 124). 
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by reference to its bearing upon the ideals which exist as elements of a world view 
essential to determinations of considered preferences” (Norton 1984, 134).  Properly 
understood, what emerges is a nuanced view of preferences and values.  A preference is a 
prioritization of one thing or idea over another.  Values are “considered preferences.”  
When considering values, we give some values preference, i.e. prioritize some values 
over other values.  We might value health and prosperity.  When these values are 
considered, we may conclude that prosperity without health is worthless, and so health is 
preferred over prosperity. 
Not all communities will show the same preferences, nor will all communities 
have the same values.  Norton’s theory for how we come to value the environment is 
weakly anthropocentric in the sense that our interactions with the environment, and how 
we formulate sustainability, are still expressions of community values and emerge from 
the process of community deliberation.  For example, with regard to medicine, a 
community may hold a meeting to determine what kinds of care to fully fund; what they 
choose will depend upon their values and how those values are prioritized.  They may so 
value infants that they wish to do everything in their power to save each newborn no 
matter how premature, pouring resources into each life.  Obviously, such resource use 
may lead to a lack of resources in other areas because so many resources are required to 
save severely premature infants.  Resource intensive projects come at the expense of our 
ability to use those resources elsewhere, including but not limited to time, money, and 
facilities, along with the environmental impact of such activity.  How we enact 
sustainability is a matter of considered human preference, and requires making decisions 
on resource use and management. 
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By making his version of sustainability community based, Norton hopes to allow 
each community to specify its own sustainability goals.  This is a good way to ensure that 
the particular contextual nuances of each community are accounted for.  This is a 
significant break from earlier sustainability theory, where one prescription or principle is 
meant to be applied to every situation and every community, as in Callicott’s monistic 
theory.  
We can begin to see the framework around which Norton builds his definition of 
sustainability and what he hopes to accomplish.  So far, Norton  
1. Reduces value to considered human preference (1984, 134). 
2. Holds that every community must create its own sustainability ethic, i.e. each 
community must identify its own sustainability goals (2010, 174-176).   
There is one other important aspect of Norton’s framework that we have yet to explore.  
Norton also 
3. Recognizes that there are scientific constraints regarding our use of natural 
resources, and that these constraints limit the scope of our considered preferences 
(2005, 353). 
Norton’s community approach is based on Edmund Burke’s understanding of a 
society as “’a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who 
are living, those who are dead and those who are to be born’” provided that the continued 
existence of humanity is good or worthwhile (Burke qtd. in Norton 2003, 174).  This 
partnership is concerned with the use of resources as relates to the obligations the present 
has to “perpetuate the conditions necessary for the continuation of the human species and 
its culture” (Norton 2003, 174).  Exactly what actions are permissible must be determined 
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scientifically: easily reversible actions are more permissible, but actions causing wide 
swaths of destruction require great caution and may be impermissible.  For example, 
differing levels of resource use may be permissible depending upon how that resource 
use affects the relevant ecosystems.  However, resource use may need to be reduced or 
may become impermissible if the impact of resource use on the relevant ecosystems 
threatens the integrity of those ecosystems. 
Within this framework, Norton gives a schematic definition of sustainability, 
where sustainability is “a relationship between generations such that earlier generations 
fulfill their individual wants and needs so as not to destroy, or close off, important and 
valued options for future generations” (2005, 363).  That is to say, if one generation lives 
in such a way as to remove options and choices from that generation or generations that 
follow, then that generation is living unsustainably.  If the present generation were to 
gather a specific plant to the point of extinction, then the possible choice of future 
generations to avail themselves of the use of that plant is removed.  Note that the 
definition is still schematic because the valued options and values to be sustained are not 
specified, but are to be determined at the community level. 
We can understand unsustainable living by a community or group of communities 
in the following way.  Norton’s model of sustainability is a contextualist model of 
sustainability, i.e. it interprets the systems impacted by human activities in ecological 
terms (2003, 176).   Within a contextual model of sustainability, individual actions are 
inconsequential unless part of an overall trend, but where trends occur there is a potential 
for intergenerational impact.   
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Unsustainable living by a community or group of communities can be identified 
by trends that limit or destroy important options for future generations.  Norton gives the 
following example: 
Assume… that models showing rapid and accelerating warming of the 
atmosphere in response to a build-up of greenhouse gases were strongly verified, 
and that these models showed increases, 50—100 years in the future, too rapid for 
civilizations to survive.  I believe that most people would say, once more 
scientific uncertainty was removed, that such a scenario would trigger non-
negotiable constraints limiting current behavior (2003, 174-175). 
Non-negotiable constraints on our behavior may come from scientific fact that we learn 
through inquiry.  In the above example, because of the fact that the earth is warming at a 
rate that would make the survival of civilization and the human species unlikely, there are 
non-negotiable constraints on our behavior.  Still, how we operate within those factual 
constraints is a matter of considered preferences pertaining to what values are to be 
sustained, and what options are chosen for sustaining those values.  The obligations come 
from our values, which are considered preferences that are constrained by real contextual 
features, e.g. levels of resource availability.   
One might argue that, while the preservation of value is useful, if we’re really 
worried about leaving future generations better off, then we should focus on leaving 
future generations greater economic wealth.  Greater wealth would increase the options 
available to future generations even in the face of environmental degradation.  For 
example, an economist might point out that while destroying a natural resource like a 
forest eliminates some options, it also increases wealth, which in turn creates new 
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options.  In reply, Norton points out that people in the future may be worse off than we 
are now even if they are wealthier and have more options, if the values specified as 
important to be preserved for future generations are hindered or lost (2005, 364).  Values 
that are most important are likely to be values that are important to preserve 
independently of one’s preferences.  Developing strategies to sustain certain values, 
however, is impossible without first determining what values are to be sustained.  Such 
decisions, though they comprise the heart of Norton’s theory, are up to individual 
communities. 
The benefits of Norton’s definition of sustainability are obvious.  I endeavor to 
discuss only a few of the many virtues Norton’s definition possesses.  First, it avoids one 
pitfall of a general principle of sustainability by allowing communities to decide what 
values are to be preserved instead of dictating those values to the plethora of diverse 
communities with differing concerns.  Communities are arguably best suited for knowing 
how to act sustainably in ways compatible with their local culture.  A community in a 
desert region will face different challenges for sustainability than a community in a 
temperate climate even if both communities are within the same nation and of 
comparable socio-economic demographics. 
Second, in combining ecological and economic considerations at the community 
level, concerns over what values are to be sustained become appropriately complex.  An 
economic solution may lead to negative ecological consequences, while an ecologically 
sound solution may be economically unfeasible.  This cautious approach is often 
necessary to avoid unintended negative consequences when dealing with issues within 
medicine.  Physicians put the patient first, and rightly so.  Nevertheless, putting the 
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patient first may be short-sighted, especially when rationing resources.  All too often 
medical technology is developed and offered with the benefit of the individual patient as 
the sole concern of medicine, while concerns over how the population is affected are 
secondary concerns at most.   
Unfortunately, there are more considerations.  Any technology implemented 
sustainably will have to be evaluated in terms of ecological and economic considerations.  
Whether the community level is the appropriate level for these decisions to occur remains 
a complex issue.  Furthermore, if medicine is to be sustainable, it must also be socially 
sustainable.  Concerns for social sustainability are “concerns over the processes that 
generate social health and well-being now and in the future, and those social institutions 
that facilitate environmental and economic sustainability now and for the future.” 
(Dillard, Dujon, and King 4).  A medicine that is economically and ecologically 
sustainable may still fail if it is not socially sustainable.  One could imagine ecologically 
and economically sound measures taking a toll on the community such that the 
community would no longer be able to sustain their efforts due to exhaustion, lack of 
will, etc. 
If we apply Norton’s model to building a theory of sustainable medicine, we can 
immediately see that, at the very least, communities will have to agree that health is a 
value that must be sustained for posterity.  Otherwise, community A may choose values 
that may undermine the ability of community B to choose health as a value.  For 
example, one community might choose economic growth as a value to be sustained, and 
so medical technology may develop and be implemented very rapidly.  The unfettered 
use of medical technology may actually have ill effects on the economy and the 
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environment like we have experienced today, including rising health care costs and 
contributions to environmental degradation, both of which may harm human health.  The 
question of what kind of health any particular value includes, and whether the health a 
community chooses as a value includes a consideration of environmental or ecological 
health, is debatable.  For example, a community may choose to value health, but only 
insofar as everyone gets “fair innings,” or lives a reasonably long life, after which 
emergency care is not given.  Alternatively, another community might choose to value 
health as vitalists and include complete consideration for the elderly, including all life-
saving treatments and prolonging life whenever possible.  Valuing health in this way is 
likely antithetical to environmental or ecological health because of the resources and 
intervention used to treat every illness that comes along.   
We might also wonder whether health takes priority over other values, and what 
those values might be.  Further, communities will have to decide just how to sustain 
health, dependent upon the relevant contextual factors.  Certain practices or procedures 
might hold more value for one community than another, especially if there are any 
common health problems within a particular community, e.g., high cholesterol levels due 
to genetic factors.  Naturally, these factors will be the ones the community prefers to 
sustain over other factors.   
Despite the advantages of the community-based focus for the formulation of 
sustainability goals within Norton’s model of sustainability, there is a source of great 
tension when Norton’s model is used to inform a theory of sustainable medicine.  What 
medical services a community places value on will vary and may even undermine 
sustainability efforts elsewhere.  Where scarce medical resources are used to the 
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advantage of patients in one community, other patients will want to avail themselves of 
those same resources, even from other communities.  Because of a new influx of patients, 
the use of scarce medical resources may no longer be sustainable. 
Still, one consideration that might fruitfully be taken from Norton’s account of 
sustainability lies in his balancing of economic and ecological concerns.  Balancing 
economic and ecological concerns is certainly an advantage, if it can be done.  Adaptive 
ecosystem management allows for varying metrics to be applied to ecosystems in order to 
manage those ecosystems and balance ecosystemic concerns with economic concerns.  
However, varying metrics may be incomparable to one another.  Incomparability is 
problematic because, if two metrics are incomparable, then there are significant problems 
trying to discuss how the metrics relate to one another and what input each should have 
for the management of an ecosystem.   
Despite similar difficulties, sustainable medicine also requires the successful 
navigation of economic and environmental concerns.  Ecological and economic 
considerations affect the current and future practice of medicine by changing what 
procedures and practices are available and which are not.  For example, there may be a 
plentiful supply of rare earth metals today, but in the future there may be a shortage, 
altering the availability, cost, and frequency of products and services that involve rare 
earth metals.  Such a shortage would impact the ability to produce most modern 
electronics, including durable magnets used in magnetic resonance imaging machines or 
MRI’s. 
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There are several lessons to carry forward toward envisioning a sustainable 
medicine.  The lessons are listed, followed by a brief discussion of the justification for 
each: 
1. Public discussion and prioritization of values as relates to sustainable 
medicine is necessary for the success of implementing sustainability 
initiatives.   
2. There are non-negotiable constraints regarding our use of natural resources. 
 Questions surrounding the discussion of which values should besustained as well 
as how to implement and enforce non-negotiable constraints may fruitfully be considered 
by examining the successes and failures of past public health measures, and finding the 
appropriate strategies.  Within a democracy, it is of the utmost importance to gain popular 
support for laws before, after, or during implementation.  There is no guarantee what 
values will result from a public discussion of value. Many public health measures began 
as unpopular, but later appreciated wide acclaim.  A common thread for the success of 
such measures is facilitating individual voluntary assent to the public health measure—
the gaining of which is a topic of deeper discussion in chapter three. 
 
2.2.4 John Nolt   
 
Nolt’s definition of sustainability is based upon the Brundtland definition, but is 
schematic like Norton’s definition of sustainability.  Nolt’s definition of sustainability is 
also similar to Norton’s definition in that there is choice concerning what value is 
sustained.  Nolt notes that there are many points of agreement between himself and 
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Norton, writing, “He sees, as I do, important advantages in formulating the definition of 
sustainability schematically; and, like me, he holds that these include logical clarification, 
potential agreement on fundamentals despite disagreement on the identity of V, and 
openness to a plurality of quantities to be sustained,” where V is a value to be sustained 
(Nolt 2010, 151). Norton takes values to be considered preferences decided upon by a 
community, and there is no guarantee of what sorts of values the community will choose.  
Nolt notes that what value is to be sustained is often contested, and that values should be 
contested because there is more than one value that ought to be sustained.  The problem 
of how to come to a consensus on what is to be sustained and how to do it is outside the 
scope of his project, as the purpose of his project is to schematize the Bruntland 
definition in such a way as to adapt it to more than just sustainable development, and to 
allow for various instances of particular values to be sustained. 
There are several critical points that Nolt raises in reference to Norton’s schematic 
definition of sustainability.  According to Nolt, Norton’s definition 
1. “implies that sustainability can be achieved without any substantive value 
being sustained, 
2. if some value distinct from adaptive management itself is sustained, the 
definition does not require that it meet any ethical standards, 
3. the definition’s mention of human wants, in addition to needs, reinforces the 
second worry, 
4. the definition rules out direct consideration of non-anthropogenic values, and  
5. it is community-based and hence insufficiently global” (Nolt 2010, 152). 
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I’ll explain these criticisms, in the order listed above, after some commentary 
related to the first point.  First, it seems that the set of environmental debates in which it 
is possible to have the dialogue necessary to determine the values to be sustained is quite 
small.  Nolt quotes an important passage from Norton illuminating the issue.  Norton 
writes: 
All of the models, the analyses, the applications of concepts and methods from the 
various fields of study explored in the book apply only to that subset of 
environmental “solutions” where a community-based, inclusive, deliberative 
process is possible because participants and opponents in a disagreement are 
committed to addressing the situation cooperatively (by seeking consensuses on 
which to act) and deliberatively (by  openly seeking and employing 
environmental science in an adaptive search for cooperative actions and win-win 
solutions) (Norton 2007, 402). 
Several key points are worthy of note.  Community-based initiatives are often easily 
corrupted because the numbers of participants are small and the stakes are sometimes 
high concerning what values are to be sustained.  However, even if we grant that 
corruption will not occur, the set of environmental debates like the one Norton describes 
is quite small, even in liberal democratic states.  In the US, recent political debate is 
fragmented by lobbyists and wedge campaigning, often obfuscating environmental 
problems under the guise of political ideology.  The deliberative process is undermined.  
The mechanism of deliberation that makes democracy possible is also the mechanism 
which slows democracy when political self-interest trumps public minded service.  The 
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point is this: democratic processes and deliberation do not guarantee problem resolution, 
and sometimes worsen problems instead of making them better. 
 For example, there is no guarantee that a consensus ever emerges even if we find 
an ideal situation in which to deliberate what values to sustain.  Democratic deliberation 
and public discourse of various issues like abortion, how to stimulate the growth of a 
troubled economy, and what a just system of health care may look like are all questions 
that have been extensively debated in the public sphere without consensus.  All three of 
these issues are a matter of disagreement because of disagreement over the values that 
inform our views on these issues.  Because of conflicting values, consensus on these 
issues has never emerged.  A consensus may be defined simply as an agreement that most 
of the relevant parties are comfortable with.  Furthermore, there is no guarantee how long 
a consensus might last.  It may change from year to year or from generation to 
generation.  Here we have come to the first criticism listed above.  Through constant 
adaptive management, the only value sure to be sustained is adaptive management (Nolt 
2010, 152-153).   
 Second, there are no ethical standards that adaptive management must meet.  Nolt 
argues that the deliberative democratic process by which communities will choose what 
values to sustain does not automatically yield ethical results.  This seems 
uncontroversially true.  Democracies may enact legislation which sustains some values, 
but those values are not necessarily ethically sound values, e.g. slavery, misogyny, etc.  If 
the people practicing adaptive management are not ethical, then there is no guarantee that 
the results of their deliberation will be ethical (Nolt 2010, 153). 
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 Third, Nolt argues that Norton’s definition and inclusion of human wants 
reinforces the worry that Norton provides no ethical standards that adaptive management 
must meet.  Wants, for Norton, are preferences.  Specifically, the preferences Norton 
includes are considered preferences, to be differentiated from mere preferences.  His 
intent is to avoid the inclusion of just any preference while including preferences of great 
import.  To ensure only important preferences are included as values for adaptive 
ecosystem management, Norton theorizes that the inclusion of preferences must come 
only after democratic deliberation (Norton 2005, 360).  But even our considered 
preferences, Nolt argues, may not be ethical (Nolt 2010, 155). 
 Fourth, there is reason for concern that Norton excludes non-anthropogenic 
values.  Non-anthropogenic values are values that originate not from human interests, but 
from the interests of nonhumans.  If nonanthropogenic values are excluded, then the 
value of all things is judged according to human standards of valuation.  Though Norton 
realizes that some humans do recognize nonanthropogenic values, those values may only 
be considered through the humans that recognize them.  There is no way to directly 
recognize nonanthropogenic values.  Such preference for human values may be 
speciesist, discriminating against other species solely on the basis that they are other 
species.  Nolt’s schematic definition allows for nonanthropogenic instantiations of value 
V, and so has the possibility of being more inclusive than Norton’s definition (Nolt 2010, 
156-157). 
 Finally, Nolt argues that Norton’s community-based system is insufficiently 
global.  According to Nolt, sustainability cannot be defined adequately apart from global 
considerations.  Nolt uses an apt example from Healing Appalachia: Sustainable Living 
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through Appropriate Technology by Paul Gallimore and Al Fritsch, whose authors argue 
that ecotourism should be included in the sustainable economy of Appalachia.  Nolt 
points out some troubling problems with ecotourism, criticizing the idea on the basis that, 
while ecotourism may arguably be good for the economy of the area, it may have a 
negative impact on areas.  He writes:  
There must be a sustainable supply of tourists, who can have or can be sustainably 
stimulated to have, a desire to visit Appalachia.  These tourists must have wealth 
and leisure, provided by a larger, and ultimately global, sustainable economy.  
This economy must provide a sustainable transport system that can move them to, 
from and around Appalachia, and sustainable sources of energy, food, water, 
waste management, and so on, to provide for them en route and during their stay.  
The community cannot simply decide on its own to make ecotourism a 
sustainable value (Nolt 2010, 157). 
Though a community may decide to sustain some value like ecotourism, in a modern 
economy these values have far reaching effects.  These far reaching effects must be taken 
into consideration and will often conflict between communities, undermining the efforts 
at sustainability. 
 Now that we have seen how Nolt’s schematic definition of sustainability differs in 
important ways, a deeper exposition will be useful.  Nolt’s definition is based upon the 
famous Bruntland definition for sustainable development.  Sustainable development is 
defined in the Brundtland definition as "development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (United 
Nations 1987, 16).  This is a good basic starting point for sustainability, but Nolt’s 
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definition of sustainability has wider applicability.  With regard to sustainable medicine, 
Nolt’s definition seems initially promising because it seems that it counts medicine as 
sustainable only if it is adequate according to a reasonable definition of adequacy.  Both 
Nolt’s schematic definition and a possible definition adapted to sustainable health care 
follow. 
According to Nolt,  
 A global generation G achieves the sustainability of value V if and only if 
(1) V is already adequate or G raises it to adequacy, and 
(2) G does not impair the ability of its posterity to maintain the adequacy of V 
(Nolt 2010, 150). 
Adapted to health care, we might propose the following: 
The present global generation achieves sustainable health care if and only if: 
1. Health care needs are already adequately satisfied or the global generation brings 
their satisfaction to adequacy,  and 
2. The global generation does not impair the ability of its posterity to adequately 
meet health care needs. 
Nolt notes that his definition is similar to the Brundtland definition in three ways.  These 
are listed below, followed by a brief explanation. 
1. It makes the criterion of sustainability adequate, not non-declining V, thus 
avoiding both the mentality of ‘always at least as much as before’ and the 
need for a linear ordering of levels of V. 
2. It distinguishes sustainability from sustainedness, i.e., it does not tie a 
generation’s achievement of sustainability to what future generations do, and 
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3. It makes the spatiotemporal unit of sustainability the global generation (2010, 
150). 
There are distinct benefits to avoiding a mindset of ‘always at least as much as 
before.’  There are times when sustaining some value at a level of ‘always at least as 
much as before’ is unsustainable, or, even if that value is sustainable, it may not be right 
to have always at least as much as before.  Consider this mindset applied to health.  
Health is a value which we always strive to attain a level of at least as much as before.  
Maintaining at least as much health as before is unsustainable given current population 
levels, technology levels, and resource consumption in the institutions responsible for 
maintaining high levels of health.  Sustainability, if it is to be successful, must be 
responsive to changes in resource availability and resource use.  Always at least as much 
as before may lead to unsustainable resource use when adhered to for too long.  As long 
as the adequacy of V is maintained, then that value V is maintained, even if V declines.  
 Second, Nolt’s definition distinguishes sustainability from sustainedness.  When 
value V is extended beyond the current generation, we risk some people confusing 
sustainability with sustainedness.  Sustainability requires that V be sustainable now, but 
does not guarantee that V will be sustained far into the future.  Sustainedness, by contrast, 
implies that V will be sustained indefinitely.  Sustainability may be achieved by the 
current generation even if V drops below adequacy in the future.  (Nolt 2010, 147).  The 
responsibility for sustainability, then, is properly placed upon the current generation, yet 
the current generation is not responsible for future sustainability.  To hold them 
responsible for future sustainability would be to confuse sustainability with 
sustainedness. 
  47 
 Third, Nolt’s definition makes the smallest spatiotemporal unit of sustainability 
the global generation.  The spatial dimensions of sustainability are often contested.  Some 
theories talk of communities achieving sustainability; others speak of individuals.  Nolt 
makes the global generation the smallest spatiotemporal unit of sustainability because 
sustainability attained by a group or an individual cannot be considered in isolation—that 
is, even if a community is performing some action sustainably, what they are doing 
cannot be considered sustainable outside of a global context.  Their actions must be 
considered within a global context in order to be sustainable at all.  As the global 
population increases, the ecological footprint that each individual or group may 
sustainably maintain decreases.  The smallest temporal unit of sustainability is a human 
lifetime or a human generation, because sustainability depends on our actions during our 
lifetime (Nolt 2005, 149).  That is, we may achieve sustainability today.  This does not, 
however, guarantee that V will be sustained in the future.  Whether we achieve 
sustainability depends upon what we accomplish during our morally responsible lives, 
making the smallest temporal unit, in the global sense, a human lifetime or generation.  
Nolt concludes that the spatial dimension of sustainability is the global generation 
because sustainability is “relative to, and cannot be understood apart from, global 
population” because the effects of living unsustainably are global effects (2005, 148).   
Though Nolt presents a schematized version of the Brundtland definition, the 
schematization is superior because it allows for various values to be sustained, it clarifies 
the logical structure of the definition, and it allows for a discussion of what value should 
be sustained in a way that is abstracted from political considerations, at least at the outset 
(Nolt 2005, 151).  We could, for example, easily apply Nolt’s definition to many values 
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that we wish to make sustainable.  Some of these values may be the values of human 
institutions.  Manufacturing, health care, and agriculture are all examples of human 
institutions with values that are good candidates for sustainability. 
 As pertains to health care, the advantages listed by Nolt are mirrored when 
applying his schematic definition to health care.  We can immediately see that, according 
to Nolt’s definition, health care must be adequate, but it need not be non-declining.  That 
is, health care under this model of sustainability is properly dynamic, meaning that the 
kind and level of care provided will depend on the relevant contextual considerations 
(while remaining adequate) rather than on sustaining a set level of care.  This is 
advantageous because the levels of care provided, in order to be sustainable, must always 
take into account the economic, social, and natural capital available.  The exception to 
this is, of course, when even minimal standards are beyond our ability to meet.  This 
might occur because resources become too scarce; in such a scenario, the value cannot be 
sustained and sustainability is lost.  On the other hand, we might sustainably raise the 
standard of adequacy due to a wealth of resources, technology, or innovation.   
Furthermore, the responsibility for making health care sustainable lies with the current 
generation.  The current generation cannot be held responsible for whether health care 
remains sustainable indefinitely: they are responsible only for what they can control, e.g. 
events that occur which affect whether medicine is sustainable in the present without 
impairing the ability of future generations to maintain health care as well.   
Fleshing out Nolt’s definition for a more detailed analysis requires a look at some 
background thought.  Already, we noted that, for Nolt, the proper spatial dimension of 
sustainability is the global generation.  This is in direct contrast with Norton’s local, 
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community based approach.  The difference becomes important when we consider the 
ramifications of sustainability actions at the local level and universalize the act across the 
global generation.  The global generation is constantly increasing in size (globally, 
though some regions are decreasing) at the time of this writing.  An increase in 
population requires that the ecological footprint for some will have to shrink in order to 
maintain current demands on the environment.  If we are only concerned with local 
sustainability, then we might lose sight of how our local sustainability practice affects 
others globally.  A community may be sustainable, but the sustainability efforts in one 
community may undermine the sustainability efforts going on elsewhere. 
It is expected that sustainability will not look the same everywhere, even though 
global sustainability is the goal.  In different environments, various practices may be 
sustainable that are not sustainable elsewhere, though the definition of sustainability must 
be inclusive insofar as it must be sustainable for the global generation and the consumer 
culture that dominates.  In making medicine sustainable, we must likewise be concerned 
with the global generation because sustainability is an inherently global concept (recall 
ecotourism in Appalachia). 
 One problem requiring close examination when applying Nolt’s schematic 
definition of sustainability to medicine is why people should be content with adequate 
care when adequate care may not be the best care possible.
3
  If we apply Nolt’s schematic 
definition to health care, we immediately wonder why anyone would want just adequate 
health care.  Indeed, there are few things people value more than their health.  It follows 
                                                 
 
3
 Special thanks are due to John Hardwig for many discussions surrounding this issue. 
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that a great many other values are secondary in comparison to the import that health care 
carries with it.  If so, it seems that what people really want is exceptional health care—
but exceptional health care is not possible to achieve if it must be achieved sustainably 
for the global generation.  Under an ecological conception of sustainability, exceptional 
health care that is not limited in any way by consideration for the environment is 
impermissible.  
The problem with Nolt’s definition as pertains to sustainable medicine is largely 
practical.  Some notion of adequacy must be determined.  With regard to medicine, 
whatever notion of adequacy is used will likely be a hotly debated topic given the history 
of debate within medicine concerning the rationing of care (a related, though not 
identical, topic).  Health care levels will change over time due to resource use, 
innovations toward renewable resources, and the discovery of new resources.  At some 
times, what was once sustainable may become excessive; at this juncture, hard choices 
will have to be made when the topic of sustainability is health care.  Any notion of 
adequacy would be dynamic, not static, due to the various factors that affect what 
resources may be put to use for health care and how those resources may be used, so long 
as adequacy is some minimum standard or higher.  Policy based on this theory must 
reflect this uncertainty, though this concern is perhaps not special to Nolt’s theory, as 
adaptive management techniques like Norton’s face similar policy challenges concerning 
the elasticity of policy with respect to what is sustainable at any given time. 
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2.3 Lessons from Sustainability Literature 
    
By examining the literature on sustainability, we can see the important ways in 
which the study of sustainability has evolved in philosophical conversations.  Each theory 
of sustainability reviewed offers its own promise as the basis for a theory of sustainable 
medicine, yet each has its flaws.  Looking at the history of sustainability, we found that 
early visions of sustainability were anthropocentric and concerned with resource 
consumption as it relates to humans and the ability of humanity to survive or thrive.  
Ecosystems, nonhuman life, and the environment are all considered through the lens of 
their value to humanity.   There is little recognition of invaluable goods, i.e. goods that 
have no monetary valuation, in the earlier versions of sustainability.   
We may also question whether an anthropocentric or nonanthropocentric strategy 
would be beneficial, or if some other way of envisioning a theory of sustainable medicine 
would be maximally useful.  The idea that there is a sharp distinction between 
anthropocentrism or human centered ethics and nonanthropocentrism or non-human 
centered ethics is overblown, insofar as anthropocentrism is often equated with only 
valuing the environment instrumentally.  If the differences between human centered and 
non-human centered approaches are overblown, then a useful strategy for formulating a 
theory of sustainable medicine may be to provide a theory of sustainable medicine that is 
simply ecological, i.e. a theory of sustainable medicine focusing not only on human 
health and medicine but also on ecosystems and their relation to human health.  Such a 
conception of sustainability could technically be anthropocentric, as ecosystems need not 
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be valued independently of human valuation in order to be morally considerable in 
important theory and policy shaping ways. 
In addition, we find that the object of sustainability differs widely between each 
theory.  If a theory of sustainable medicine is to be complete, then it must argue in favor 
of some object of sustainability, or it will lack a cohesive, unifying factor.  Callicott’s 
object of sustainability is human activity, while Norton’s object of sustainability varies 
based on the values of each community.  Nolt’s notion of sustainability focuses on value 
V, while V must be adequate for the global generation: whatever value we use for V is the 
object of sustainability.  Note that even Norton’s community-based approach is global to 
some degree, though insufficiently, insofar as each community everywhere around the 
globe has an obligation to act sustainably.  The choice that each community must make is 
what values will be sustained. These values need not be global, and communities need 
not directly consider nonanthropogenic values.  Callicott’s vision of sustainability is also 
global; human activity, as he understands it, is largely the kind of activity that is required 
for living and going about daily business, regardless of culture.   
In Norton’s defense, it may be that some values are so common to human 
experience that they will obviously be valued in some way by all communities.  Health 
care may be one such value because it is unlikely that future generations will be so free of 
disease and infirmity that they do not need health care.  But perhaps the majority of 
values, and many important values, are not of this enduring type.  Should unenduring 
values be the ones that a community decides to sustain, they may miss the point of 
sustainability altogether—to sustain at some level those things necessary for a decent 
human existence now and into the future. 
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The key pragmatic difference between the theories is, of course, applicability.  
Callicott’s theory remains a viable alternative as a theory of sustainability even though 
his reasons for choosing human activities as the object of sustainability are flawed.  
Despite his flaw in reasoning concerning the non-identity problem, we might still 
consider human activities (essentially those activities that comprise human culture) as the 
object of moral considerability for a theory of sustainability.  However, the emphasis on 
human activity as the object of sustainability is worrisome because it is unclear that the 
activities are what we really want to achieve sustainability for—it is the product of those 
activities.  For example, we may wish to sustain the activity of practicing health care far 
into the future by making it sustainable now and maintaining sustainability, but the 
activity is not really the important object of sustainability.  Rather, the important object is 
of sustainability in such a scenario is health.  If for some reason we cured disease and 
remained healthy until the moment of death, we would be satisfied even though the 
activity of sustaining health was no longer necessary, e.g. practicing health care.   
Norton’s vision of sustainability appears quite strong, but may not be a good 
candidate to model sustainable medicine due to differing community values.  There is no 
guarantee that each community chooses to become sustainable.  Nolt’s theory seems to be 
workable, but finding the level of health care sustainable (as adequate) and figuring out 
how to do that properly places sustainability and what is sustainable out of the abstract 
and into the concrete.  I find the transition into the concrete helpful, yet dangerous, 
because dealing with concrete issues leaves much room for debate.  I now turn attention 
to the main theories of sustainable medicine available at the time of this writing. 
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2.4 Theories of Sustainable Medicine 
    
 It will be useful to evaluate the existing theories of sustainable medicine in 
addition to the literature on sustainability already reviewed.  There are two major works 
on theories of sustainable medicine.  The first I will address is entitled The Ethics of 
Environmentally Responsible Health Care by Andrew Jameton and Jessica Pierce.  The 
second is Daniel Callahan’s book, False Hopes: Overcoming the Obstacles to a 
Sustainable, Affordable Medicine, with additional information included from many of his 
other important works.  Each section includes a synopsis of the work, followed by a 
critique of each.  In particular, the short review given to each will give clues as to how 
the issues and problems highlighted in the previous sustainability literature may be 
mitigated or solved by an existing theory of sustainable medicine.  In turn, we’ll look at 
the remaining issues that might be worked out in a new theory of sustainable medicine. 
 
2.4.2 Andrew Jameton and Jessica Pierce 
    
Jameton and Pierce, in describing their own theory of sustainable medicine, 
identify three key ethical tensions that must be addressed in any model of sustainable 
medicine: the individual versus the whole, sustainability versus social justice, and 
sustainability versus health (Jameton and Pierce 2001, 367).  Any attempt at sustainable 
medicine needs to address these tensions to satisfy both environmental concerns and a 
worthy commitment to patient care.  Their approach may be described as ecological, 
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insofar as they are concerned with the health of ecosystems and environmental 
restoration.   
The first tension, the individual versus the whole, references the problem that 
current medical practice focuses on the well-being of the individual to the detriment of 
other people in need of medical services.  For example, the ethics of health care is deeply 
influenced by the Hippocratic principle of “do no harm.” This is in part a problem of 
resource allocation.  If medicine is to operate within the boundaries of sustainability, then 
considerations like finite resources and the distribution of those resources become 
paramount.  Doctors are sworn to do what is in the best interest of their patient; yet when 
focusing on the individual, the whole is often sacrificed, either because resources have 
been exhausted on individuals or because of other unintended consequences of treating 
individuals such as environmental degradation.  As global environmental concerns 
become a part of health care, then the principle of “do no harm” must be applied not only 
to the patient but also to society in general (as society may be seen as composed of future 
patients) and the environment.   
The second tension, sustainability versus social justice, concerns whether we can 
accomplish both sustainability and justice; if not, then an account of sustainable health 
care will have to demonstrate ways to navigate this tension.  Much of the time, the 
relationship between sustainability and justice centers on questions of distributive justice, 
such as resource allocation.  For example, given limited resources, what might a just 
distribution of those resources look like, and how would we accomplish such a 
distribution?  In addition to distributive justice, there are also concerns pertaining to 
retributive justice, e.g. the just enforcement and implementation of a theory of sustainable 
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medicine.  For example, legislation aimed at making medicine sustainable has to be 
sensitive to differing resource levels.  It would be unjust to outlaw the use of DDT in 
developing nations without some alternative to protect the population from malaria.  
Even if sustainable medicine is implemented justly, there are still concerns relating to 
how to enforce violations of policies stemming from a theory of sustainable medicine and 
what those policies should look like. 
The third tension is sustainability versus health.  This tension concerns the 
problem of balancing environmental concerns with competing concerns about human 
health.  Sustainable health care is often incompatible with the aggressive gains necessary 
to continue the rate of improvement in human health and welfare.  Improvements in 
human welfare often rely on increased standards of living through economic 
improvement, while human health improvement is currently driven by technological 
advancement.  If the industrialized world becomes widely sustainable and health care 
also becomes sustainable, then it is unclear that the current methods employed in the 
improvement of human health and welfare can be continued.  For example, if human 
welfare is improved in the developing world using fossil fuels for developing industry 
and infrastructure, environmental degradation is highly likely to result. 
One alternative for the improvement of human health is given to us by examining 
past public health measures.  Significant gains in health and welfare are recognized as 
sanitation, safer foods, and vaccinations, to name only a few (CDC 2001).  Further gains, 
such as the gains attempted in much of current medicine, often require an intense use of 
resources and wealth, which often result in solutions that are unsustainable.  Jameton and 
Pierce address the key ethical tensions mentioned above by envisioning a theoretically 
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environmentally responsible medicine.  In envisioning an environmentally responsible 
medicine, they avoid trying to form a model of sustainability and focus on sustainable 
solutions to particular problems within the field of medicine.  Their solutions culminate 
in a vision of an ideal health care practice: The Green Health Center (GHC).  The 
preamble to the guidelines for the GHC will give us an idea of the theoretical 
underpinnings of the GHC, while the guiding principles will demonstrate how these 
theoretical underpinnings might be realized. 
 In the preamble to “Ethical Principles and Purpose of a Green Health Center,” 
included in The Ethics of Environmentally Responsible Health Care by Jameton and 
Pierce, there are several statements that articulate their vision of sustainable medicine.   
1. Human well-being is dependent on the intact functioning of earth’s ecological 
systems. 
2. The well-being of individuals and families is dependent on access to health 
care and public health, together with other basic social goods. 
3. The provision of health care for present generations must not undermine the 
ability of ecosystems to support future generations. 
4. Health care practice must reinforce the restoration and maintenance of global 
ecosystems. 
5. The clinical and environmental activities of health care must be conducted 
with fairness and without exploitation (Jameton and Pierce 2004, 63). 
These five statements combined give us an idea of the framework within which Jameton 
and Pierce argue that medicine should operate.  In the preamble, we find statements 
similar to some of those gleaned from a review of the literature on sustainability, namely 
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that human health is dependent upon the health of various ecosystems.  Concerns for 
justice in health care acquisition and distribution are addressed, and there is an attempt to 
balance those concerns over justice in health care with environmental concerns.  By 
seeing how they frame the boundaries within which sustainable medicine should operate, 
we can infer what the basic ideas behind their idea of sustainable medicine are, or what a 
hospital operating under these statements might look like in operation.  Fortunately, we 
don’t have to wonder, because Jameton and Pierce have developed a detailed conception 
of just such an institution. 
  The following principles are meant to guide the operation of the GHC within the 
boundaries of the preamble. These are: 
1. The GHC provides health care in ways that minimize harm to human and 
ecosystem health. 
2. The architecture, organizational design, strategic planning, management, and 
budget of the GHC embody principles of responsibility to nature and future 
generations. 
3. The GHC provides ecologically sustainable therapies and products. 
4. The GHC provides services to patients with any health condition but may limit 
the range of therapies offered in order to reduce ecological impacts and increase 
efficiency. 
5. The GHC engages in a continuous process of assessment and evaluation of its 
services, in light of both patient satisfaction and research into environmentally 
preferable technologies. 
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6. The GHC employs ecologically sound conceptions of health, recovery, and 
rehabilitation. 
7. The GHC encourages staff and patients to live in environmentally sound ways 
that express a modest level of consumption. 
8. The GHC acts as a community educator, advocating principles of sustainability in 
every aspect of life. 
9. The GHC encourages institutions with which it has business and academic 
relations to operate in environmentally responsible ways. 
10. The GHC pays its share of the environmental and social costs of providing health 
care. 
11. The GHC monitors, minimizes, and equalizes environmental risks to GHC 
employees. 
12. The GHC provides high-quality services at a level inexpensive enough that they 
can be made equally available to all (Jameton and Pierce 2004, 63-75). 
There is much to be said for this approach.  Insofar as the GHC operates within 
the parameters set forth in the preamble, it shows in sharp detail what is required of 
health care if it is to become sustainable.  The GHC is designed in theory to at least be 
entirely sustainable, from brick to lab coat, student to resident, scalpel to sick bed.  
Jameton and Pierce also recognize that “a sustainable health perspective recognizes that 
the overall public health gains realizable from health care are limited.  Allocating 
resources to meet the health care needs of individuals should be framed in the context of 
maintaining sustainable public health for all people and ecosystems” (Jameton and Pierce 
2004, 3).   
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The GHC is only part of what Jameton and Pierce have to offer.  Any complete 
analysis of Jameton and Pierce’s model of sustainable medicine will need to focus on and 
evaluate not only the GHC, but also the prescriptions drawn from its guidelines.  Such an 
analysis is outside the scope of our purposes in this chapter and this work as a whole, but 
the GHC remains an excellent example of what kind of health care institution their theory 
might yield if their theory were implemented.  Though merely theoretical, the GHC gives 
ideals to strive for, and, in striving for those ideals, practical considerations arise that 
must be dealt with.  For example, the GHC buys locally whenever possible to reduce 
environmental impact.  But in many areas of the globe, the materials necessary to run the 
GHC are not available locally, and must be shipped; for example, surgical tools may have 
to be imported to developing countries that lack the capacity to manufacture their own.  
Such difficulties illustrate how institutions must be careful of unintended consequences 
pertaining to medical supplies in addition to those pertaining to patient care.  
Furthermore, buying locally will not always be in the best interest of the environment in 
cases where the pollution from local production and energy sources are greater than if the 
products were produced and shipped from elsewhere. 
In summary, Jameton and Pierce advocate environmentally responsible medicine.  
They recognize that major changes to social structures, cultures, and economies are 
necessary in order to make medicine sustainable.  They have a strong grasp of the 
environmental issues at hand and suggest a detail oriented approach to those problems in 
an effort to make health care environmentally sustainable.  For example, they suggest that 
materials and procedures must each be studied to calculate the full cost of the material or 
procedure, including environmental, economic, and social costs.  They also recognize 
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that these studies will have to be done in various regions in order to account for the 
resources, cultures, and needs of those regions.  They recognize that this could result in 
“fewer, more carefully chosen treatments and technologies may be offered, with an eye 
toward serving the key health needs  as many as possible, within global environmental 
constraints” (Jameton and Pierce 2004, 3).  One aspect of Jameton and Pierce’s approach 
that differentiates their approach from Callahan’s is precisely the detail oriented approach 
to various problems and an advocacy of placing sustainability principles at the core of 
bioethics. 
Their work is yet unfinished, however.  The sustainability principles at the core of 
their discussions concerning medical ethics suggest the need for a complete theory of 
sustainable medicine.  Through maintaining a detail oriented stance on the issues, 
Jameton and Pierce offer much to the expert, but less for those uninitiated in philosophy 
and medicine.  They advocate a limitation of autonomy and indicate that coercion may be 
necessary to attain sustainability, but offer no analysis of the implications of such a 
suggestion.  Furthermore, without an explicit account of human health and 
ecosystem/environmental health, their detail oriented approach to the relationship 
between environmental problems and human health seems inadequately justified.   
Still, there are more virtues of their theory than I could list.  Some aspects of their 
theory that seem particularly worthy of carrying forward for inclusion into a vision of 
sustainable medicine are those listed in the preamble to “Ethical Principles of a Green 
Health Center” relisted below for convenience: 
1. Human well-being is dependent on the intact functioning of earth’s ecological 
systems relevant to human well-being.   
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2. The well-being of individuals and families is dependent on access to health 
care and public health, together with other basic social goods. 
3. The provision of health care for present generations must not undermine the 
ability of ecosystems to support future generations. 
4. Health care practice must reinforce the restoration and maintenance of global 
ecosystems. 
Jameton and Pierce note the importance of a well-functioning ecosystem to 
human well-being, but do not make the further distinction that some ecosystems may not 
be important for human well-being at all.  From an anthropocentric standpoint, with 
regard to sustainable medicine, the only ecosystems we need to worry about are those 
that directly affect human health, though we may worry about other ecosystems or parts 
of the environment for aesthetic, scientific, or recreational reasons.  If we view 
ecosystems nonanthropocentrically, then even ecosystems that do not have a direct effect 
on human health are morally considerable and must be factored into how health care is 
provided.  Depending on how far toward a nonanthropocentric view the reader is willing 
to go, a sustainable medicine may look very different—including what ecosystems figure 
into a vision of sustainable medicine.  Though ecosystems may affect one another, and 
are certainly interconnected, it is not true that human well-being depends upon the intact 
functioning of all ecosystems.  Think of the following example.  Some ecosystems are 
more important for human well-being than others.  The Amazon is extremely important 
for human well-being because of its ability to produce oxygen and absorb carbon, but the 
Sahara is less so because the Sahara provides few of the resources and ecosystem services 
on which human well-being depends.  If true, then regardless of what value or kind of 
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value an ecosystem has, some will be more valuable for human well-being than others.  It 
is only on a nonanthropocentric view that all ecosystems matter independent of human 
valuations. 
On the individual level, access to health care is a major issue for sustainable 
health care.  Without access to health care, it is more difficult for individuals to remain 
well over long periods of time (though exceptions do exist).  Public health projects 
arguably create the largest gains in standard of living while being more cost effective 
than individual treatments.  This kind of access to health care is not available everywhere, 
which is a major reason why the health of some societies or cultures ranks much lower 
than that of other places.  Aside from public health, social goods, including social 
interaction and access to goods and services, are necessary for individuals to stay healthy.  
Again, we see that many areas lack these basic necessities of life.  A theory of sustainable 
medicine must include in its considerations the accessibility of these basic necessities in 
order to be a successful model of medicine. 
With respect to the provision of health care, health care for the current generation 
must not undermine the ability of ecosystems to support future generations.  It is easy 
enough to see how this might occur.  A health care practice that may be sustained for the 
current generation might exhaust resources to the point that future generations cannot use 
health care in the same way, making the practice unsustainable.  There is a large debate 
concerning this discussion in sustainability. Depending on your definition of 
sustainability, an action may be sustainable only if future generations have the same 
resources available; alternatively, another approach is that future generations have to be 
left no worse off.  There are many others.  The point to carry forward from Jameton and 
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Pierce is more specific.  Ecosystems must be able to function well so that future 
generations might avail themselves of the resources and ecosystem services from well-
functioning ecosystems to provide for the relevant ecosystem dependent parts of their 
health and health care. This is a slightly different point than the older debate within 
sustainability concerning resources: though ecosystems may provide resources, the chief 
benefit for human well-being that ecosystems offer are ecosystem services like soil 
creation, hydrological cycles, food production, and many more.  Properly understood, 
Jameton and Pierce rightly advocate that health care should not undermine the ability of 
an ecosystem to provide those same services to future generations. 
Lastly, health care must reinforce the restoration and maintenance of global 
ecosystems.  Health care must because health care should not contribute to ecological 
degradation.  Contributing to ecological degradation is antithetical to the ends of 
medicine because, as ecological degradation occurs, the likelihood that individuals living 
in and dependent upon that ecosystem will suffer ill effects from the ecological 
degradation increases as environmentally dependent risk factors for illness increase.  If 
medicine contributes to environmental degradation in ways that affect human health, then 
medicine has an obligation to stop contributing to that degradation simply because of its 
stated ends.  What those contributions may be, and to what extent they affect human 
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2.4.3 Daniel Callahan 
 
Another extensive attempt to describe a sustainable medicine is Daniel Callahan’s 
book, False Hopes: Overcoming the Obstacles to a Sustainable, Affordable Medicine 
(1999).  First, I’ll introduce Callahan by way of a brief summary.  Second, I’ll follow that 
summary with a look at some of Callahan’s key points. 
Callahan does not give a neat definition of sustainability.  Rather, Callahan’s 
notion of sustainability is defined by certain goals and characteristics.  Callahan is trying 
to accomplish two goals in his theory of sustainable medicine: a steady-state medicine 
and the advancement of a view of human life (1999, 23). A steady-state medicine is a 
medicine “in which a socially agreed upon proportion of the GNP is devoted to health 
care, with a set limit; in which technological changes are slow to come and are rigorously 
screened for efficacy and affordability; in which the public for the most part expects only 
slightly incremental improvement in the level and quality of health care; and in which 
further scientific gains are not deployed until earlier ones are fully utilized (Callahan 
1999, 38).  Usually, steady state economics require a steady population.  Oddly, there is 
no explicit discussion of a steady population in Callahan’s work on sustainable medicine, 
although the topic is broached in some detail in other works.  It is sufficient for our 
purposes to note that a stable population is necessary for a steady state medicine insofar 
as it is based upon steady state economics.  Roughly defined, steady state economics is a 
system of economics with a stable or steady population with a slow or no rate of growth, 
featuring a steady or slow growing economy.  Furthermore, Callahan argues that we must 
also abandon our current idea of medical progress in favor of an idea of medical progress 
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that is not dependent almost solely on technology.  Rather, he calls for a medical progress 
dependent upon creating a better life, a higher quality of life.  He gives an in depth 
analysis of technology and whether technology can give us the life it promises, a life that 
is ever more free of disease and suffering.  In the end, Callahan concludes that we often 
celebrate technology before we’ve given justification for its use; if we cannot explain 
how a particular technology will make our life better, then the technology should not be 
used.  Callahan links our addiction to technology to our view of nature as something be 
dominated and argues in favor of accepting some of the limitations that nature puts on us.  
The effect of this acceptance is that some disease will be expected, as will the natural 
biological limits of life.   
According to Callahan, this acceptance creates another view of life: a view of life 
from which a steady-state, sustainable medicine can grow (1999). In his vision of a new 
life, we are critical of medical technology.  A focus on family and community brings 
dying out of the hospital and into the home, resulting in a decreased phase of morbidity at 
the end of life.  There is more responsibility for individual health, but an impetus to 
provide everyone with health care within the confines of his sustainable medicine.  Under 
Callahan’s model, ideally, individuals should voluntarily strive to make medicine more 
sustainable because it is in their own best interest. 
Callahan’s work is motivated by several observations.  First, Callahan observed 
that the rising cost of health care would soon outstrip our ability to pay.  Second, he 
observed that, no matter the gains made in health care, they were never enough.  Third, 
our definition of disease had grown to seemingly include death itself. In our struggle 
against disease, we began to throw more time, energy, and other resources at preventing 
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the “disease” of death.  The resulting extension of the morbid phase of life served only to 
exacerbate the economically unsustainable practices of medicine.  Finally, Callahan 
observed that the struggle against disease and death was a struggle against nature itself—
a rejection of our own fate.  Our attempt to dominate nature had spread to medicine, 
which now sought to dominate nature within the context of the human body.  According 
to Callahan, if medicine is to become sustainable, these issues need addressed.  To this 
end, Callahan develops three keys to sustainable medicine:  
1. To live within the boundaries of nature, to respect and defer to that nature and 
be prepared to learn from it. 
2. To recognize the human need to struggle against those aspects of nature that 
bring pain, illness, a loss of human functions, and a premature death. 
3. To manage that struggle in some affordable way (1999, 130). 
Callahan argues convincingly that the tension between living within the boundaries of 
nature and the human need to struggle against nature will need to be resolved within the 
practical constraints of economic considerations (1999, 130).  To understand why, let’s 
take a look at each step toward the realization of Callahan’s sustainable medicine in turn. 
In order to live within the boundaries of nature, Callahan argues that we must 
recognize that our lives are limited and finite. This change, he argues, is based in taking 
personal responsibility for our own health so that we may still have a good quality of life 
even though it may not be full of high technology fixes and end of life intervention.  
Though not rigidly fixed, our lives follow a natural cycle of life and death within a 
definitive time frame.  Callahan recognizes that, while it is true that we have extended the 
time frame of that natural cycle, all attempts at defeating the cycle ultimately fail.  
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Further, the longer the time frame is extended, the more health problems occur at the end 
of life that need to be solved in order to extend the time frame even further.  With 
increasing cost, we are able to research, and treat these illnesses, but such behavior is not 
sustainable for long. 
Callahan’s second point recognizes the human drive for survival.  Our lives are 
riddled with various illnesses that we overcome, but eventually it will likely be some sort 
of illness that causes our death.  According to Callahan, medicine has struggled to 
dominate those aspects of nature that contribute to and cause human health problems.  
These are aspects of nature that humanity will continue to struggle against because of our 
desire to prevent illness and death.   This struggle, however, may blindly lead us to 
attempt to fight against disease at all costs.  Instead of accepting the natural limitations of 
human life, we seek to treat illness even when the benefits are marginal and the cost is 
high.  Such behavior is at the root of our drive for technological solutions and the 
medicalization of death. 
Finally, Callahan argues that medicine needs to become economically affordable.  
Economic affordability will work in concert with the first two points to make a theory of 
sustainable medicine that works in practice, if Callahan is right.  Our struggle against 
nature must happen within the boundaries of economic affordability.  One way to make 
our struggle against nature economically affordable is a central feature of Callahan’s 
theory: the idea that, though we need to struggle to survive, there’s no reason to treat at 
any cost, or to needlessly prolong life.  Callahan proposes that, as a form of age based 
rationing, we give no more than palliative medical care for serious illness in the elderly 
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(Callahan 1987).  Callahan concedes that age based rationing will not be accepted now, 
but still advocates that medicine should re-evaluate end of life care.  Callahan writes: 
Medical research has found no decisive cures for the diseases of aging, but it has 
found myriad ways of keeping sick and frail people alive longer and longer. 
Unfortunately, that success — if anyone wants to call it that — increases the odds 
for Alzheimer’s. Something or other will get us in the long run, but a great deal of 
money can be spent getting us there (Callahan 2008). 
Technology, economics, and our struggle for survival are recognizably entwined in 
Callahan’s theory.  The catalyst for this change lies with all of us—in taking 
responsibility for our own health, we will request and expect fewer technological fixes, 
we will be more likely to live within the natural boundaries of our lifespan, and our lives 
will, overall, be healthier (Callahan 1999, 173-207).  There is little I have to add to 
Callahan’s analysis, in part because I agree with so much of it.  Time will be more wisely 
spent discussing the parts I disagree with, and it is to these that I turn the discussion. 
 I deeply sympathize with the emphasis on individual change and responsibility 
that we find in Callahan’s model of sustainability.  However, I fear that the emphasis 
places too heavy a burden on the individual.  It is asking the individual to change, but 
gives little extrinsic motivation for making the necessary changes.  Though taking 
personal responsibility for one’s health, expecting less technology (and expecting less to 
be offered), and living within the boundaries of nature may be in each person’s best 
interest, and even society’s interest, it remains unclear how such measures could be 
implemented.  In part, this is because the long term gains from enacting the kind of 
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changes Callahan suggests are less motivating than the short term benefits from 
unsustainable health care.  The old order Amish offer just such an example. 
The old order Amish arguably embody the mindset Callahan espouses more than 
any other culture.  They turn a critical eye toward technology, but remain surrounded by 
technological fixes, modern medicine, and unsustainable choices. It is perhaps not 
surprising, therefore, that they are seeking out unsustainable medicine and learning to live 
with the economic debt such actions create (Girod 2002).  In “A Sustainable Medicine: 
Lessons from the Old Order Amish” Jennifer Girod uses the old order Amish as a 
counterexample to Callahan’s argument, i.e. if we attain the proper mindset, then we will 
make individual choices that are, at the very least, more sustainable than previously.  
According to Girod, the Amish are an example of an entire community or group that are 
comfortable with death and dying in just the ways that Callahan wants us all to be.  They 
resist progress, evaluating each technology individually by virtue of whether it will 
positively affect their community or harm it; then, after deciding, they admit or reject the 
technology. 
Further, each member of the community leaves the community upon reaching 
adulthood and chooses to remain apart from the community or to return.  The lifestyle is 
entirely voluntary.  Still, Girod studies four cases (there are more, but these four are 
particularly poignant) in which each person is between the age of 24 and 29 years old 
from two neighboring church districts in Indiana.  The cases span an eight year period.  In 
each case, the individuals received life-saving or life prolonging organ or bone marrow 
transplants.  These communities are tightly knit—friends and family visit the hospital 
regularly.  When one dies in the community, the community takes care of the family of 
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the deceased for up to a year after death.  They eschew outside health care, depending 
instead upon a principle of Mutual Aid, which states that the community will provide for 
whatever the community needs.  Each member pays into an account for medical care 
each month at the church. 
No other community embodies the kind of mindset that Callahan argues that we 
need for his model of sustainable health care to work better than the old order Amish.  
The Amish live according to a set of rules called the Ordnung.  These rules are the 
blueprint that the Amish swear to live by.  Yet, these four individuals, after choosing to 
remain in the community and follow the Ordnung, received transplants the community 
cannot afford (Girod 35).  As a result, some of the individuals signed up for Medicaid in 
order to pay for their care despite the fact that the community as a whole decided against 
the use of Medicaid because it would erode community bonds.  When one or a few 
members choose to use outside assistance, the assistance historically results in an erosion 
of community bonds.  In other cases, the individuals receiving care left their communities 
with debt which, as a result of their simpler lifestyles and lower income, takes even 
longer to repay than usual.  Their actions are clearly economically and socially 
unsustainable, yet they chose life, in many cases with the blessings and pleadings of their 
loved ones.   
Girod’s example is cause for caution in adopting Callahan’s theory of sustainable 
medicine.  If Callahan fails to address the struggle against nature that he identifies so that 
considerations for human survival do not always (or even quite often) trump 
environmental concerns, then Callahan’s theory may not contain the foundation for the 
implementation of a medicine that is sustainable in the long term.  Considerations for 
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human survival will remain strong, and this seems likely to undermine Callahan’s vision 
of sustainable medicine.  Indeed, while the example of the old order Amish is a problem 
for any theory of sustainable medicine, it would become a crippling problem for any 
theory of sustainable medicine which fails to remove or at least come up with a system 
for dealing with unsustainable yet tempting treatment choices.  As we find in the example 
from the old order Amish, even those people living in a community critical of 
technology, who possess an acceptance of their own mortality, and who have sworn to 
abide by certain rules will break oath and rule in favor of economically unsustainable 
medical treatment if it might stay death a while longer.  The old order Amish show us 
that unless unsustainable choices are not available, there will be a significant temptation 
to choose treatment.  Such temptation undermines the entire enterprise of sustainable 
medicine.  Some way of removing the temptation, or to mitigate the effects of choosing 
such a temptation must be considered. 
There are several aspects of Callahan’s vision of sustainable medicine that are 
indispensable to sustainable medicine.  To conclude my discussion of Callahan, I will list 
the aspects to be used and include a justification for the inclusion of each aspect.  The 
aspects are as follows: 
1. People should take personal responsibility for their health. 
2. People need to learn to live within the boundaries of biological life-spans. 
3. We must maintain the affordability of health care. 
4. We must remain critical of our use of technology in medicine.  
Personal responsibility for health is, in my mind, the starting point for sustainable 
medicine.  Note that earlier I criticized Callahan on this point. My criticism, however, is 
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based upon the weight that Callahan gives to this aspect of sustainable medicine.  
Personal responsibility of health is a starting point for medicine, but it is not a keystone 
for sustainable medicine in the way that Callahan argues.  People who take responsibility 
for their own health will, on the whole, be healthier than those who do not.  Though 
healthier people do not necessarily make health care more affordable, people responsible 
for their own health are conscious enough concerning decisions that affect their health 
that they may also make environmentally sound health care and lifestyle decisions, 
especially in cases where those decisions have a direct effect on their environment.  If 
one takes responsibility for one’s own health, then many health problems will become 
less prevalent, allowing research, resources, and energy to be used elsewhere to help 
make medicine more sustainable.  Furthermore, it is likely that one who feels a deep 
responsibility for their own health will, by extension, not want others to make decisions 
that may be harmful to their health or the health of others.  By avoiding harm to oneself 
and others when making health care decisions, one step is made toward making medicine 
more sustainable.   
For example, there is often pressure put on physicians by patients with viral 
infections to prescribe antibiotics.  If prescribed, the antibiotics are of marginal help to 
the individual.  Antibiotics used in this way may prevent secondary infections by 
bacteria, but will not aid the immune system in defeating a virus.  Moreover, the 
antibiotics may weaken the natural bacteria that are helpful in the daily functioning of the 
body and cause problems in their own right, including new infections.  The potential for 
harm is clear, even before we consider the wider effects on the environment, such as the 
creation of antibiotic resistant bacterial strains (CDC 2014). 
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There also seems good reason to believe that our struggle against the biological 
end of life is not sustainable.  From a monetary standpoint, health care dollars spent on 
marginally beneficial end of life care are misspent.  There is far greater justification to 
use those health care dollars on maximally beneficial care at other stages of life and 
provide excellent palliative care at the end of life.  Emergency care for someone not 
expected to live very long, while laudable in intent, results in unjustifiable consequences.  
Higher health care cost and marginally beneficial procedures are not only bad to perform 
from the standpoint of monetary capital, but of social and environmental capital as well.  
Doctors and nurses must use precious time and effort, while the use of energy and other 
natural resources contributes to waste and environmental degradation.  By studying only 
a few waste streams, researchers found that hospitals in America create 5.9 million tons 
of trash annually and produced 215 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent waste in 
2007 alone (Chung and Meltzer 2009).  Cessation of marginally beneficial care is a start 
to waste reduction. 
While reducing the environmental impact of health care may require the cessation 
of marginally beneficial care, we must also be careful that innovations aimed at reducing 
the environmental impact of health care do not create an environmentally friendly 
medicine that is unaffordable.  Health care that is not environmentally harmful but is 
unnecessarily burdensome to the population due to cost is also unjustifiable.  Though we 
could enter a debate over whether health care is now already unjustifiably expensive or 
not, everyone can agree that health care must remain affordable.  Just what that means, 
and how to pay for it, is a complex matter that is somewhat outside the scope of this 
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work.  Aspects of making health care economically sustainable for the present and future 
generations will be part of later discussions. 
Finally, it is necessary to foster the thoughtful use of technology.  When using 
technology thoughtfully, medical professionals and, to a lesser extent, patients need to 
ask whether the technology in question will be used wisely.  That is, they might ask, “Do 
alternatives exist?” and “Will this technology cause undue harm to the environment 
despite the benefits to humanity?”  The effects of using technology thoughtfully are at 
least beneficial insofar as technology which is marginally beneficial should not be 
included for widespread medical use.  Furthermore, technology that causes great harm to 
the environment should be closely scrutinized to determine whether the aggregate effects 
of its use will cause more harm than good (at least on a consequentialist view), or make 
the use of the technology marginally beneficial.  One example of a technology or 
application of technology that might be considered marginally beneficial because of 
environmental impact is a historical example that everyone is familiar with, namely, the 
use of mercury in medical equipment.  According to a recent EPA report, the incineration 
of contaminated medical waste is responsible for 13% of all atmospheric mercury (EPA 
2002, 2).  As a result, hospitals are actively looking for alternatives to equipment 
containing mercury.   
 
2.5 Contributions to Sustainable Medicine from the Literature 
    
 In reviewing a variety of theories on sustainability and sustainable medicine, the 
careful reader will note that each theory has at least some possible contribution to make 
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toward envisioning a theory of sustainable medicine.  By way of summary, here are the 
lessons being carried forward from the two theories of sustainable medicine: 
From Jameton and Pierce: 
1. Human well-being is dependent on the intact functioning of earth’s ecological 
systems relevant to human well-being.   
2. The well-being of individuals and families is dependent on access to health 
care and public health, together with other basic social goods. 
3. The provision of health care for present generations must not undermine the 
ability of ecosystems to support future generations. 
4. Health care practice must reinforce the restoration and maintenance of global 
ecosystems. 
From Callahan: 
5.  People should take personal responsibility for their health. 
6. People need to learn to live within the boundaries of biological life-spans. 
7. We must maintain the affordability of health care. 
8. We must remain critical of our use of technology in medicine.  
The points above and at the end of the section on sustainability literature are 
essential to envisioning a theory of sustainable medicine.  They are detailed bullet points 
for addressing the difficulties in making medicine sustainable.  In order to be successful, 
a theory of sustainable medicine must take into account economic, ecological, and social 
factors that influence sustainability.  Furthermore, we must address concerns for justice.  
Both theories of sustainable medicine address concerns over justice in different ways. For 
Jameton and Pierce, justice in health care focuses on just access and distribution, as 
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applied to particular cases, institution by institution rather than a broad, across the board 
prescription or principle.  For Callahan, justice is largely contractual: once sustainable 
measures are agreed upon, then those outliers that are unfortunately stricken with disease 
that cannot be sustainably treated are indeed unfortunate, but their denial of care is not 
unjust because the re-envisioning of the good life he advocates allows people to 
voluntarily desire this mode of medicine. 
 We must determine what levels of care are appropriate given concerns of justice 
and the boundaries created by finite resources and other natural limitations on human 
activity, including ecological health, population, and concerns for future generations.  In 
order to decide what levels of care are appropriate, we must agree on a definition of 
health that includes within that definition a recognition that human health is dependent on 
ecological health.  We must also recognize and try to fix some of the social factors that 
contribute to the deleterious relationship health care has with the environment. This effort 
begins with our definition of health.   
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CHAPTER III 
3.1 SUSTAINABILITY AND THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICINE 
 
Unless otherwise noted, this discussion remains focused within the confines of 
long term anthropocentric environmental concerns, including moral consideration for 
future persons, i.e. intergenerational ethics—especially as pertains to sustainability and 
more particularly, sustainable medicine.  In this chapter, I discuss the principles of 
medicine in relation to sustainability and by extension, sustainable medicine.  Medical 
professionals may worry that sustainability is not compatible with medicine, because the 
principles by which medicine operates seem to be in tension with the goals of 
sustainability.  In order for medicine to be compatible with sustainability, there must be 
consistency between the principles of medicine and sustainability.  Each principle is 
discussed, though some require more detail than others.  Crucial to understanding the 
principles of medicine and their link to sustainability is the link between public health 
and sustainability.  Environmental risk factors for health affect the health of the 
population.  These risk factors will be, in general, higher without sustainability than if we 
achieve some level of sustainability because the environmental determinants of those risk 
factors will trend toward fewer negative impacts on health.  Two principles of medicine 
require extra attention.  In particular, there is great tension between autonomy and public 
health measures, meaning that we must examine whether sustainability is compatible 
with autonomy.  The second principle is justice.  Concerns over justice in medicine are 
often concerned with just distribution, but not often concerned with the transgenerational 
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distribution of goods.  Our discussion begins with a brief introduction to the principles of 
medicine. 
Medicine already has strong moral traditions.  The Hippocratic Oath, though 
partially inapplicable to the practice of medicine in today’s society, still encompasses the 
spirit of medical practice; in short, to do no harm; to do good whenever possible; and 
some measures to ensure standards of professionalism (North 2002).  Today the 
Hippocratic Oath has evolved into the code of ethics endorsed by the American Medical 
Association.  The American Medical Association has no form of the oath, but instead 
focuses on the ethical practice of medicine in modern society.  Their code of ethics, 
however informative, is quite lengthy, and is meant as a practical guide instead of an 
explication of theoretical underpinnings.  Perhaps the best theory for the practice of 
medicine is the principles of biomedical ethics.   
The most well-known and widely accepted principles of medical ethics were 
developed by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress.  There are four principles: 
autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice.  Each of the four principles may 
override the others, depending on the situation.  For example, under most circumstances, 
nonmaleficence is given priority as a primary principle of medical ethics.  It may become 
secondary, however, in a situation where causing some harm is necessary to save the life 
of the patient, such as in cases of surgery or chemotherapy.  In cases of public health, 
public health measures might decrease autonomy but be beneficent measures overall in 
spite of the harm caused to some affected by the public health measure, where public 
health “refers to all organized measures (whether public or private) to prevent disease, 
promote health, and prolong life among the population as a whole” (WHO 2014).   
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3.2 Autonomy 
 
In medical practice, respect for autonomy is often referred to as respect for 
persons.  The two phrases are used as synonyms for one another.  One famous report, the 
Belmont Report, was published in the 1970’s in response to previous abuses of human 
test subjects, including the infamous Tuskegee syphilis experiments. The report is meant 
to provide greater protection for human test subjects in an attempt to prevent a recurrence 
of past test subject abuses.  The report outlines ethical guidelines for human research and 
identifies three principles by which all human research should be guided: respect for 
persons, beneficence, and justice.  Respect for persons, as outlined in the Belmont Report 
part B, requires that patient autonomy be respected and that patients with diminished 
autonomy be offered special protection (Belmont 1979).  Autonomy is defined as “the 
personal rule of the self that is free from both controlling interferences by others and 
from certain limitations such as an inadequate understanding that prevent meaningful 
choice” (Beauchamp and Childress 99). Respect accords patients the right to make their 
own decisions concerning care and treatment.   
At first glance, autonomy seems problematic for envisioning a sustainable 
medicine, if only because any vision of sustainable medicine must respect the limitations 
of finite resources; in turn, these limitations will limit the choices available to patients, 
perhaps in ways that their choices were not limited previously.  From an anthropocentric 
standpoint, short term resource limitations are of little worry so long as there is enough 
for the near future.  However, on the long view, resource limitations significantly restrict 
the choices that can be made.  Even if one took the stance that the environment is only 
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valuable insofar as it is useful to humans, if we are worried about future generations, then 
resource limitations must be taken into account.  We already worry about resource 
allocation in medicine on a daily basis, even in rich nations. The problem is far worse for 
poorer nations where 
 
there may not be enough resources to give even a minimal amount 
of care.  For these reasons, autonomy seems diminished under a theory of sustainable 
medicine relative to autonomy as found under the practice of medicine that does not take 
resource limitations into account.  The justifications for restricting autonomy must be 
very strong to overcome objections to restricting autonomy, especially since some 
restrictions on patient autonomy pertaining to medicine may result in the deaths of 
patients that would otherwise be saved.  We could easily envision patient requests for a 
life saving heart transplant at seventy years of age, and deeply sympathize with their 
situation.  We already question the wisdom of approving such a procedure; but if the 
individual is healthy, there is a chance they receive the transplant.  Under sustainable 
medicine, there is little chance one receives the transplant due to the comparably small 
increase in life quality that that a transplant provides for an elderly individual.  The same 
transplant done in a younger individual probably yields many more years of high life 
quality compared to an elderly patient.  Spending limited resources on an elderly patient 
may then not be a viable option if we are to use our resources wisely.  Elderly patients 
have worse health outcomes after transplants, and can expect to live fewer years at a 
lower quality of life than younger patients.  Depending on the level of care sustainable, 
transplants may not be permissible at all for many countries where basic health needs are 
not currently met. 
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Worth noting, however, is that autonomy has not always been an overriding 
concern of biomedical ethics.  That is, the importance of autonomy is perhaps as widely 
debated as the definition of the term.  While autonomy was still important in the medical 
profession a hundred years ago, it did not garner the attention that it does today or even in 
the last 50 years, especially given the attention to autonomy in literature surrounding 
informed consent, competency, and the move away from a paternalistic physician/patient 
relationship.  One might argue that medical practice in the West is too worried about 
patient autonomy, especially since patients are generally more informed than in the past 
and doctors are less paternalistic in comparison to the paternalistic practice of medicine 
that dominated medicine before the last fifty years (approximately).  Other cultures, 
especially in the East, have not always viewed autonomy as an overriding concern for 
medical ethics.  In his most recent work, John W. Traphagan argues that autonomy 
should not be a foundational principle of common morality because our idea of autonomy 
is greatly influenced by culture and thus cannot be part of a common morality (Traphagan 
2013). 
Feminist philosophers have long taken issue with the idea of autonomy used in 
Beauchamp and Childress.  According to a summary of these critiques written by 
feminist philosopher Carolyn Ells, a common critique is that the concept of persons 
implied by Beauchamp and Childress’ conception of autonomy is false because it 
overemphasizes independence and rationality.  Further, feminists argue that the effects of 
Beauchamp and Childress’ conception of autonomy are pernicious in that those effects 
are harmful to medical theory and society because they narrow our concept of persons 
and the moral life.  These critiques are damaging and worthy of note because, in using 
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Beauchamp and Childress’ conception of autonomy, one should be aware that this 
conception of autonomy is only one among many and may not be as “common” as 
Beauchamp and Childress argue.  Theirs is the dominant conception of autonomy, and so 
it is theirs to which I apply my analysis, though not without reservation.  It is outside the 
scope of this project to pursue these concerns in detail.  I leave that debate for dedicated 
spaces intended to give it proper attention.  I will, however, sketch some alternative 
conceptions of autonomy to see how they differ in important ways from Beauchamp and 
Childress’ conception. 
Conceptions of autonomy vary within moral and political philosophy.  Instead of 
noting the variations in such a broad spectrum of literature, it is beneficial to examine 
competing notions within biomedical ethics.  Joel Feinberg’s excellent work Harm to Self 
identifies four different conceptions of autonomy, combinations of which may be used to 
form robust conceptions of autonomy.  They are the capacity for self-government, the 
actual condition of self government, an ideal of character derived from the idea of self 
government, and the “sovereign authority” to govern oneself (Feinberg 28).  These 
categories of autonomy may have many particular variant conceptions of autonomy that 
fall within them, and it should be noted that Feinberg does not exclude the possibility that 
other categories may exist. 
Autonomy as the capacity for self government refers to the idea that one is 
competent to govern oneself.  This concept of autonomy depends in part upon the 
capability to determine one’s future, which we possess in varying degrees from person to 
person.  The variance of capability is influenced by many things, including but not 
limited to our ability to reason, to understand, and our personal values.  Competence to 
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govern oneself is determined in part by the circumstance under consideration; while an 
Alzheimer’s patient is entirely competent to decide what television show they would like 
to watch or whether they would like to go for a walk, their competence to decide who 
should have power of attorney over their estate is questionable and a matter of intense 
scrutiny.  This aspect of autonomy is widely recognized within biomedical ethics and is 
an explicit part of Beauchamp and Childress’ conception, which incorporates the first, 
second, and fourth conceptions of autonomy discussed by Feinberg. 
As the actual condition of self government, autonomy refers to being in the state 
of affairs where one can govern oneself.  A person could have the capacity to self-govern 
and the right to do so, but still lack the condition to self-govern, as in situations where 
one person is slave to another (Feinberg 31).  We aspire to autonomy as an ideal because 
it is never perfect; there are always outside restrictions on the condition.  This aspect of 
autonomy is recognized by Beauchamp and Childress and commonly within biomedical 
ethics because it is widely recognized that there are conditions under which one may be 
unable to exercise their capacity for autonomy, e.g. when one is denied a procedure 
because of insurance, or when an adult makes decisions for a child. 
Feinberg defines autonomy as an ideal of character to strive for.  It is not the 
complete moral ideal, but is part of what would make an exemplary moral character.  
Feinberg notes that autonomy cannot be the complete moral ideal of character because 
autonomy can exist as part of one’s moral character along with serious moral failings.  
Importantly, Feinberg argues that as a person is partly made up of experiences as a social 
animal, discussing autonomy in such an abstract, individualistic sense threatens to 
undermine the idea that one never exists outside of an ongoing community of one sort or 
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another.  The ideal is “that of an authentic individual whose self-determination is as 
complete as is consistent with the requirement that he is, of course, a member of a 
community” (Feinberg 47).  This conception of autonomy is very different than 
Beauchamp and Childress’ conception because of both the virtue theoretical aspects and 
because of the explicit recognition of the autonomous individual as a member of a 
community.   
As sovereign authority, autonomy is conceived as a right to self-determination.  
This is often the sense of autonomy used by biomedical ethicists in discussions of 
obligation to patients.  The obligation to respect patient autonomy is a recognition of the 
patient as sovereign authority of their body and life plan.  This is the kind of autonomy 
advocated by Beauchamp and Childress, though elements between the different 
conceptions of autonomy often overlap.  Even a conception that focuses on people and 
the right to self-determination in biomedical ethics must allow for considerations of 
patient competency and, at times, justified paternalistic overriding of that autonomy.   
In another alternative conception of autonomy, Jameton and Pierce advocate a 
notion of autonomy that recognizes that humanity is a part of a wider moral community, 
including the surrounding biotic community.  They write, “With a shift in thinking, 
personal choice can be understood in the context of belonging to and feeling responsible 
to the biological as well as the human community” (Jameton and Pierce 2004, 119).  
When thinking about autonomy this way, it is easy to see how our obligations to the 
community limit our autonomy as they do in any community, but with greater regard for 
the environment because all creatures are considered “members of a moral community 
who share common ends” (Jameton and Pierce 2004, 119).  Under this view, autonomy 
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may be restricted due to obligations owed to each other rather than merely through 
coercive policy measures—though it should be recognized that owing obligations to each 
other may itself give rise to coercive policies.  This sounds a bit more promising, and will 
be revisited after an evaluation of more common notions of autonomy. 
Nonetheless, autonomy enjoys a prominent place in bioethical thought.  One’s 
autonomy is diminished if one is unable to make decisions for oneself.  Children, the 
mentally challenged, and people with Alzheimer’s or dementia are examples (Beauchamp 
and Childress 100-105).
4
  This diminishment of autonomy may also be a result the 
patient’s volition, as when one signs over power of attorney to some close, trusted 
individual.  At other times, however, the diminishment of autonomy is a result of 
paternalistic intervention by the clinician because the clinician may deem the patient 
incompetent.  Usually, the justification for paternalistic intervention is based upon the 
prevention of harm (nonmaleficence), as in a case where the physician is convinced 
someone is trying to harm themselves or another, or in the name of benefitting the patient 
(beneficence), where a patient is not making decisions in their best interest.  These are 
hotly debated topics.  But for present purposes it is enough to be aware of the debate.  
The real point is to illustrate the importance of autonomy in medical ethics in the West 
compared to other moral and ethical traditions. 
The implementation of a vision of sustainable medicine requires good justification 
if it is restrictive of autonomy.  The justifications must be stronger, however, if autonomy 
                                                 
 
4
 There is significant debate over when each of these classes of people may be considered competent and 
capable of informed consent in bioethics literature.  Each has exceptions and borderline cases, with 
strategies to determine competency—a precursor to determining whether someone can act 
autonomously on Beauchamp & Childress’ definition. 
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is a dominant part of one’s moral tradition.  Sustainable medicine may violate the 
autonomy of an individual who does not consent to sustainable medicine of their own 
volition while competent.  For example, someone may wish to have a bacterial infection 
treated with antibiotics so that it heals more quickly, but because such treatment 
encourages antibiotic resistance, doing so would be environmentally irresponsible if the 
wound would heal well without the use of antibiotics.  Sustainable medicine is properly 
understood as a public health measure, affecting millions (or, if global, billions) of 
people.  Recall that WHO defines public health as “all organized measures (whether 
public or private) to prevent disease, promote health, and prolong life among the 
population as a whole” (WHO 2014).   
One promising way to think about issues at the intersection of public health and 
autonomy is suggested by David Buchanan.  He argues that public health should seek to 
expand/enhance individual autonomy by improving population health instead of seeking 
to diminish autonomy, which often occurs with legislation prohibiting actions.  In order 
to accomplish this, Buchanan argues that public health should focus on clarifying 
principles of justice rather than focusing on the justification of paternalistic interventions.  
In clarifying principles of justice, appeals to concepts of justice may be made instead of 
justifying paternalistic public health policy.  Through discourse over ideals of justice, we 
may determine what capabilities citizens value that they would like public health to strive 
for—essentially, showing what the will of the people would be, and informing 
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subsequent public health policy.
5
  The appeals to justice that we could make after such 
discourse would be verifiably in line with public values, at least in theory.  As a reason 
against justifications for coercive public health measure, Buchanan argues that 
empirically, there is good reason to suggest that public health efforts would be best spent 
expanding individual autonomy to improve population health by enhancing public 
discourse concerning public health issues and how to address them.  For example, when 
implementing a public health measure, resistance and noncompliance is often the result 
of paternalistic implementation.  But in terms of justifying public health measures like 
sustainable medicine, if we can find ways to expand individual autonomy through 
implementation, then resistance and noncompliance will be lessened, the measures will 
achieve greater success, and public health will improve (Buchanan 2008).  To achieve 
this goal, Buchanan recommends that public health open public discussions aimed at 
“clarifying the role and character of justice in America today” (Buchanan 18).     
Buchanan goes on to discuss the justifications for public health measures, first 
identifying three common lines of argument in favor of paternalistic interventions; they 
are “appeals to voluntary and informed consent, weak paternalism, and utilitarianism” 
(Buchanan 15). Paternalism is defined by Beauchamp and Childress as “the intentional 
overriding of one person’s preferences or actions by another person, where the person 
who overrides justifies this action by appeal to the goal of benefitting or of preventing or 
mitigating harm to the person whose preferences or actions are overridden” (Beauchamp 
and Childress 208). One obvious issue arises when applying this definition of paternalism 
                                                 
 
5
 See Figure 1 for the list Buchanan includes of valued capabilities. All figures and tables are located in the 
Appendix.. 
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to cases of sustainable medicine.  In particular, the definition involves an act of 
paternalism with respect to an individual, not an aggregate of individuals like an entire 
population.  Sustainable medicine, however, is heavily concerned with populations.  In 
the case of sustainable medicine, an institution, government, or other authority may enact 
sustainable medicine or some other public health measure paternalistically if they act in 
the best interest of the population because of the effects of that particular public health 
measure on an individual.  We may define paternalism toward a population similarly to 
paternalism to an individual; paternalism toward a population is the intentional overriding 
of some individual preferences within the population by another individual or governing 
body; where the individual or governing body who overrides preference justifies this 
action by appeal to the goal of benefitting or of preventing or mitigating harm to the 
target population with at least some individuals whose preferences are overridden. We 
may understand a population’s preference to be a preference held by the majority of the 
population in question after a reasoned consideration of available options.   
Paternalism may be divided into two camps: soft (or as Buchanan puts it, weak) 
paternalism and hard paternalism.  Soft paternalism is rather uncontroversial compared to 
hard paternalism.  Beauchamp and Childress write, “In soft paternalism, an agent 
intervenes in the life of another person on grounds of beneficence or nonmaleficence with 
the goal of preventing substantially nonvoluntary conduct.  Substantially nonvoluntary 
actions include cases such as poorly informed consent or refusal, severe depression… and 
addiction that prevents free choice and action” (Beauchamp and Childress 209-210).  By 
contrast, “in hard paternalism the intended beneficiary does not accept the values used to 
define his or her own best interests.  Hard (or strong) paternalism reflects the benefactor’s 
  90 
conception of best interests and may ban, prescribe, or regulate conduct in ways that 
manipulate individuals’ actions to secure the benefactor’s intended result” (Beauchamp 
and Childress 210).  If implemented, sustainable medicine may manifest as a case of hard 
paternalism toward the current generation.  Because many people reject the value of 
sustainability, their consent will not be given.  Sustainability measures running contrary 
to the consent or values of any individual, and especially many individuals, require 
justification.  What follows is an examination of three justifications that, according to 
Buchanan, are common justifications for public health measures.  I discuss each as a 
justification for sustainable medicine, understanding sustainable medicine as a public 
health measure.  The aim is to examine Buchanan’s ideas for enhancing autonomy in the 
application of public health measures and evaluate their applicability to sustainable 
medicine since, as a public health measure, sustainable medicine may be implemented 
paternalistically, or possibly, nonpaternalistically. 
 The first justification for public health intervention that Buchanan lists is that 
public health intervention is justified when individuals provide voluntary, uncoerced, 
informed consent for some treatment (Buchanan 16).  Paternalism is not necessary in 
such a case at all, so there is no conflict with autonomy such as we find in other 
justifications for public health measures.  In cases of behavior that poses a health risk, 
medical professionals often feel justified in intervening.  This may occur some of the 
time for procedures done within a system of sustainable medicine.  However, such a 
scenario is unlikely to work to implement any vision of sustainable medicine because of 
how pervasive and far reaching the changes necessary to make medicine sustainable are. 
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Buchanan writes, “On another front, public health professionals have, in general, 
implicitly assumed a form of weak paternalism. Weak paternalists take the position that 
interventions to prevent people from harming themselves are justified when there is a 
defect in their decision making that leads them to engage in self-harming activity” (in 
contrast to strong paternalists, who maintain that interfering is justified even when the 
decision to participate in unhealthy behavior is fully voluntary and totally unimpaired) 
(Buchanan 17).  Such interventions do involve interfering with an individual’s autonomy 
and are often justified on utilitarian grounds.  Expanding on this idea,  
Public health has long been associated with the utilitarian school of moral 
philosophy. Utilitarianism is essentially consequentialist in analyzing issues, 
holding that the most ethically reasonable course of action is that which produces 
the greatest good for the greatest number. Thus, the most common criticism of 
utilitarianism is that the ends are used to justify the means. This school of thought 
frequently leads into protracted debates about the apparent costs and benefits of 
an intervention (e.g., does smoking cessation truly save the government money?) 
(Buchanan 17). 
Sustainable medicine would be good for the environment and, by virtue of ecological 
interdependencies, good for humans as well.  It would not be good for every individual, 
however.  Sustainable medicine may prohibit some actions deemed unsustainable, and so 
prevent someone from receiving some forms of care that they would otherwise receive.  
Importantly, sustainable medicine would still be in the best interest of most people 
despite unfortunate individual consequences; the case for sustainable medicine becomes 
stronger if we consider what is also in the interest of future generations.   
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 Given strong arguments against paternalistic intervention that may diminish 
autonomy we should consider options that are autonomy enhancing.  Understood 
properly, Buchanan argues that public health measures may be autonomy enhancing 
rather than autonomy diminishing.  He recognizes the need for a public dialogue based 
upon mutual responsibility toward the goal of building consensus on public health issues.  
Autonomy enhancement is possible for the majority of people through measures aimed at 
decreasing social inequalities, though admittedly there would be winners and losers in 
such a scenario over the short-term.  In the long-term, research suggests that the reduction 
of inequality may be beneficial to everyone, even those who initially sacrifice so that 
inequalities may be reduced (Woodward and Kawachi 2000).  If the reduction of 
inequality is at least consistent with the ability to pursue opportunities that citizens value, 
then reducing inequality is not only a valuable public health measure but a wish of the 
people that may be implemented nonpaternalistically.  To see why, we must better 
understand how inequality, health, and autonomy relate to one another within society. 
Research strongly supports the view that a reduction in social inequality results in 
better health outcomes for the population in which the inequality was reduced regardless 
of whether one is rich or poor (Woodward and Kawachi, 2000; Deaton 2003;  
Subramanian and Kawachi 2004).  Reduced social inequality may also result in a greater 
range of options for one to choose from, according to Norman Daniels’ work on fair 
equality of opportunity (2001). This again is true whether you are poor or nonpoor.  We 
may wonder whether there is no increase in opportunity because of increased competition 
for the same opportunities.  However, competition for opportunity does not decrease the 
range of opportunity available.  Daniels’ account focuses on species-typical functioning, 
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and argues that if it is absent then many opportunities are unavailable.  Loosely speaking, 
this is a reduction in that individual’s autonomy.  In support of my claims, current 
research supports the idea that a reduction of social inequality requires an increase in 
social mobility (OECD 2010).  If increased social equality results in greater social 
mobility, then as social equality increases, more opportunities (jobs, training, 
entrepreneurism, etc.) are available; such opportunities are just the sort that species’ 
typical functioning also assures one the chance to pursue, and are the opportunities that 
Daniels argues requires a decent minimum of care.
6
 Social mobility is often defined as a 
measure of how likely one is “to move up or down the distribution of incomes, earnings, 
and wealth, comparing people and families relative to one another across time” (Working 
America 139).  Furthermore, as Figure 1 illustrates, the reduction of many inequalities is 
justifiable by the fact that citizens value certain capabilities, many of which are easier to 
enhance or maintain with decreased inequality (Buchanan 19). 
The psychosocial effects of material differences create social stratification and 
distance between people.  While competing for the same resources in an unequal society 
where the bulk of resources are concentrated in the hands of the few, those without 
abundant resources develop a lack of trust in one another.  A lack of trust exacerbates the 
other problems created because of inequality by increasing stress, one of the primary risk 
factors for disease and illness.  One is constantly faced with judgment, either because 
they are poor and looked down upon, or because they are rich and faced with jealousy.  
One always has to protect their social status and their job, leading to increased stress and 
                                                 
 
6
 For now it is enough to have just a basic understanding of Daniels’ position.  It is discussed in greater 
detail later. 
  94 
anxiety, all of which are harmful for health and causes of health problems for individuals 
(Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). 
Daniels also argues that social inequalities are not acceptable because they 
produce health impairments.  These health impairments reduce one’s ability to capitalize 
upon the opportunities available to them in society relative to their abilities if they were 
not impaired at all (Daniels 1981, 1985).  The effect on health is not just on the poor.  A 
particularly insightful study testing whether health outcomes were related to poverty or 
inequality found that low income people living in low inequality areas had better health 
outcomes than low income people living in high inequality areas.  Higher mortality rates 
were found in areas of higher inequality regardless of income (Lynch et. al. 1998).  In 
another study, Frank J. Elgar concludes that “Income inequality might contribute to short 
life expectancy and adult mortality in part because of societal differences in trust… 
Societies with low levels of trust may lack the capacity to create the kind of social 
supports and connections that promote health and successful aging” (Elgar 2315).  Trust 
is important because a lack of trust may be responsible for increasing stress factors that 
lead to disease and illness (Elgar 2010, Wilkinson and Pickett 2011).  As pertains to 
sustainable medicine, there is also good evidence to suggest that inequalities also lead to 
greater environmental degradation, which would also result in worse health outcomes for 
populations living with social inequity (Boyce, 1994; Baland, Bardhan, and Bowles 
2006).  
Whether the relationship is merely correlative, or whether inequality has causal 
effects on health (and other areas) is difficult to measure but matters if inequality is 
  95 
meaningful as a call to action.  Salvatore Babones compiled previous research and data to 
try and determine whether the relationship could be causal, concluding that  
Change in inequality 1970-1995 is significantly related to change in life 
expectancy and infant mortality, suggesting a causal relationship, but these 
correlations are not robust with respect to sample or controls. It can be concluded 
that there is a strong, consistent, statistically significant, non-artifactual 
correlation between national income inequality and population health, but though 
there is some evidence that this relationship is causal, the relative stability of 
income inequality over time in most countries makes causality difficult to test 
(Babones 1614).   
Babones suggests that further research is necessary to positively determine whether 
relationships are directly causal or merely correlative, though the consistent correlation 
does suggest a causal relationship in at least some cases (Babones 2008).  Given the 
strong correlations and some evidence of causality, the links between inequality and 
health are strong enough to call for action. 
One of the most prominent researchers of inequality, Éloi Laurent, discusses five 
macro-ecological channels or pathways by which inequality affects the environment.  
They are: 
1. Inequality increases the need for environmentally harmful and socially 
unnecessary economic growth (Laurent 5). 
2. Inequality increases the ecological irresponsibility of the richest, within each 
country and among nations (Laurent 7). 
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3. Inequality, which affects the health of individuals and groups, diminishes the 
social-ecological resilience of communities and societies and weakens their 
collective ability to adapt to accelerating environmental change (Laurent 9). 
4. Inequality hinders collective action aimed at preserving natural resources 
(Laurent 10). 
5. Inequality reduces the political acceptability of environmental preoccupations 
and the ability to offset the potentially socially-regressive effects of 
environmental policies (Laurent 12). 
It is not self-evident that inequality increases the need for environmentally harmful and 
socially unnecessary economic growth.  However, there are complex psychological 
processes at work that produce this outcome.  One effect, sometimes called keeping up 
with the Joneses, is a psychological phenomenon where we compare how well off we are 
relative to those around us, and if we do not judge ourselves favorably, we participate in 
conspicuous consumption to make the comparison more favorable (Boyce and Brown, 
2010).  There are also economic forces at work; Laurent notes that when wealth is 
concentrated in a small percentage of the population, the rest of the population requires 
greater economic development and growth to compensate for the concentration of wealth.  
When wealth is increasingly concentrated, those not in the top concentration either have 
less wealth (the have-nots), or require more economic growth to maintain the same level 
of wealth as they had before wealth concentration increased.  Often, this concept is 
understood as analogous to eating pie; if at time T1 Jerry had 80% of the pie and I had 
20%, and at time T2 Jerry had 90% of the pie and I had 10%, then for my slice of the pie 
to be the same size as it was at T1 the entire pie has to be bigger.  Economic growth is 
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often coupled with greater ecological degradation for a variety of factors, including 
increasing consumption (Laurent 5). 
 Concerning the second channel, Laurent writes, “Widening inequality exacerbates 
the fundamental tendency of capitalist enterprises to maximize profits by externalizing 
cost at the national and international level and to turn socio-economically deprived areas 
into “pollution havens” (Laurent 7; Hall 2009, Lepawsky and McNabb 2010).  That is, 
because of inequalities, it is easier to displace environmental degradation onto those 
poorer because of income and power inequalities.   
Wealth concentration and its harms are not confined to countries that have high 
levels of inequality within their borders.  Relative to poorer countries, rich nations are  
better able to adapt to climate change due to their financial wealth, and have little 
incentive to curb carbon emissions because of the real or perceived threats to economic 
growth that measures aimed at decreasing carbon emissions are accused of causing 
(Laurent 7-8).  These concerns have given rise to organizations like the Environmental 
Justice and Climate Change Initiative, who focus partly on the effects of climate change 
on poor communities and nations. 
 The third channel is related to the second (and in a way, all are related).  Laurent 
notes that due to pioneers of the research like Richard Wilkinson and Michael Marmot 
(and as echoed by Norman Daniels) it is already well accepted that inequality has various 
negative impacts on physical and mental health.  The negative effects on health directly 
result in an increased sensitivity to, and a decreased ability to recover from, 
environmental stresses like natural disasters.  Health cannot be fully understood outside 
of its environmental and social contexts (Marmot, 2010).  This exacerbates the problem 
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of climate change and its increased effect on the poor, effectively worsening the unequal 
burden placed upon the poor due to environmental degradation. 
 The fourth channel focuses on the ability of a population to enact measures 
necessary to reverse and prevent environmental harms.  Laurent notes that many studies 
demonstrate how inequality frustrates resource management and disorganizes human 
communities, creating conditions that must be overcome in order to effectively organize 
populations to preserve natural resources (Laurent 10, Klooster 2000).  That is, inequality 
results in an inability for the poorer to voice their concerns and to advocate for reforms 
that represent their interests.  Since most of the population of the world is not wealthy, 
this is a significant issue.  If the interests of the wealthy concerning the environment are 
in conflict with those of the poor at any point, and the poor are more populous than the 
wealthy but less able to effect political change, then the potential for increased harm 
rises.  The poor, being more numerous, will include a greater number of people adversely 
affected by environmental harm, and will also be less able to effect legislation necessary 
to prevent or to enforce the prevention of harm to the environment.  Being less able to 
protect the environment, and less able to protect themselves from the negative health 
effects of a degraded environment, their health will be affected on a greater scale than the 
health of their wealthy counterparts.   
 The fifth channel seems particularly pernicious.  Inequality, Laurent argues, is 
harmful to the process of gaining political acceptability for environmental policy 
measures when those policy measures are seen to be economically harmful, regardless of 
whether the measure may be economically beneficial in the long run because of the short 
term sacrifices entailed.  When a population does not perceive that they are doing well, 
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the short term sacrifices seem unacceptable (Laurent 12).  Those not well off may think 
they are already far enough behind the others in society, and so to ask them for further 
sacrifices is unacceptable.  This may be seen as a related but separate effect of the 
Joneses phenomenon mentioned earlier. 
Decreasing inequalities may enhance autonomy for a population even though 
some medical practices may be prohibited in order to protect the environment.  The poor 
would, in theory, have greater political power to enact the changes necessary to reduce 
the burden of environmental degradation on themselves, resulting in better educational 
and health outcomes.  Better health and educational outcomes don’t just benefit the poor, 
either; studies show that when inequality is reduced, both rich and poor benefit over the 
long term (Marmot 2010, UK National Equality Panel, 2010). 
Furthermore, restricting autonomy is not an aim of sustainable medicine; rather, 
when viewed anthropocentrically, the aim is to reduce the impact of medical practice on 
the environment for human benefit.  Any diminishment of autonomy is unintentional but 
may, in some circumstances, be necessary for the benefit of humanity.  There may be 
situations where a choice is altogether off limits because the cost of the procedure, 
practice, or technology is so high.  The result is a clear abridgement of autonomy at the 
level of the individual due to the removal of choice.  Implementing sustainable medicine 
may still be justifiable despite the removal of some choices; furthermore, if there is an 
overall net gain in autonomy due to inequity correction, then our justifications become 
stronger.  It may be that de-emphasizing autonomy in favor of greater social equality isn’t 
necessary if we understand that a decrease in social inequality results in a greater range of 
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opportunity for the citizens affected and by extension, results in a net gain of autonomy 
overall. 
Still another option is advocated by Jameton and Pierce.  Their discussion is not 
restricted to patients, but also doctors, and involves the concept of autonomy more 
generally.  They propose redefining autonomy to understand autonomous individuals as 
“members of a moral community who share common ends.  This community needs to 
expand to place humans within their biotic community” (2004, 119).  Considered in 
isolation—i.e. considering an individual separate from other considerations, it is easy to 
see that denying someone options for care that may otherwise be available in a 
nonsustainable health care system is objectionable.  But if the individual is understood as 
part of a moral community that shares common ends, a diminishment of individual 
autonomy may not only be unobjectionable, but obligatory—a conclusion in conflict with 
Jameton and Pierce’s conception of autonomy.  On their conception of autonomy we 
have a moral obligation to recognize duties to each other and to nature, but they fall short 
of calling for a diminishment of individual autonomy in order to recognize those duties. 
Jameton and Pierce note that an obvious objection arises; many suspect that their 
concept of autonomy simply disguises coercion instead of really dealing with the idea 
that coercion is occurring if their model of sustainable medicine is used.  Jameton and 
Pierce reply, noting that both “patients and physicians… are already coerced by 
prevailing interventionist standards and by the ready availability of heroic ‘life-saving’ 
treatments and drugs” (Jameton and Pierce 2004, 119).  In essence, they argue that 
coercion would not increase, or expressed negatively, that autonomy would not decrease 
using their model of sustainable medicine.  That physicians are already coerced has no 
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bearing on whether physicians may be coerced under their model of sustainable 
medicine, and coercion may be necessary to remove some environmentally detrimental 
options from doctors unless we leave doctors in a situation where they are both steward 
and patient advocate.  Doctors as stewards and advocates creates a clear dilemma for 
physicians that may undermine the physician/patient relationship so vital to providing 
good health care because patients may wonder whether their doctor is heavily weighing 
stewardship instead of looking out for their individual interests. 
Jameton and Pierce also note the typical resistance of individuals to changes in 
lifestyle, conservation measures, and voluntary cost reducing measures to health care.  
According to Jameton and Pierce, all these factors add up, meaning that if their model is 
enacted there is really no increase in the level of coercion in any case—what we really 
have is a shift from “forcing expansion to supporting stewardship and modest health-care 
consumption” (Jameton and Pierce 2004, 119).  Their option, however, would not create 
an increase in autonomy, even if it succeeded in averting increased coercion, and I am not 
convinced that it succeeds. 
What we’re really worried about is coercion or an objectionable reduction of 
autonomy that occurs as a result of sustainable medicine.  If coercion or an objectionable 
reduction occurs, then strong justifications are necessary regardless of whether on their 
conception of autonomy there is no net increase in coercion.  Furthermore, a reduction in 
the autonomy of patients has a far greater net impact than a reduction in the autonomy of 
physicians.  It is unclear that sustainable medicine, or sustainability in general, may be 
implemented without legislative measures that will necessarily result in a net reduction of 
autonomy whether the measures are considered coercive, objectionable, or otherwise.  
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 3.3 Beneficence 
 
The second principle of medical ethics that I will discuss is beneficence.  Again, 
my aim is to determine whether the principle of beneficence is consistent with 
sustainability and, by extension, sustainable medicine. According to the principle of 
beneficence, medical professionals are obligated to act for the benefit of their patients.  
Beauchamp and Childress identify two kinds of beneficence.   
They write, “Positive beneficence requires agents to provide benefits to others.  
Utility requires that agents balance benefits, risks, and costs to produce the best overall 
results” (Beauchamp and Childress 197).  They note that positive beneficence supports 
many rules, such as:   defend the rights of others; prevent harm to others; remove 
conditions that will cause harm to others; help persons with disabilities; rescue persons in 
danger (Beauchamp and Childress 197).  Sustainable medicine as I understand it is 
supported by the principle of positive beneficence because it is intended to prevent harm 
to others and the removal of conditions that cause harm to others.  In making medicine 
sustainable, harm caused by the practice of medicine contributes to illness (via negatively 
influencing environmental risk factors) in not only the patients that look to medicine for 
cures, but also those in developing countries that are most vulnerable to climate change.  
To practice medicine beneficently, medical professionals should consider not only the 
level of doctor to patient, but the level of health care as an institution. 
Utility, understood as a principle of beneficence, is not identical to the more 
familiar principle of utility found in classical Utilitarianism.  Within the principles of 
medical ethics, utility may be constrained by any other principle of medical ethics 
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depending upon the contextual features of a given situation.  Classical utilitarianism uses 
the principle of utility as the overriding principle.  While the principle of utility may be 
used to constrain other principles, as it is used in Beauchamp and Childress, utility is only 
one principle among many.   
Still, within their theory, the principle of beneficence understood as utility 
requires weighing benefits, risks, and costs to achieve the best results.  Admittedly 
Beauchamp and Childress leave what ‘best’ might mean as vague, due to the problems in 
defining such a term.  Whatever is ‘best’ must be determined by the agent and justified 
independently of justifications for choosing to act according to the principle of 
beneficence as utility (Beauchamp and Childress 197-198).  Use of the principle of 
beneficence in this special sense to justify sustainable medicine is problematic.  Some 
harm is justified in the form of cost and risk if the good produced is great enough.  This 
claim is ambiguous, however.  The claim may mean that cost and risk are evaluated in 
terms of harm to the environment, or the claim may mean that cost and risk are evaluated 
in terms of harm to the individual, or in terms of harm to the population.  Harm to the 
environment may be justified to heal a patient, while harm to a population may be 
justified in the name of public health measures that are ultimately beneficial.  Harm to an 
individual may likewise be justified to heal that particular individual, or when the benefit 
to the environment or to a population is sufficiently greater than the harm to the patient.  
Whether or not the harm is worthwhile depends on contextual features.  Utility is used to 
weigh benefits and harms, (including benefits and harms to an individual, the population, 
or the environment) in order to determine whether an act or class of actions performed 
produce the best overall results.  That the calculation of utility is more complex when 
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used in the context of sustainable medicine is to be expected because there is a greater 
number of interests involved. 
On an anthropocentric view, it may be easier to act beneficently than it would be 
under a nonanthropocentric view because there are fewer morally considerable beings.  
The patient is the primary morally considerable agent in our current medical practice.  
However, even on a long range anthropocentric view it also seems true that there is an 
obligation to act beneficently toward future generations.  There are many circumstances 
encountered in medicine where there are conflicting obligations to act beneficently; 
however, these seemingly conflicting obligations are really just considerations when 
deciding how to produce the most good, i.e. provide the best possible outcome.  Usually, 
when determining the best possible outcome, medical professionals and policy makers err 
on the side of present and near future people.
7
  Nonetheless, acting too beneficently 
toward a patient in front of us may actually impinge upon our ability to act beneficently 
in other ways.  This is just the case in triage situations, where spending too many 
resources on a patient who is not likely to survive seems unjust because the physician 
cannot act beneficently toward patients who have a better chance at survival.  By acting 
too beneficently toward patients today, we may detract from our ability to act 
beneficently toward patients in the future. 
                                                 
 
7
 This is likely tied to human psychology.  We are not very good at delaying gratification, and so often 
sacrifice greater gains in the future in favor of immediate gratification.  Cf. Mischel & Ayduk, 2004; 
Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999. 
  105 
By now the reader may wonder what the difference is between acting beneficently 
and acting nonmaleficently.  Rules of nonmaleficence differ from rules of beneficence in 
several important ways.  Rules of nonmaleficence are: 
1. Negative prohibitions of action. 
2. Rules that must be followed impartially. 
3. Rules that provide moral reasons for legal prohibitions for certain forms of 
conduct (Beauchamp and Childress 199). 
Rules of beneficence, by contrast, are rules that: 
1. Present positive requirements for action. 
2. Need not always be followed impartially. 
3. Generally do not provide reasons for legal punishment when an agent fails to 
follow them (Beauchamp and Childress 199). 
The difference seems pretty clear.  First, rules of beneficence are positive rules, while 
rules of nonmaleficence are negative rules.  Prohibitions of nonmaleficence must be 
followed impartially, but notice how rules of beneficence need not always be followed 
impartially.  This is a recognition that there are some who we have special relationships 
with that we would normally benefit over others, and that to do otherwise may be seen as 
a moral defect on our part.  However, Beauchamp and Childress argue that a determinate 
(impartial) obligation to act beneficently toward some person exists when a “person X 
has a determinate obligation of beneficence toward a person Y if and only if each of the 
following conditions is satisfied (assuming that X is aware of the relevant facts) 
(Beauchamp and Childress 202). 
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1. Y is at risk of significant loss of or damage to life or health or some other 
major interest. 
2. X’s action is necessary (singly or in concert with others) to prevent this loss or 
damage. 
3. X’s action (singly or in concert with others) has a very high probability of 
preventing it. 
4. X’s action would not present very significant risks, costs, or burdens to X. 
5. The benefit that Y can be expected to gain outweighs any harms, costs, or 
burdens that X is likely to incur (Beauchamp and Childress 202). 
The above conditions are used to argue that some situations, like saving a drowning 
person when one has the ability to swim, are obligatory.  It is not likely that these 
conditions would apply successfully to show that a class of actions pertaining to 
something like sustainable medicine is obligatory.  However, these conditions may apply 
to some actions required to make medicine sustainable, making those actions determinate 
obligations according to the principle of beneficence. 
 Let’s examine the broad action of making medicine sustainable to see if it fulfills 
all of the above criteria.  Let Y be future generations, and let X be the current generation.  
It seems that condition one is fulfilled; if medicine is not made sustainable by the current 
generation, then there will be significant damage to life or health of some (many) future 
people.  There is a long history of literature dedicated to proving that current 
environmental harm causes harm to future generations.   The actions of our generation 
are necessary to prevent this loss or damage, so condition two is also met.  That is, no one 
  107 
else may perform this action.  The first point of contention seems to come when we 
consider the third condition. 
 I do not mean to imply the hyperbolic and untrue conclusion that if medicine is 
made sustainable that the harm caused by environmental degradation to future 
generations will be prevented.  This is not associated with the problem of harming people 
who will only potentially exist (the nonidentity problem), discussed in chapter two.  
Rather, the concern is that even if medicine is made sustainable, if other significant 
changes are not made to realize sustainability in the present—i.e. from a significant 
majority of humanity--that harms to future generations will occur despite the best efforts 
of medical professionals and policy makers to make medicine sustainable.  If medical 
care is made sustainable by itself, it may be true that efforts toward making medicine 
sustainable will lack the impact necessary to benefit future generations.  However, if we 
argue for sustainability in general and see medicine as a part of that sustainability, we 
need not worry about the effects of only making medicine sustainable.  Sustainable 
medicine is a part of sustainability more broadly, but if we are to mitigate the effects of 
climate change and other environmental harms resulting from anthropogenic activity then 
it is sustainability that is required and not merely sustainable medicine. 
But if we look at X’s action (the current generation) as in concert with other 
actions, then the third criterion does seem fulfilled.  If the current generation makes 
medicine sustainable, in concert with other efforts at sustainability, then there is a high 
probability at preventing more extreme loss and damage due to global climate change 
than we will already experience.  Medicine is one institution in society, so even if it is 
made sustainable, much work would remain to make the rest of civilization sustainable.  
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The current generation may make human civilization sustainable if acting in concert as 
part of a global effort.  
The fourth criterion, that X’s action would not present very significant risks, 
costs, or burdens to X, sounds at first glance impossible to meet.  To make medicine truly 
sustainable, there will be a high cost.  In terms of development, buildings and equipment 
must be retrofitted or replaced.  Some of this work has already begun.  In terms of 
energy, hospitals must switch to green power sources.  If the hospitals own these power 
sources, then the money spent will decrease as the savings add up over time.  For 
example, take photovoltaic electricity production.  The return on investment for solar 
panels varies widely due to the cost of the panels, annual amount of sunlight, government 
incentives like tax write-offs, the cost of electricity in a given area, and the efficiency of 
the solar panel or array.  Estimates range between less than ten years to nearly twenty 
years depending on these factors.  However, the return on investment is variable but 
generally well within the lifespan of the product despite sometimes being a decade or 
more, and well within the lifespan of many medical institutions like hospitals and offices.  
The EPA writes that “System developers and investors typically realize their investment 
objectives within 5 to 8 years after realizing applicable tax incentives, depreciation and 
other financial benefits” (EPA 2009).   Furthermore, according to the National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory, the energy payback period, or the time that it takes for a 
photovoltaic cell to produce more energy than it takes to manufacture it, is two years 
according to a 2004 report (NREL, January 2004).  Both the energy investment and the 
monetary investment yield returns on investment. 
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On a long term view of sustainability, twenty years is not a very long time.  
Nothing is more expensive than global climate change.  According to Sir Nicholas Stern, 
global climate change will cause a drop of up to 20 per year in the world’s GDP by 2050 
(Stern 2006).  Another economist, William Nordhaus, finds the costs of climate change to 
be much lower but also finds that the cost of environmentally friendly policies to be 
relatively small (Nordhaus 1999).  It is worthy to note that Nordhaus discounts future 
values to arrive at this number, opening his work to the criticism of undervaluing future 
values by over-discounting future value.  Though the burden of change would be borne 
by the current generation, the cost is justified in two ways.  One, the current generation 
has benefitted from exploiting the environment unsustainably, and so bearing the cost of 
making life sustainable (or more sustainable) is just desert.  Second, the current 
generation would likely see the results of making society or life more sustainable within 
their lifespan.  Compared to global climate change, the risks are small.  The fourth 
condition is met. 
The fifth condition, that the benefit that Y can be expected to gain outweighs any 
harms, costs, or burdens that X is likely to incur, seems proved by the evidence arguing 
in favor of satisfying the fourth condition.  There is good reason to believe that 
sustainable medicine will provide great benefit to future generations.  A cleaner 
environment will decrease the severity of environmental risk factors and result in an 
improvement in public health.  To prove that the benefit for future generations outweighs 
the harms and costs to the current generation would require a lengthy review of the costs, 
benefits, and discounting issues involved with future generations.  Even then, depending 
on the discounting rate used (if one were used at all), and the calculation of costs and 
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benefits, the results would still be disputable.  Instead, I offer the following less 
particular, but perhaps clearer line of reasoning. 
If medicine is to be made sustainable it will have to change, and it will have to 
change in some significant ways.  These changes will sometimes be painful.  A procedure 
that was once offered may no longer be offered, or may have certain restrictions.  But a 
sustainable medicine is not necessarily a worse medicine.  The benefits that future 
generations receive from sustainability and making medicine sustainable will be felt now 
to a lesser extent.  Even if one is already receiving excellent health care under an 
unsustainable health care system, there are still significant benefits to sustainable 
medicine even if the level of care possible under sustainable medicine is not as high as on 
the current unsustainable system.  Quantity of life matters, but so does quality of life.  It’s 
worth noting that many will receive an increased lifespan as well as a higher quality of 
life; in those cases, such as populations in developing nations with poor health care the 
benefits are obvious.  If we truly care about others within the global community, it is 
difficult to argue that there isn’t an obligation to make medicine sustainable. 
There are many other ways that the current generation may benefit from 
sustainable medicine.  There are three main categories of benefit: health, economic, and 
environmental. Lower environmental risk factors for health because of a healthier 
environment means a healthier population.  A healthier population means a better quality 
of life, and perhaps fewer obstacles to overcome in the pursuit of one’s goals.  A more 
sustainable medicine means a higher return for health care dollars spent because those 
dollars will be less likely to contribute to disease causing factors, resulting in funds that 
may be used for a variety of other goods and services we need or want; particularly those 
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things not contributing to conspicuous consumption, but that are of some benefit to 
society, or at least not harmful to society.   
  It is a different kind of medicine, a different way of caring for the sick.  Part of 
this is accomplished by lowering environmental risk factors for illness.  Some of it will 
rely on technological innovation to make medicine more sustainable.  I am here reminded 
of Callahan’s refrain of living within our biological limits and taking a critical eye of 
technology and its use.  But if the benefits of sustainable medicine can be reaped by the 
current generation, then surely it is a small cost compared to the benefit that future 
generations will enjoy.  By meeting all five criteria, enacting sustainable medicine is 
arguably obligatory according to the principle of beneficence. 
 
3.4 Nonmaleficence  
 
Nonmaleficence is sometimes seen as the overriding principle of medical ethics.    
Nonmaleficence differs from beneficence because while beneficence requires helping 
others, nonmaleficence requires one to refrain from intentional harm to others.  
Beauchamp and Childress recognize that while nonmaleficence often overrides other 
principles, in some cases nonmaleficence may be outweighed by other considerations like 
beneficence (149-151).  This occurs in cases where a patient is put at risk through surgery 
in order to cure them, or where public health measures are enacted despite the costs to 
society.  In both cases, the benefits outweigh the cost.  Sustainable medicine is arguably a 
public health measure because it is meant to benefit the public as a while rather than any 
particular individual.  The point of implementing sustainable medicine is to mitigate and 
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eliminate, wherever possible, the contributions that medicine makes to environmental 
degradation because of the direct effects of environmental degradation on human health.   
When considering harm, however, an obvious problem arises.  A good definition 
to aid in our analysis of harm is to understand harm to a population to mean a loss of 
utility for that population.  While nonmaleficence requires medical professionals to avoid 
causing harm, in avoiding causing harm to the population (by practicing medicine 
sustainably) they may cause harm to some individuals.  At the level of a practicing 
physician, this is avoidable because responsibility may be shifted to the level of 
policy/law makers.  Physicians must act within the boundaries of law, so any policy 
requiring certain actions from physicians or any policy prohibiting some actions 
effectively frees the practicing physician from responsibility for harm caused by 
following policy.  It is my position that doctors should not be put into the position of 
violating the principle of nonmaleficence by the implementation of sustainable medicine.  
Any other position risks the consequence of causing damage to the physician/patient 
relationship, which is built upon trust.  If a patient must wonder whether their doctor is 
worried more about rationing resources or saving the environment, then the 
physician/patient relationship is damaged and the best care possible (all things 
considered) cannot be given. 
Though the tension between the principle of nonmaleficence and sustainable 
medicine may be solved, the question of whether the principle of nonmaleficence might 
be consistent with a theory of sustainable medicine remains.  Beauchamp and Childress 
note that the principle of nonmaleficence supports many specific rules, citing the 
following for examples: 
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1. Do not kill. 
2. Do not cause pain or suffering. 
3. Do not incapacitate. 
4. Do not cause offense. 
5. Do not deprive others of the goods of life (Beauchamp and Childress 153). 
Careful readers will note the obvious tension among the rules.  The rules, as well as the 
principle of nonmaleficence (and the other principles of biomedical ethics) are prima 
facie instead of absolute.  The agent’s discretion decides what rule is primary at any 
given time based upon context.  Furthermore, the obligation to not cause harm includes 
obligations to not “impose risks of harm” (Beauchamp and Childress 153).  This last part 
is essential to a justification of sustainable medicine using the principles of biomedical 
ethics, because practicing medicine unsustainably arguably imposes risks of harm on the 
public through the exacerbation of environmental risk factors for health. 
 The fifth rule listed by Beauchamp and Childress is the most worrisome to me.  
Whether nonmaleficence is consistent with sustainability in general depends on what 
conception one has concerning the goods of life.  The same is true for sustainable 
medicine, just in more particular ways.  It would be foolish to hazard a definition when 
philosophers have pondered what the ‘good’ is or what the ‘good life’ is for thousands of 
years.  Instead, I propose a work-around.  If doctors are not responsible for withholding 
care as a matter of policy, then they cannot be responsible for depriving one of the goods 
of life, because offering such goods is not within the power of the doctor to begin with.  
Perhaps this proposal is more than just a workaround, because one may argue that doctors 
really are responsible for harms despite the prohibitions of policy.  At the very least, any 
  114 
practitioner during a transitionary period will know of treatments that were once available 
that now are not; or treatments that exist, but which aren’t permitted due to issues with 
using the treatment sustainably.  If we grant that doctors have such responsibility, then 
their ability to offer some treatments must be curtailed; otherwise, they are obligated 
according to oath to find ways to offer whatever treatments they can.  Removing their 
ability to offer some procedures is already routinely done through policy and would not 
differ greatly in practice from what is already occurring, even though the reasons for the 
restrictions may be different.  A religiously affiliated hospital may decide to only offer 
procedures consistent with their religious beliefs, while some procedures are banned by 
federal or state mandate.  Physicians already operate within the confines of beliefs, law, 
and contextual considerations like ability to pay or available equipment.  Sustainable 
medicine, in this regard, differs in the reasons for restriction, but is not especially 




There is much discussion of justice in biomedical ethics, which falls into two 
categories.  The first, distributive justice, is concerned with connecting “properties of 
persons with morally justifiable distributions of benefits and burdens” (Beauchamp and 
Childress 244).  The second is justice as fairness, entitlement, or desert.  Fairness, 
entitlement, and desert are not equivalent in their meaning.  This second sense of justice 
is a broad category that deals with justice largely outside of the concerns of distributive 
justice (Beauchamp and Childress 241).  Note that in this discussion of justice we are not 
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concerned with how to justly implement sustainable medicine; rather, our concern is 
merely whether particular conceptions of justice are consistent with a vision of 
sustainable medicine. There are five kinds of theories of distributive justice identified by 
Beauchamp and Childress: utilitarian, libertarian, communitarian, egalitarian, and 
cosmopolitan (244).  Not all are relevant to sustainable medicine, and at least one 
relevant to sustainable medicine, intergenerational justice, is not discussed by Beauchamp 
and Childress.  I will discuss only those that are compatible with sustainable medicine 
insofar as sustainable medicine is consistent with particular conceptions of justice.  
Simply put, I am interested in conceptions of justice according to which sustainable 
medicine can be just. My purpose is not to give a complete discussion of each kind of 
justice as applies to sustainable medicine—such a project is too lengthy and deserves 
many volumes.  Rather, my purpose is to evaluate whether sustainable medicine is 
consistent with some particular conceptions of justice that I see as most promising for a 
vision of sustainable medicine.   
Among those conceptions of justice that Beauchamp and Childress discuss that I 
will not thoroughly consider here are libertarian, utilitarian, and cosmopolitan.  I do not 
discuss libertarian theories of justice because libertarianism seems at odds with the ends 
of sustainability.  Sustainability requires limiting some freedoms in order to meet the 
goals of whatever conception of sustainability under consideration.  A libertarian theory 
of sustainability would probably require a voluntary model of sustainability—an idea that 
I find untenable given our unwillingness or inability to voluntarily already do so.  A 
utilitarian theory of justice holds some promise for a vision of sustainable medicine.  I 
reject considering utilitarian theories of justice, since they are not complete; while we are 
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worried about consequences in sustainability, consequences are not the only factor 
determining the rightness of an action.  Furthermore, it is unclear how to calculate utility 
with regard to future generations because I cannot anticipate the values of future 
generations.  What seems to have social utility from my current vantage point may not 
have any social utility for a remotely future generation.   
Cosmopolitan theories of justice share many similarities to communitarian and 
egalitarian theories of justice, and are global in scope.  Beauchamp and Childress write 
that cosmopolitan theories, “take as [their] starting point large and usually catastrophic 
social conditions—in particular famine, poverty, and epidemic disease.  The theory then 
attempts to delineate which obligations extend across national borders to address these 
problems.  The obligations advanced in the theory are similar to those traditionally found 
in moral and political theory, but globalized” (2009, 264).  This sounds promising at first 
glance, but the cosmopolitan requirements of other nations to solve problems of justice 
across national borders requires either giving up some national sovereignty or common 
cross-national institutions acting autonomously from within different nations.  This seems 
unlikely both from a historical analysis and the current political climate. 
Communitarian theories of justice focus on an encumbered concept of the self 
instead of an atomic self, i.e. they often show the individual as having responsibility to 
the community, and the community having responsibility to the individual rather than the 
libertarian view that the individual is only responsible for him/herself.  There is little talk 
of rights or contracts, and principles of justice are regarded as pluralistic.  Each 
community may have a different conception of the good, and so the standards of conduct 
that an individual should live by are derived from the community.  One prominent 
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example of communitarian health care is that of Ezekiel Emanuel, who argues in favor of 
community health providers.  The health provided is determined by the community and is 
oriented toward the social goals of each particular community.  This is done through 
deliberative democratic processes within the community and made into health care policy 
that varies from community to community or from like-minded groups of communities to 
other groups of communities (Beauchamp and Childress 246-247; Emanuel 2008).  A 
sustainable medicine, should one arise, would find justification if a particular community 
sought after sustainable medicine as a goal.  The problem that remains for communitarian 
theories based on democratic processes is that sustainability could fail whenever a 
community or group of communities choose, through democratic processes, medical 
options that are not sustainable.  For communitarian theories to work as a basis for 
sustainable medicine, there must be some way to either guarantee or to make it extremely 
likely that communities will choose options for medicine that are sustainable.  We might 
start by recognizing obligations to each other and to future generations as a way to show 
how people are obligated to choose sustainable practices, giving justification to laws 
enforcing sustainability. 
Avner de-Shalit’s seminal work Why Posterity Matters: Environmental policies 
and future generations outlines a communitarian theory of intergenerational justice.  De-
Shalit reconceptualizes our common idea of a community to include future generations, 
i.e. a transgenerational community.  As members of a community, we have positive and 
negative obligations toward each other.   These obligations mean that “we should 
consider them when deciding on environmental policies; we should not overburden them; 
furthermore, we should supply them with goods, especially those goods that we believe 
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are and will be necessary to cope with the challenges of life, as well as other, more non-
essential goods (de-Shalit 13).    
Any person belongs to many different communities, some of those being national, 
cultural, familial, vocational, religions, class, and the like.  Regardless, we may consider 
a person part of our transgenerational community if we share certain things in common 
with them.  These, de-Shalit argues, are cultural interaction and moral similarity.  The 
definition of moral similarity is rather intuitive; moral similarity exists between members 
of a group whenever they share particular attitudes pertaining to moral and political ideas, 
values, and norms (de-Shalit 28).  Note that moral similarity is only likely to continue for 
near future generations, because generations far into the future are far less likely to share 
the same political ideas, norms, values, etc.  Remotely future generations are, according 
to de-Shalit, relevantly different because it is difficult to share the commonalities with 
that we share with near future generations.  As a result, our obligations to remotely future 
generations are different.  Our obligations to remotely future generations are mostly 
negative obligations based on humanity instead of justice, because with regard to 
remotely future generations our obligations stemming from membership in our 
transgenerational community do not apply.  Remotely future generations are still morally 
considerable, however, because they are still people, i.e. our obligations to them stem 
from their humanity and not from justice.    Essentially, this means that we are obligated 
to avoid causing harm to future generations and attempt to prevent harms, but no more.  
De-Shalit’s theory of justice seems like a very consistent, natural fit for sustainability in 
general as well as sustainable medicine. 
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One difference between general sustainability and de-Shalit’s version centers on 
reciprocity.  For de-Shalit, obligations to one another are reciprocal—I can expect 
members of my community to recognize their obligations to me while I recognize my 
obligations to them.  With regard to future generations, I cannot expect reciprocity (de-
Shalit 95).  I may fulfill my obligations to future generations but will never see a return.  
However, if we consider that we’ve already gotten the return from past generations, then 
we may yet have obligations to future generations based upon reciprocity, at least for 
near future generations.  Having benefitted from the actions of the past generation of our 
community, we have already received our benefit and are obligated to reciprocate by 
benefitting future generations (de-Shalit 95-98).  My obligations to remotely future 
generations are much less certain, however, because there is less of a direct connection to 
my community.  The same relationship does not exist to remotely future generations.  
This is part of why my obligations to remotely future generations are mostly negative 
obligations based on humanity, rather than positive obligations based on justice.  I 
shouldn’t harm future generations, but it is unclear on de-Shalit’s view what my other 
obligations might be.  Sustainability may require positive obligations to future 
generations in some cases, making de-Shalit’s view a problematic fit for sustainability, 
especially in cases where we feel that avoiding harm to future generations is inadequate.  
A ready example of a positive obligation for a near future generation is saving for our 
children’s college fund.  For a remote future generation, we may have obligations to 
make positive steps in researching green energy so that energy options exist for remote 
future generations before fossil fuel use makes the planet uninhabitable (Hansen et. al. 
2013). 
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In a different vein of thought, egalitarian theories of justice argue in favor of an 
equal distribution of some goods.  Theories tend to differ on the criteria that determine 
what an equal distribution might be.  The most influential egalitarian theory of justice is 
that of John Rawls.  However, the most influential egalitarian theory of justice as applied 
to medicine is Norman Daniels’, who takes Rawls’ theory of distributive justice and 
extends it to problems of distribution in health care.  Daniels focuses on fair equality of 
opportunity, where the distribution of health care goods should be arranged so that each 
person may avail themselves of the normal range of opportunities available to them in 
their society (Daniels 1985, Beauchamp and Childress 248).  Justification for sustainable 
medicine might be found from within Daniels’ theory insofar as fair equality of 
opportunity may be impinged if medicine contributes to environmental degradation, as 
environmental degradation is linked to various health issues.  Furthermore, environmental 
degradation is worse in socio-economically poor areas, where residents already find a 
reduced range of opportunities even before health problems arise. 
Still, Daniels focuses on present people, not future people.  It is easy enough to 
extend Daniels’ theory out to include future generations if we synthesize it with the idea 
of a transgenerational community like de Shalit’s; we end up with an account of 
intergenerational fair equality of opportunity, where the distribution of health care goods 
should be arranged so that all people, present and future, may avail themselves of the 
normal range of opportunities available to them in their society.  What those 
opportunities are, and how that affects sustainable medicine, is a matter worthy of 
detailed discussion.  The next chapter focuses on issues at the intersection of sustainable 
medicine and how to go about delineating sustainable from unsustainable care, including 
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a further examination of Daniels’ idea and a presentation of a vision of sustainable 
medicine. 
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CHAPTER IV 
4.1 GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE MEDICINE  
 
In order to continue our discussion of Daniels’ ideas of equality of opportunity 
and a decent basic minimum within the confines of sustainability, it will be useful to 
define just what kind of sustainable medicine I propose so that we may determine 
whether an idea like Daniels’ is consistent with the vision of sustainability at work.  In 
chapter two, I regarded Nolt’s definition of sustainability as a workable theory of 
sustainability, with one reservation; the problem of defining what counts as adequate care 
within the confines of sustainability is a particularly worrisome detail.  My reason for 
choosing Nolt’s schematic definition of sustainability extends beyond practical reasons to 
those listed as its virtues in chapter one, among those being the ways in which it avoids 
the criticisms of many other theories of sustainability while maintaining applicability.  
The issue of defining a notion of adequacy can no longer be avoided if I am to use Nolt’s 
schematic, however, because the definition of adequacy within his schematic definition 
of sustainability raises questions concerning justice and resource distribution.  Section 4.2 
is dedicated to defining sustainable health care.  In section 4.3, I outline why there is a 
baseline of care that adequate health care cannot fall below based on the equality of 
opportunity account of health care developed by Norman Daniels.  In section 4.4 I 
suggest options for dealing with desired levels of care and the tension between those 
desired levels and limited resources coupled with burgeoning populations. 
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4.2 Defining Sustainable Medicine 
    
Recall that Nolt’s version of sustainability allows for the consideration of 
particular values within a model of sustainability: 
A global generation G achieves sustainability of value V if and only if: 
1. V is already adequate or G raises it to adequacy, and 
2. G does not impair the ability of its posterity to maintain the adequacy of V. 
Adapted for healthcare as value V: 
The present generation achieves sustainable healthcare if and only if: 
3. Healthcare needs are already adequately satisfied or the global generation brings 
about their adequate satisfaction,  and 
4. The global generation does not impair the ability of its posterity to adequately 
satisfy healthcare needs. 
This adaptation of Nolt’s definition differs from Callahan’s notion of meeting health care 
needs: 
1. Minimum individual adequacy will be achieved when most people have a 
statistically high probability of receiving over their lifetime the kind and 
amount of health care they need to survive and to function at the levels 
common in their society (1999 203-206). 
Note  that Callahan’s definition of minimum individual adequacy neatly avoids the 
problem of whether people actually access health care when it is available.  All that is 
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required is a statistically high probability, and that may be all that can be realistically 
achieved.  However, as I noted in chapter three, the effects of inequality often result in 
those who are less well off in society not availing themselves of care that is available.  
Minimum individual adequacy is not enough to actually push people toward availing 
themselves of health care to function at levels common in their society.  With this in 
mind, I turn to fleshing out my own vision of adequate care. 
It is easy to see but also to underestimate the importance of how my definition 
posits sustaining a particular value—the value of health care.  Instead of uncertainly 
trying to predict what resources should be sustained for the future, we can sustain the 
value of health care because for the foreseeable future, health care needs will remain even 
if particular methods and practices may change.  Hinging the definition of sustainability 
on values instead of objects is advantageous because some values are resistant to 
technological and societal change.  Healthcare is one such value—no matter what society 
looks like or what technology we have, for the foreseeable future healthcare will remain 
something we value.  However, just how that value must be sustained will change 
depending on contextual considerations such as current levels of care, population, 
resources, money, infrastructure, and technology.   
By ensuring that “healthcare needs are already adequately satisfied or the present 
generation brings healthcare needs to adequacy,” my theory stresses the impetus to bring 
a baseline of health care for all people.  In some places of the world, the first step will be 
in bringing clean drinking water and sanitation to the area.  In the industrialized world, 
health problems associated with unhealthy lifestyles must first be addressed by public 
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health campaigns, many of which are already underway, e.g. campaigns against smoking 
and campaigns in favor of exercise and healthy eating.  Studies show that increasing 
access to preventative care, increasing activity, tobacco cessation, and eating healthy are 
major contributors to public health outside of genetics and increased risk factors due to 
inequalities (Halpin et. al. 2010).  But even if we fix health problems related to lifestyles, 
more needs done to make health care sustainable.  For example, someone who is healthy 
most of their life may use just as many medical resources as one who is leading an 
unhealthy lifestyle.  A runner may have great cardiovascular health but need two knee 
replacements and assisted living due to their overall health and longevity.  Within the 
context of global sustainable health care, it will be up to us to find alternatives to the use 
of some health care practices and to curb or entirely outlaw the use or implementation of 
many other health care practices because the practices are either economically, socially, 
or environmentally unsustainable.   
 The first criterion listed for achieving sustainable health care in my vision of 
sustainability recognizes a positive obligation for health care services for the global 
generation, creating problems for sustainability because of the increased consumption of 
medical goods and services required for global sustainable health care.  Sustainability 
constrains adequacy through the second criterion because the second criterion is a 
negative obligation—the global generation may not impair the ability of its posterity 
adequately to satisfy health care needs.  Exactly what services and procedures may be 
offered depend on a wide variety of contextual factors, such as available resources, 
cultural factors such as beliefs, values, and tradition, technological availability, and 
countless others.  Since the information required to sustainably meet standards of 
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adequate care is best known at the local levels, I will instead develop my vision of 
sustainable health care so that it may be applied to many different circumstances. 
Included in this definition is the idea that health care needs for the global 
generation must be adequately satisfied, meaning that in some instances, health care 
standards will have to rise to adequacy, while in other places excessive forms of care 
preventing the ability for the global generation to meet of health care needs adequately 
(due to resource depletion or a distribution of resources so unequal that luxury is met in 
one place while basic needs are not met in another) will need to decrease to sustainable 
levels, or if no level is sustainable, disappear entirely.  Other obstacles that hinder the 
provision of adequate health care will also need to be overcome, including the cessation 
and avoidance of war, political corruption, poverty, and inequality.  The global 
generation is the proper unit to achieve sustainable health care because if health care is 
unsustainable in one particular place but not others, due to the increasingly globalized 
social and economic systems the entire system of sustainable health care would be 
jeopardized over the long term.  In the short term the system would not be undermined 
because resource depletion is a consequence of long term unsustainable activity.  As a 
global problem in an increasingly globalized world, health care must reach global 
sustainability in order to be sustainable at all.   
The reasons are not obvious, but one reason is particularly difficult to analyze.  In 
a global market individuals may go to other countries to receive treatment that they could 
not receive in their home country, or they may elect to have treatment in another country 
due to higher costs at home.  In biomedical ethics, this is the problem of medical tourism.  
Medical tourism is defined as  “the intentional pursuit of non-emergency medical 
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treatment outside of a patient’s home country that is likely to include a pre or post-
operative stay abroad during which some tourist activities may be undertaken” (Johnson 
2010, 3). 
The flow of medical tourists usually comes from the Global North, i.e. developed 
nations, to the Global South, i.e. undeveloped nations.  Rory Johnston et. al. reveal in a 
recent survey of the effects of medical tourism that “hospitals positioning themselves as 
leading medical tourism destinations are largely found within lower and middle income 
countries (LMICs), where favourable [sic] exchange rates have given them a competitive 
advantage in attracting price-conscious international patients (Johnston 2).  Tourists are 
seeking lower cost care that is highly accessible compared to their country of departure 
(Johnston 1). 
Johnston also points out that there are few regulations of medical tourism, further 
exacerbating concerns about not only the quality of care, but whether that care has an 
adverse environmental impact.  The system supporting medical tourism is a largely 
unregulated, for profit system where the majority of hospitals attracting medical tourists 
are not focused on primary care of the local population.  Critics of medical tourism argue 
that because competition for medical tourists is profit driven, medical tourism 
commodifies health care and thereby threatens the “equitable delivery of health care 
worldwide” (Johnston 2).  Tourists have to travel before and after care, usually via air, 
exacerbating contributions to pollution via air travel.  In some countries, like India, 
medical tourism is being encouraged and government funds are being used to build new 
private for-profit facilities friendly to medical tourists.  Subsidies have included 
providing public land, corporate tax cuts, and the removal of tariffs for the import of 
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medical equipment (Johnston 5).  These public funds, critics argue, are not being used for 
the benefit of the public and serve to worsen problems of inequality within the destination 
nations. The effects of inequality are discussed in chapter three.   
With regard to resource consumption, medical tourism poses different problems.  
Just as public funds should be for public use, commonly held resources within a society 
should be available for those within that society when they are needed.  We can easily 
imagine a scenario where a booming medical tourism industry exacerbates health care 
gaps between the rich and poor by increasing the demand for some resources and services 
so that some resources and services are priced out of the range that poor members of a 
society can afford, despite need and despite the very real possibility that if demand had 
not been created for those resources and services through medical tourism, they may be 
affordable.  If the reduction of inequality is key to sustainability, then the situation just 
described is highly objectionable.  More research is necessary to determine whether the 
above scenario is accurate, however, because currently no hard data exists on the matter 
to the best of my knowledge. 
 Medical tourism is already accused of exacerbating health care inequalities in 
other ways.  Johnston writes, “The higher wages and advanced technolologies available 
at facilities offering medical tourism act as a lure for health care providers working in 
more modest facilities. Because medical tourism facilities are primarily urban, this 
process also hastens the internal migration of health care providers from rural areas into 
cities, thereby enhancing rural deprivation” (Johnston 8).  Medical tourism frustrates 
attempts to distribute of health care in ways that would allow for the global generation to 
receive adequate health care.  The solution I recommend is that medical tourism should 
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be disallowed, with few exceptions.  Though prohibiting medical tourism would decrease 
individual autonomy, those in rural areas in many developing countries would see an 
overall enhancement of autonomy as choices for medical care become more widely 
available.   
A good definition of sustainability is at least an arguably just definition of 
sustainability.  Nolt’s definition is one such definition, as it includes not only 
intergenerational justice but also intragenerational justice.  More importantly, in using the 
schematic definition of sustainability from Nolt and applying it to the value of health 
care, the model of sustainability is itself a model of social justice for that particular 
value, e.g., health care.  The model of sustainability assures fairness insofar as all people 
have access to adequate health care relative to my particular definition of health—though 
it is worthy of note that fairness does not necessarily entail the exact same care, nor even 
the same level of care if cultural, regional, and economic differences are accounted for.  
Adequate health care would be a huge change from our current health care 
system.  In the United States, we have an expansive definition of what counts as a 
healthcare need.  Compared to developing countries, society often counts something as a 
medical need when in fact the procedure or object in question is a medical luxury.  For an 
example, some medical tests that we regularly perform we have come to think we need, 
but are actually unnecessary.  In a study done concerning unnecessary medical practices 
in 2012  “The American College of Cardiology is urging heart specialists not to perform 
routine stress cardiac imaging in asymptomatic patients, and the American College of 
Radiology is telling radiologists not to run imaging scans on patients suffering from 
simple headaches” (Rabin 2012, Guest and Cassel 2012).  The same study prescribed that 
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doctors should not “perform annual stress cardiac imaging or advanced non-invasive 
imaging as part of routine follow-up in asymptomatic patients (ABIM Foundation 2012).    
We can now see how we might go about delineating sustainable care from 
unsustainable care.  Under a consideration of global sustainability such as I propose, my 
model constrains the satisfaction of patient demand for healthcare to cases where the 
demand does not threaten the structure and health related functions of society and the 
relevant ecosystems.  This will, for example, limit care that is minimally beneficial yet 
costly (and many other forms of care).  But it extends the consideration of cost to include 
natural capital—i.e. not only the monetary impact of such treatment, but the impact on 
natural resources and ecosystems as well.  In this definition of health, there is recognition 
that some medical treatments, though beneficial to the individual, are ultimately harmful 
to the global community e.g., people, ecosystems, etc., broadly considered.  Weighed 
against the harms to the global community then, many more treatments will be 
unjustifiable.  The denial of such a treatment and the decreased health of the individual 
would, on this view, be unfortunate but not unfair. 
It is unjustifiable to engage in medical practice promoting ecological degradation 
that will, on balance, create greater health problems for humans either in current 
generations or future generations.  What seems to be excellent, top tier health care may 
heal some but increase risk factors for others. 
Part of this is because the proper spatiotemporal unit of sustainability is the global 
generation.  As Nolt points out, the question is not whether some group can achieve 
sustainability of some value in isolation.  We no longer exist in isolation from one 
another, but instead are dependent upon not only each other but people in different 
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nations for some goods and services.  Nolt writes, “We might suppose that a person or 
group is living sustainably if she, he or it adopts a lifestyle that, were it adopted by all 
people or groups, would sustain V” (2010, p.148).  But if “all” really is all inclusive, i.e., 
“all” includes every person, then what is sustainable depends in part upon the population.  
If everyone is to live sustainably, then when the population grows the ecological footprint 
that each person may have shrinks, resulting in more demanding requirements for what 
counts as sustainable (Nolt 2010, p.148).  For now, I mean only to mention the problem, 
but will give it full attention in section four. 
If, as Nolt suggests, sustainability is global, then, health care is in serious trouble 
due to the vast inequities between the health care across the globe.   Some countries have 
an abundance of healthcare, albeit at a high economic and environmental cost.  
Conversely, developing countries have a shortage of healthcare and often spend little 
money on it.  I do not intend to address the problem of healthcare in developing 
countries, since such a project would require serious logistical analysis of economies and 
distribution.  It is enough to begin to imagine the changes necessary to bring health care 
to adequacy.  In the United States, the changes would be sweeping and widespread.  
To understand the differences between wants, needs, and adequacy, it will be 
useful to differentiate adequacy from each respectively.  First, adequate healthcare is 
different than a medical need because there are some medical needs that are beyond the 
scope of adequate care.  To many, this sounds counterintuitive because there is a long 
tradition in sustainability beginning with the Bruntland definition that sustainability 
fulfills needs but not wants.  A medical need is defined as the requirement of an 
individual to receive medical assistance to return to typical species functioning.  In 
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medicine, however, within the confines of sustainability, what may count as a medical 
need may be unsustainable.  That is, though adequate healthcare is largely made up of 
medical needs, some medical needs are impossible if adequate healthcare is to be 
provided for the global generation.  Providing treatment for a medical need is a sufficient 
but not a necessary condition of adequate healthcare.   
If a ninety year old person is dying from terminal cancer, but might be saved with 
extensive surgery, the surgery is a medical need.  Although most people are deceased 
before the age of 90, typical species functioning is a state of life rather than death no 
matter the age of the individual.  Otherwise, a commitment to return patients to species 
typical functioning would commit one to kill patients after a certain age in a practice that 
seems obviously objectionable.  Regardless, such a surgery would be above and beyond 
adequate care; in such a case the patient may not want the surgery.  Even should the 
patient wish for the performance of such a surgery, the friability of organs in one of such 
advanced age makes survival much less likely despite the steady rise in the average age 
of persons receiving life-saving treatment (Callahan 2008).  Even if the individual should 
freely elect surgery, the fact that resources relevant to medical care could do more good 
within a health care setting elsewhere remains, regardless of whether an individual 
spends the money they would have used to elect surgery on consuming some other 
resource.  Wisely using resources relevant to health care within the health care is 
necessary to satisfy the responsibility of making health care sustainable for the current 
global generation.  This is exactly why when faced with scarce resources like transplant 
organs, we are so careful in who we give them to.  Heart transplantation is not generally 
performed in patients over 70 years of age because the recovery process is so difficult 
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that a successful outcome is doubtful (Mehra 2006).  In short, our resources—including 
those of the patient—are better used in other ways.  Even though a patient may wish to 
elect surgery, it is not unfair or unjust to deny the request because they are not a good 
candidate for various reasons.  Sustainability simply adds another consideration for 
whether or not one counts as a good candidate by forcing us to consider the 
environmental impact.  The patient may live out their life as they wish within their 
ability; an autonomy affirming act for many when the likelihood of returning to wellness 
is statistically improbable.  Such medical need is beyond adequate medical care.  Still, 
one may argue that all I have done is shown how my vision of sustainable health care 
deals with marginal cases.  In what follows I examine less marginal cases and apply the 
vision of adequate care. 
 To apply my vision of adequate care in less marginal cases, it is necessary to 
consider and directly apply our definition of adequate healthcare.  Expressed in a 
negative way, healthcare that impairs the ability of present of future global generations 
from adequately meeting their healthcare needs is impermissible.  If medicine is to be 
sustainable, then we must avoid spending too much capital—whether social, ecological, 
or economical—on any patient or group of patients because such action will impair the 
ability for the current generation as well as future generations to adequately meet their 
own healthcare needs.  On the face of it, our responsibility to make health care 
sustainable forces us to choose what health care practices would be offered and which 
would not.  Some of the most resource intensive medical procedures would be 
impermissible. One example of a class of procedures that are generally capital intensive 
and likely to be unsustainable is transplants.   For example, transplants are generally near 
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the top of economically expensive medical procedures—and likely to be economically 
unsustainable if the global generation is to meet their healthcare needs adequately, 
because they are among the most expensive medical procedures and well beyond the 
means of an individual earning an average income.  Transplants are afforded through 
insurance, resulting in higher rates and exacerbating existing socioeconomic inequality.  
According to the Department of Health and Human Services, “the average cost of 
transplantation in 2008 ranged from $259,000 for a single kidney to over $1,200,000 for 
a heart-lung transplant” and cost $2,500 per month for immunosuppressing drugs (2014).  
Such funds could be used for vaccinations, which yield an 18% return due to economic 
growth from the increased health and longevity of the population (Wolfson et. al. 2008).  
Though economic growth is in tension with sustainability because it tends to be caused 
by increased consumption, it is clear that the option yielding better health and reducing 
inequality is vaccinating or other such public health measures like clean drinking water 
and sanitation, which are also more economically sustainable than transplants. 
 Perhaps more clear is the distinction between adequate care and medical wants.  
One might argue that all medical wants are beyond the confines of adequate medical care.  
This isn’t true either; one can easily imagine a case where someone wants to have a 
procedure performed that is not expensive, damaging to society, or damaging to the 
environment.  Such a procedure would be at least theoretically permissible unless it were 
part of a greater trend, whereby as part of the aggregative impact of many such 
procedures the procedure begins to have a detrimental impact to society, the environment, 
or monetarily.  The procedure may become impermissible at the point where it becomes 
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detrimental, or other tough decisions, such as population reduction, could be considered.  
Later in this chapter I discuss the population issue in detail. 
Corrective or reconstructive plastic surgery is an easy example of a medical need, 
as opposed to a procedure involving a medical luxury like elective plastic surgery.  For 
example, a cleft lip and palate may cause various medical problems for the unfortunate 
person born with it.  Problems directly associated with a cleft palate include trouble 
eating, poor growth, misaligned teeth, frequent ear infections, a change in nose shape, 
and hearing problems (Pubmed Health 2012).  Such problems seriously decrease the 
quality of life for the individual afflicted, and increase the need for health care.  Early 
treatment is by far the cheapest option over the lifetime of the individual (Cohen, 2008).  
Contrast repairing a cleft palate with an elective rhinoplasty; such surgeries are often 
performed because the patient is unhappy with their current nose.  In extreme cases the 
patient’s negative perception of their nose may even be a source of mental distress.  In 
such a case, the surgery may no longer be elective; to keep our distinction between need 
and luxury, I take a clear case of elective rhinoplasty to be a case where the patient has no 
psychological issues present that may be cured by the surgery, and who is otherwise 
healthy.  That is to say, the patient merely wishes to have a different nose, or to have their 
current nose shaped more to their liking.  Clearly, the former case of the cleft palate is a 
case of medical necessity, while the latter case is an example of medical luxury. 
 Still, all I have done is to point out two points on a spectrum.  On one side, there 
is clearly necessary healthcare, i.e., medical needs, and on the other side, there is clearly 
luxury healthcare, i.e., medical wants.  The real debate, however, is where to draw the 
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line for adequate healthcare.  If healthcare practices fall along such a spectrum, then 
without a well justified criterion for determining adequacy, any point may seem arbitrary.   
Of great concern then are procedures and types of care that are needed almost 
universally to maintain at least a baseline of adequacy of care.  Prenatal care of some sort 
is necessary universally, as is palliative care, vaccines, antibiotics, clean water, basic 
vision care, and basic dental care to name only a few of the services needed by everyone 
to remain healthy on nearly any definition of health.   Here is where the greatest task for 
envisioning sustainable medicine lies.  These services are needed just to maintain 
adequate care.  Both public health outcomes and individual health depend upon the 
continued offering of these services.  Bringing health care to adequacy depends upon 
extending these services to places where such services are scarce in such a way as to 
promote sustainability and in so doing, benefitting human and nonhuman health. 
 What if one can afford better, yet unsustainable healthcare?  It is easy to imagine 
any number of people who possess the financial, social, or natural capital necessary to 
fund any medical procedure they choose.  What should we do in such cases?  There are 
really three options which I take to be the main options available.     
1. Maintain the status quo. Allow the purchase of such services free of costs that 
are normally (currently) externalized. 
2. Deny the purchase of all such services. 
3. Pay as you go. Allow the purchase of such services, but include in the cost of 
the purchase enough capital to offset the aspects of the procedure that make 
the procedure unsustainable and provide for using the funds raised to maintain 
sustainability. 
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If we allow the purchase of unsustainable medical services then we risk undermining the 
sustainability of the entire system.  If any lessons have been learned from the Amish, it is 
that the promise of a cure is stronger than conviction and oath.  The Amish are offered 
such care, and with increasing numbers they purchase it, to the detriment of their society 
as discussed in chapter two.  If we deny the purchase of all such services then we 
diminish patient autonomy and risk putting doctors at odds with their patients.  Any act 
that diminishes patient autonomy requires justification that proves the act diminishes 
patient autonomy for ethical reasons.  If patient autonomy is diminished, then the 
autonomy of one of the most vulnerable parts of our population, i.e. those who are ill or 
diseased and at the mercy of medical care, is diminished at a time when autonomy 
affirming and autonomy reinforcing actions are most needed for patient health.   
 Furthermore, denying the purchase of healthcare outright creates unnecessary 
philosophical tension within my view.  It may be unjustifiable to deny care in all cases on 
the basis of the procedure being unsustainable because what determines whether a given 
procedure is sustainable or not is whether the practicing of a given healthcare procedure 
or service creates a trend.  One procedure or the sporadic operation of a procedure in your 
average circumstance will not create massive environmental harm.  Rather, the practice 
of an unsustainable procedure on a large segment of the population is what creates 
massive environmental harm.  Denying certain individuals access to a procedure that 
would not constitute a trend seems indefensible on my view.  Instead, I propose that 
luxury health care be taxed to provide basic health care for those who need it, and to 
offset the environmental harm done. 
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 If we allow the purchase of unsustainable medical services but include a program 
of offsetting the sum total environmental impact of unsustainable medical services then 
we might find a compromise between allowing the purchase of unsustainable care in a 
way that at least promises not to undermine the system of sustainable medicine, so long 
as we ensure that the funds raised through the offsetting program go toward maintaining 
sustainability.  The idea of an offset would be to negate impact of unsustainable 
procedures by using capital gained from the procedure to result in no net loss of protected 
environmental values, e.g. climate stability, streams, forests, or particular biota.  Like any 
market solution, any program to offset environmental degradation from human activity is 
subject to the well documented problems of economic analysis and valuation.  Problems 
include how to provide the offset (taxes or other compensation?), the loss of original 
habitat that cannot be offset at all because the habitat cannot be easily replaced or 
replicated elsewhere, and whether the compensation given is really adequate (Campbell 
2014).  In principle, a luxury tax program works to protect the environment while at the 
same time allowing healthcare institutions to meet patient demand.  The danger of a 
luxury tax program is that existing inequalities between the rich and poor may worsen 
because many of the poor will not be able to afford such a program. 
 There are admittedly many practical problems with the implementation of an 
offsetting program.  A limiting factor to an offsetting program within my theory of 
sustainable medicine would be that all offsetting must cease at the point where continuing 
to allow consumption of some environmental good compromises the ability of the current 
or of future generations to adequately meet their healthcare needs.  In the case of scarce 
resources, it will be necessary to have some resources like old growth forest, Mt. Rainier, 
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etc., that are entirely off limits, even for a system of offsetting.  Still, such a system may 
allow for adequate health care for all, which may result in greater equality of opportunity.  
In the next section, I return to a discussion of Daniels’ idea as applied within the confines 
of sustainability. 
 
4.3 Equality of Opportunity 
     
More needs clarified about Daniels’ argument concerning opportunity and health 
care.  Central to Daniels’ position is that equality of opportunity requires a decent basic 
minimum of care because health care is a positive right.  According to Daniels, society 
has an obligation to offer a decent basic minimum of care because health care is a special 
good—while we may do without other goods, doing without health care is harmful not 
only to our bodies, but also the range of opportunities available to us (Daniels 1982, 78-
79).  A health care need is something needed to “maintain, restore, or provide functional 
equivalents (where possible) to normal species functioning” so that people may avail 
themselves of the normal opportunity range for their given society (Daniels 1981, 158).   
What counts as normal species functioning is a matter of debate and crucial to 
understanding Daniels’ position.  Normal functioning is achieved when there is a lack of 
physical or mental impairment hindering people’s ability to avail themselves of the range 
of opportunities available to them in their society.  This optimal range of opportunity is 
theoretical; each person has an effective opportunity range, which is a subset of the 
overall opportunity range and includes all contextual limiting factors (Daniels 1981, 159).  
Fair equality of opportunity is defined as equal access to jobs and offices, including 
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prohibiting barriers to access and requiring corrections for the negative effects on 
opportunity resulting from a variety of factors like social discrimination, lack of training, 
and socioeconomic inequalities (Daniels 2001 3).  The things necessary to allow for a 
normal opportunity range are divided as follows: 
(1) Adequate nutrition, shelter 
(2) Sanitary, safe, unpolluted living and working conditions 
(3) Exercise, rest, and other features of healthy life-styles 
(4) Preventative, curative, and rehabilitative personal medical services 
(5) Non-medical personal (and social) support services (Daniels 1981, 158). 
Daniels intends for this list to categorize the relations between goods, services, and our 
opportunities, since a wide range of variables may affect our opportunity range.  If 
Daniels is correct, then there are strong obligations to ensure the offering and availability 
of all five categories, though medicine would most obviously be involved with the first 
four, while the third category carries a strong requirement of personal responsibility so 
long as facilities are available to all.  With deficiencies in the distribution, offering, and 
use of services in nearly every category, it is important to note that Daniels is most 
concerned with offering services and ensuring that there are as few hindrances as possible 
to availing oneself of the services in each category. 
 Daniels notes the need to differentiate how to determine whether something is 
part of a decent basic minimum of care or not, and proposes the ability of people to avail 
themselves of the normal opportunity range as a rough measure for how to determine the 
decent basic minimum.  Ruud Ter Meulen rightly argues that “since what constitutes a 
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decent minimum of care is heavily dependent on individual conceptions of the good life, 
defining that the decent minimum of health care can only be created (not discovered) in a 
process of negotiation [sic]” (Meulen 2011, 614).  Still, for my purposes the continuation 
of the possibility of having a good life is essential so long as an individual’s conception 
of the good life does not preclude or contradict obligations to future generations. 
Whatever my conception of the good life, it should be likely that my children could also 
live in comparably good ways.  At present, given the rate of climate change and human 
contributions to that change, we are obligated to do what we can to allow future 
generations to also live a good life.  Constrained within the bounds of sustainability, we 
can define adequate health care by building upon Daniels’ account of fair equality of 
opportunity and a decent basic minimum of care. 
 When considering equality of opportunity between societies within the current 
global generation, it is easy to argue that gross inequalities exist.  Though many factors 
affect life expectancy, when life expectancy is low in a country health outcomes are 
worse over the lifetime of an individual and adversely affect the ability of those living 
within that country to avail themselves of the normal range of opportunities than they 
may otherwise have if health outcomes.  According to Dwyer’s figures, countries that 
have a higher ecological footprint also tend to have higher life expectancies.  This trend is 
also observable using the Happy Planet Index, which tries to measure sustainable well-
being.  The index determines sustainable well-being by multiplying life expectancy by 
experienced well-being and dividing that number by ecological footprint.  Citizens of a 
country are surveyed and asked to report their experienced well-being on a scale of 0-10, 
with ten being the best life possible.  Comparing Tables 1 and 2, we see that countries 
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with high life expectancies tend to have unsustainable ecological footprints, while 
countries with low life expectancies tend to have sustainable ecological footprints but 
experience less well-being (Abdallah, Shah, and Marks 2012).  Much of this is related to 
global inequality, as countries processing natural resources tend to be wealthier and the 
countries where the natural resources are extracted tend to be poorer, tend to have worse 
health, and tend to have a lower ecological footprint (Harris 2010).   
 In an increasingly globalized world, worse health outcomes lead to very real 
inequalities in the opportunities available to the citizens within nations, but also between 
nations.  Intragenerationally there is inequality of opportunity and inequality of access; 
moreover, there will be inequality of opportunity intergenerationally if resources are used 
to the extent today that future people cannot maintain adequate levels of health care at a 
decent basic minimum or above. 
First, I’d like to point out that equality of access to care, whatever contested 
definition one means by the term “equality,” is an ideal to strive for—an ideal that may 
not be reachable, but which is a more than worthy goal.  As I use the term, “equitable 
access” means access to a decent basic minimum or baseline of care, below which 
adequate care cannot fall in order to remain considered “adequate.”  In Equity of Access 
to Health Care, Daniels notes that when people speak of equal access to care, what they 
mean is that barriers to care like financial limitations and geographical location should 
play little or no part in whether one who needs care can get care (Daniels 1982, 55).  This 
is part of the problem, but it is an oversimplification of an incredibly complex issue. 
Equality of access to care does not mean that everyone has formally equal access 
to care; rather, each individual must have substantively equal access to care.  Formally 
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equal access to care would guarantee nondiscrimination and equal access to care for all, 
without taking any action to correct existing inequalities (such as accidents of birth) that 
will hamper the ability of health care institutions to care for members of society.  Under a 
substantively equal system, not only is care available to all but that systems are put in 
place that encourage people avail themselves of health care in order to overcome pre-
existing inequalities to health care access.    Instead, I advocate substantive equality 
because it is clear that simply providing access to health care would not be enough to 
provide adequate health care for all.  Well documented distrust of science and medicine 
on the basis of cultural barriers and a misunderstanding of the procedures involved is 
enough to show that substantive equality is necessary to provide adequate health care to 
the global generation (Daniels 1982).  There are many documented cases where due to 
cultural and linguistic barriers, people such as the Hmong distrust western medical 
practice.  When positive steps are not taken to overcome this distrust, the Hmong (a 
hilltribe living in the area around Laos) and other cultures with similar cultural and 
linguistic barriers to western medicine will have worse health outcomes (Fadiman 1997).  
In order to provide substantively equal care to the global generation, there must be 
attempts to rectify pre-existing inequalities in health care access and usage.   
There must also be constant vigilance that inequalities in access of care do not 
worsen.  While changes in lifestyle and in our expectations from health care are 
necessary, we must ensure that in the process of rectifying existing inequalities that new 
inequalities are not created either intentionally or inadvertently.  A careful balance must 
be struck to ensure that the standard of adequate health care does not worsen income 
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inequalities, since income inequality is linked to poor public health outcome 
(Subramanian and Kawachi 2004, 2006).   
With regard to intergenerational justice, because adequate health care is subsumed 
within the confines of sustainability, future generations must have the ability to maintain 
their own level of adequate care.  As with intragenerational justice, intergenerational 
justice requires that health care inequalities do not worsen from the passing of the current 
generation and into the next, as a worsening of health care inequalities would impair the 
ability of future generations to maintain their own adequate levels of care. Part of 
adequate health care is to ensure that the current generation acts on their responsibility to 
make medicine sustainable so that they do not impair the ability of future generations to 
also maintain adequacy of care. 
We may measure whether health care inequalities worsen within systems of 
medicine today. Current methods for measuring access to care are already in place and 
used; the same methods could be used to comparatively measure trends in access to care 
and help ensure that future generations have comparably easy access to care compared to 
the current generation.  Current methods do not take an environmental approach to the 
problems, however, and instead focus on the individuals.  But if the sustainability of 
health care requires the reduction of inequality in general and not just inequalities in 
access to care, current methods will need to expand to ensure that the current generation 
fulfills obligations to posterity. 
Admittedly, there are many barriers to access to care that developing nations 
encounter that make my vision of sustainable health care practically problematic.  The 
vision of sustainable health care that I have in mind requires improving the access to care 
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that people in developing nations have to the point that their access to care allows them to 
avail themselves of the normal opportunity range in their society, and maintain 
comparable access to care for future generations. When the normal opportunity range 
within a society is insufficient to live a minimally decent life, efforts to assist in the 
implementation of public health measures are necessary from the global community.  If 
done within the confines of my vision of sustainability, both the countries giving and 
receiving aid will benefit from investing in societies in need economically, socially, and 
with regard to health.  The obligation to give aid to other countries is clear—if greater 
inequality within a country is destructive in the ways outlined in chapter three, and if 
pollution and illness are able to cross borders, then many countries are obligated to help 
countries in need to prevent harms to their own population, as well as to prevent harm in 
the population of the country in need.  In particular, providing care in this way allows us 
to account for the particular conditions encountered in different nations, and allows for 
health care itself to be unequal among nations while improving access to care for those 
nations that are still developing. 
I propose the following criteria for determining adequate care, as differentiated 
from health care needs and wants.  I take these criteria to be a starting point for defining a 
baseline, rather than the final word.  Furthermore, aside from their theoretical usefulness, 
these criteria are only meant to help states and institutions decide what minimal care to 
give within the context of sustainability.  That is, some kind of care may not meet all of 
these criteria, but a state or institution may value it enough to include it anyway.  I also 
consider these criteria essential to a transgenerational account of Daniels’ ideas.  It is a 
wedding of sustainability to Daniels equality of opportunity: 
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1. Health care necessary to ensure access to the opportunities one’s society offers for 
the current generation and to ensure that the ability of future generations to do the 
same is not impaired. 
2. Care that raises the opportunities one’s society offers to a minimum baseline or 
better for all in the current generation and does not impair the ability of future 
generations to have at least a minimum baseline as well. 
Both criteria are aimed at accomplishing Daniels’ idea of access to care and equality of 
opportunity for the current generation while recognizing the obligation to refrain from 
impairing the ability of future generations to do the same.  The first criterion is a 
recognition that without one’s health, the opportunities that one’s society offers may 
become inaccessible.  This, Daniels argues, is unjust according to Rawlsian egalitarian 
principle.  I need not adopt the same theoretical backing; ensuring access to the 
opportunities that one’s society offers is morally defensible according to many ethical 
theories.  In borrowing the criterion, I do not mean to suggest, as Daniels is sometimes 
criticized for doing, that health will always increase one’s opportunity range (Cust 1993, 
156).  This is a dubious assertion because of the myriad of circumstances affecting one’s 
opportunity range; though one may have optimum health, other factors may exist that do 
not permit health to contribute to an increased range of opportunity.  I do, however, 
maintain that without care, many opportunities that may otherwise be attainable to an 
individual are not.  Recall that Daniels defines a normal opportunity range as "the array 
of life plans reasonable persons are likely to construct for themselves" (Daniels 1985, 
33).  Health may enable one to make and follow those life plans, circumstance allowing.  
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More certainly, health can hinder the making and following of such life plans, even when 
circumstances otherwise allow.   
 There is an additional concern when considering the current generation that the 
first criterion raises.  Some people live in places where they do not have even basic 
opportunities.  The current generation is responsible for ensuring that basic opportunities 
are available to all.  For example, basic opportunities are things like making a family, to 
have a life expectancy high enough to see grandchildren, to have a vocation, and to learn 
skills that enrich life beyond mere survival.  This obligation is rooted in the idea that we 
are part of a global community, and should treat one another as citizens of the same 
community—an idea that is increasingly accepted as we become more globalized.  This 
idea applies to health care as much to opportunity due to the close relationship between 
health and the opportunities that are available to us. 
I agree with Daniels that health care, insofar as justice requires, must be 
“universal” as health care is a positive right—though the justifications for my view are 
the transgenerational considerations for justice required by sustainability, and what is 
meant by “universal” is more expansive.  Daniels’ concept of universality means health 
care for all of at least some sort within a society, but the scope of his discussion remains 
within national borders.  If, as I have admitted, sustainability must be global, then a 
global scope is the appropriate scope for sustainable health care.  Intragenerationally, the 
first criterion obligates us to restrict all health care in developed nations to levels that 
actualize the responsibility to make health care sustainable in the current generation, 
unless technology and innovation make it possible to achieve health care sustainability 
worldwide and still provide for luxury care in developed nations.  This would in theory 
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allow for all other nations to likewise have adequate health care if and only if the current 
generation accepts and acts upon the responsibility to make life sustainable more 
generally, freeing up resources for the developing world.  Otherwise, there may be a 
tendency to spend the money and resources not spent on health care in other ways just as 
detrimental to sustainability and sustainable health care.  The developing world would 
then have to avail themselves of those resources, however.  Because adequate care is 
necessary for a normal opportunity range, adequate care must be possible for all nations 
and societies—if health care uses too many resources in one area, it may impair the 
ability of another country to raise health care to adequate levels in the same way that a 
society that is unsustainable will impair the ability of other societies to attain an adequate 
standard of living.  
Intergenerationally, the first criterion, (that health care necessary to ensure access 
to the opportunities one’s society offers for the current generation and to ensure that the 
ability of future generations to do the same is not impaired) restricts the health care levels 
and activities of the current generation so that future generations may also have the health 
care necessary to ensure a normal opportunity range.  Moreover, the current generation 
should also have health care at a level that allows them a normal opportunity range as 
well, so long as all health care in any case is constrained within the limits of 
sustainability.  In examining transgenerational notions of adequate health care and 
equality of opportunity, levels of care remain a central concern.  It is there that I turn my 
attention next. 
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4.4 Levels of Care 
    
First it may be beneficial to understand levels of care in the other visions of 
sustainability first discussed in chapter two, beginning with Jameton and Pierce and to 
consider the differences between their approach and my own.  Key differences occur in 
the placement of authority for making decisions concerning levels of care, and where the 
emphasis lies concerning the responsibility for making medicine sustainable. 
The level of care advocated by Jameton and Pierce isn’t defined so much as it is 
framed.  Jameton and Pierce lay the responsibility for becoming environmentally oriented 
on institutions themselves.  Institutions, they say, must independently establish a 
“background of material standards for patients and clinicians” (2004, 84).  Individual 
choices are then subject to the materials and standards deemed environmentally sound by 
particular institutions.  What care is offered, and what form that care takes, is defined by 
the individual institutions.  As an example of what individual institutions might look like 
under Jameton and Pierce’s vision of sustainable medicine, they offer the hypothetical 
Green Health Center.   
Jameton and Pierce argue that an arrangement like the Green Health Center will 
allow patients to make more meaningful choices.  Choices, they argue, are important not 
because of the number of choices but the meaningfulness of choices.  By allowing 
environmentally conscious choices to be made, they argue that the subsequent choices 
made will be more meaningful (Jameton and Pierce 2004, 84).  Jameton and Pierce claim 
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that patients would not be disempowered; rather, they would be even more empowered 
than previously, because the choices made are more meaningful than before because 
more factors are taken into account when making the choice—in effect, trading moral 
individualism for a community based view of a self that is encumbered with concern not 
just for the self, but for others as well.  Jameton and Pierce argue that “by taking global 
resources into account, the institution allows clinicians and patients to make choices that 
are more realistic, and thus more significant, in respecting our place in the world” even 
though the number of choices available may be fewer (2004, 84).  For example, when 
choosing what kind of care to offer or what kind of care is desired, clinicians and patients 
could choose between services that affect the environment in different ways and consider 
the environment as a factor in their decision. 
 One such decision important to conserving resources and using resources wisely 
occurs during end of life care.  At the end of life, Jameton and Pierce advocate allowing 
patients more readily to choose less care, or more labor intensive but low technology 
care.  Additional choices would not only enhance autonomy, but depending on what the 
choices available are it is possible to enhance autonomy and sustainability 
simultaneously.  In other circumstances however, there are fewer choices available to 
patients, but the choices available carry a different, or perhaps greater meaning.  
According to Jameton and Pierce refusing to attempt to cure a dying patient at the end of 
life is not a rejection of the sanctity of life; rather, it is an affirmation of the sanctity of 
life in the highest regard, as a realization of the interconnection between people, and a 
way of respecting the peaceful passing that anecdotal evidence suggests is desired by the 
majority of patients at the end of life.  When viewed as an example of how a green health 
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center may enhance the meaning of the decisions made by patients and empower them to 
make environmentally responsible decisions, one can see how institutions like the green 
health center may prove to be sustainable.  However, I remain unconvinced that the 
restrictions placed upon autonomy are justifiable because the choices are more 
meaningful.  Rather, if an authoritarian removal of choice is necessary at the institutional 
level, it seems better to be forthright with the removal of choice when such a removal is 
required to make health care sustainable. 
 Jameton and Pierce leave room for the medical professional to join in the 
greening of hospitals as well.  They argue that clinicians can and should be talking about 
these issues with patients, “perhaps deciding to pursue one form of treatment rather than 
another, based on environmental considerations balanced with the needs of the patient” 
(2004, 88).  This suggests that standards of care—what is acceptably sustainable and 
what is not—are dependent in part upon decisions made between clinician and patient.  
To deal with this added burden, Jameton and Pierce advocate an openness between doctor 
and patient, where the patient is aware that environmental concerns have entered the 
bedside, and the physician has been given the necessary tools to consider the environment 
when deciding on options for care.  Jameton and Pierce view this as an increase in the 
autonomy of the patient, rather than a decrease in the autonomy of the patient because the 
autonomous individual is properly understood as one person within a moral community.  
This moral community includes the biotic community of which the autonomous person is 
a part (Jameton and Pierce 2004, 119). 
 Paul Carrick argues that Jameton and Pierce actually undermine autonomy.  
Concerning the Green Health Center, he writes, “if adopted, it could undermine the 
  152 
autonomy of patients and  their families, cheapen the respect for human life ethic, and 
impose on our caring communities an autocratic system of medical management that 
smacks of environmental paternalism” (Carrick 454).  Families, Carrick argues, will be 
forced to choose from environmentally friendly options whether they want to or not, 
resulting in a loss of personal liberty (Carrick 457).   With regard to Jameton and Pierce’s 
system, I believe Carrick is correct.  Regardless of whether the choices that patients make 
are more meaningful, a net loss of available choices is a diminishment of autonomy.  On 
my view, though, there is admittedly a loss of autonomy for affluent individuals due to 
limiting medical options, there is a net gain of autonomy due to the reduction of 
inequality, as the reduction of inequality increases the ability of others to avail 
themselves of a normal opportunity range.  Without such a mechanism in place, Jameton 
and Pierce cannot answer Carrick’s objection to their view. 
 As pertains to my vision of sustainable health care, a decrease in the autonomy of 
affluent people is still objectionable despite a net global gain in autonomy that I argue 
would result from making health care sustainable.  While a reduction in the autonomy of 
the affluent is unfortunate, the obligation to make health care sustainable for the current 
global generation demands a decrease in their autonomy when necessary to achieve 
sustainability; the reduction of their autonomy need not be permanent, however, because 
circumstances determining what levels of care are adequate fluctuate according to many 
factors including but not limited to population, technology, and innovation.  Further, it is 
largely unobjectionable to constrain autonomy in the prevention of harm; this gives 
justification for legislation constraining health care that would undermine sustainability, 
and in terms of sustainability supports duties each of us has toward one another and 
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toward future generations.  The prevention of harm occurs in reducing environmental risk 
factors for disease by maintaining or achieving sustainability.  
Another point of agreement with Carrick is that Jameton and Pierce’s view 
undermines the relationship of trust needed between physician and patient (457).  Placing 
the responsibility for making sustainable decisions on patients and clinicians places the 
physician in a conflict of interest between environmental stewardship and the wishes of 
the patient.  To ensure that environmental concerns are attended to in decision making 
without undermining the physician-patient relationship, discussions concerning what 
types of care are sustainable should occur before the options are presented at the bedside 
as part of public dialogue, as discussed in the section on autonomy in chapter three.  
Restrictions on types of care that may be offered would be at either the governmental or 
the institutional level. 
On the institutional level, competition tends to promote unsustainable business 
practices so that goods and services offer better value for consumers.  Without legislative 
constraint, it is unclear that communities or individual hospitals will voluntarily choose 
sustainable health care practices.  Patients are also unlikely to voluntarily choose 
sustainable health practices when faced with health problems, as is evidenced in the 
willingness of the Amish to abandon beliefs and community obligations in favor of life 
saving health measures (Girod 2002).  While individual decisions and institutions play an 
important role in making health care sustainable, public dialogue and legislative measures 
are a necessary and unavoidable part of making health care sustainable and achieving 
sustainability in general despite issues with building the political will necessary to pass 
sustainability legislation.   
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In contrast, Callahan’s approach to levels of care bears some similarities to my 
own, in that to help determine levels of care he develops criteria for differentiating levels 
of care and envisions a framework within which those criteria are meant to operate.  First, 
let’s take a look at the criteria he sets forth.  Callahan argues that sustainable health care 
needs to focus more on health promotion and disease prevention, such as projects to 
understand and change unhealthy human behavior.  The level of care that Callahan 
proposes is tied directly to what kinds of technology, how much technology, and what 
levels of technology should be provided.  Three criteria are offered to define the 
boundaries/kinds of care that should be given: 
1. Communal Sufficiency: A sustainable medicine and its accompanying 
technology will provide a community with a level of health sufficient for that 
community to function well and to provide its members with a fair chance at 
an adequate life in the community. 
2. Minimum Individual Adequacy: Minimum individual adequacy will be 
achieved when most people have a statistically high probability of receiving 
over their lifetime the kind and amount of health care they need to survive and 
to function at the levels common in their society. 
3. Technological Economy: Technologies that strengthen public health 
programs, improve health and prevent disease, and help to motivate people 
engage in healthy behavior should be given top priority. (1999, 203-206). 
Note that Callahan’s first criterion pertaining to communal sufficiency is community 
based.  The focus on community is important because it shifts the focus of sustainable 
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medicine from the institutional level to the level of individual communities.  By focusing 
on communities, Callahan is able to envision a way that might enable individual 
communities have an adequate life—though what counts as an adequate life is left 
undefined.  There are, however, examples of what the communal sufficiency criterion 
entails.  Technology that satisfies this criterion will be aimed at public health rather than 
individual health.  Communally sufficient technology will “help the majority of citizens 
avoid a premature death, and to protect them from epidemics, contaminated food and 
water, correctable environmental hazards, and the like” (Callahan 1999, 204).  
Furthermore, technologies that strengthen public health programs, improve health and 
prevent disease, and help to motivate people engage in healthy behavior should be given 
top priority” in order to achieve a cost effective use of technology  (1999, 203-206).  
Technological fixes tend to be expensive and focus on individual emergency care, while 
public health measures tend to benefit the population in general and have the added 
benefit of being cost effective.  Individual need, however, is second in priority to 
communal need.  Since individual need is secondary to communal need, personal 
responsibility for health becomes supremely important for the maintenance of individual 
health.  As a result, education programs promoting good health habits toward the 
promotion of personal health responsibility would need implemented.   
In the discussion of his definition for minimum individual adequacy, Callahan 
notes that such measures will mean that some people fall outside the boundaries of care, 
i.e. some individuals will have needs that medicine, if it is to be sustainable, cannot 
provide.  Furthermore, Callahan notes that sustainable medicine requires equal access to 
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basic services, but not equal health outcomes.  He rightly points out that different health 
outcomes at the individual level are acceptable and unpreventable—the most one can do 
is to grant equal access to care.  In his concept of minimum individual adequacy, 
Callahan advocates that medicine need not meet every health need—only the most 
common.  The goal of such measures as he proposes is simply this: that “Sustainable 
medicine’s main goals will be to help most people avoid a premature death and, when 
they are old, to provide primary and palliative care, not the means to avoid all 
possibilities of death” (1999, 205, 241). 
The role of technology in aiding the realization of the first two criteria is of the 
utmost importance.  Technologies that are efficient, i.e. give good health gains for low 
cost, should be given priority.  Technologies that benefit only a few at high cost, or are of 
marginal benefit at a high cost, i.e. inefficient technologies, should have a lower priority.  
Finally, technology should “become an adjunct” to public health, “reserved for those 
medical conditions in which only a technological intervention can preserve health” 
(Callahan 1999, 206). 
There is, in Callahan’s work, a sense of how this may affect the environment.  
The illuminating discussion above that I’ve pulled from his work is originally placed 
within a discussion of the ways in which technology might be used by medicine 
sustainably and complementarily, i.e., as an equal approach among many approaches, and 
not the primary approach.  The focus of technology in Callahan’s work again turns upon 
the idea of our struggle against nature—the idea that humanity must conquer or dominate 
nature.  He writes, “Medicine went on the attack, seeking through research to find the 
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causes of disease and through technological diagnosis and therapy to rid us of those 
causes and relieve us of those symptoms” (Callahan 1999, 244).  However, this 
technological approach to curing disease leads to a never ending arms race against nature 
that is economically unsustainable due to the increasing investment necessary to combat 
diseases that we have thus far been unable to cure or treat. For Callahan, whether 
technological use is sustainable relates primarily to economic sustainability, and not 
environmental sustainability.  Economic sustainability is the ability to continue to afford 
spending the capital to use some technology; environmental sustainability concerns 
whether the technology has an adverse environmental impact and if so, whether that 
impact is enough to impair the ability of the current generation to raise health care needs 
to adequacy.  There are many technologies that are not costly in monetary terms but 
contribute significantly to environmental degradation.  By focusing too much on 
economic sustainability, Callahan misses the mark on environmental sustainability. 
The role of technology and its effect on medicine is constrained by Callahan’s 
first criterion of communal sufficiency, which has two parts.  First, people have a 
statistically good chance of receiving the health care that they need.  Second, this care 
will reduce the likelihood of premature death and physical or mental disability.  This is 
meant to introduce cost-effective strategies to health care, because the emphasis placed 
upon care is in favor of care that improves the health of populations as a whole, but 
which does not guarantee care for rarer cases.  Note that the focus here is on the health of 
the population and not the individual; individuals, so far as they are addressed in the 
criterion, are mentioned, are only guaranteed a statistically good chance at care.  But a 
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statistically good chance at care as Callahan uses the term only means that medicine will 
treat those diseases that people have a statistically high chance to develop.  Such 
measures will leave marginal cases, i.e. rare diseases and illnesses, without care.  Finally, 
Callahan iterates that the intent is to foster a sense of responsibility for one’s health, 
because there are no guarantees that the highest standard of technological care will be 
available (1999, 242).  In essence, since a lifestyle of a certain sort may give you a higher 
risk for diseases of a certain sort, and since you know there is likely little recourse should 
you develop such a disease, there is ample motivation to adjust your lifestyle.   
While I agree with Callahan’s effort to motivate personal responsibility for health, 
if medicine continues to act as an enabler for bad lifestyle choices, then we will continue 
to suffer the consequences of those lifestyle choices.  Counseling and psychological 
therapy should be available for those with unhealthy lifestyles as cost effective measures 
that treat not the symptom of the illness but what is very often the cause of self-
destructive behavior.  Medical intervention for diseases linked to unhealthy lifestyle 
choices should not be available when the unhealthy lifestyle choice is made through the 
exercise of one’s own autonomous and uncoerced will, and individuals should be notified 
via their health care professionals.  Many people are victims of circumstance, and so are 
forced into unhealthy lifestyles through no fault of their own; care should only be denied 
when a reasonable person would agree that the unhealthy lifestyle was freely chosen.  
When an individual is not treated because of such measures, the results may be 
unfortunate but are not unfair because treatment for the underlying causes of those 
decisions was available and their lifestyle decisions were made of their own volition. 
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Nonetheless, there is much debate among health care professionals concerning to 
what extent individuals are responsible for their lifestyle choices, and more clarification 
is necessary.  Our socioeconomic status predisposes us to some lifestyle choices or 
another; for example, low socioeconomic status increases the likelihood that an 
individual will use tobacco (Hiscock et. al. 2012).  Alternatively, lifestyles that were once 
a choice may no longer be because of addiction, while debates concerning whether 
addiction is classifiable as a disease or not continue.  If addiction is classifiable as a 
disease, then addicts should not be held responsible to the same degree for their actions in 
feeding the addiction.  Given these concerns, should we hold someone of low 
socioeconomic status who ends up smoking, or an addict who feeds their addiction 
responsible for their choices and actions?  As a practical matter, we must.  Unhealthy 
lifestyle choices contribute to increased risk factors for disease, decrease ones 
opportunity range, and at least indirectly contribute to ecological degradation while 
reinforcing inequality.   
While we must hold people responsible for unhealthy lifestyle choices, there are 
still obligations stemming from the principle of beneficence to treat these individuals 
regardless of those lifestyle choices.  In order to be justified in holding people responsible 
for lifestyle choices, programs must be available to treat the underlying physical, mental, 
and environmental conditions causing the unhealthy lifestyle to begin or continue.  Not 
only are such measures effective at preventing illness and disease as a result of the 
unhealthy lifestyle, they are more cost effective and often less resource intensive; for 
example, we can easily imagine the benefits people have from seeing a psychiatrist to 
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help them deal with self-esteem issues causing self-destructive behavior like continuing 
an unhealthy lifestyle. 
Returning to Callahan, the remaining details of Callahan’s discussion pertaining 
to standards of care are found in his idea of what a sustainable medicine looks like.  
Callahan sees a sustainable medicine as a steady-state medicine, i.e. a medicine that “in 
both research and health care delivery, aims for a steady-state plateau, at a level that is 
economically affordable and equitably available, and also at a level that is no less 
psychologically sustainable, satisfying most—but, of necessity, not all—reasonable 
health needs and expectations (1999, 26).  Specific aspects of this idea show just what 
level of care he advocates, however. 
1. Clear Benefit: The only care given is of clear benefit, in that for care to be 
offered over 50% of patients will show significant improvement in their 
medical conditions and where the costs of that improvement are not excessive 
in the context of competing medical needs and possible alternative 
expenditures. 
2. No deliberate extension of life expectancy in developed countries. 
3. No research to save low-birthweight babies beyond present limits (450-500 
grams). 
4. An obligation to educate patients and to give incentive to encourage patients 
that they need to accept personal responsibility for health and that they will 
die. 
5. Maintain decent basic care (Callahan 1999, 245-252). 
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Let’s briefly examine what each of these aspects of the level of care within Callahan’s 
vision of sustainable medicine mean.  The first aspect, pertaining to clear benefit, is 
intended to make medical technology and medicine more generally an adjunct of public 
health.  This particular criterion—perhaps more so than any of the other aspect—means 
that many people will fall outside the kind of care given according to Callahan’s vision of 
sustainable medicine.  Those afflicted by rare diseases and defects will be most affected 
by this aspect. 
Secondly, Callahan advocates a cessation of the deliberate extension of life 
expectancy in developed countries.  This too is tied to technology, because Callahan 
(correctly) identifies the rising cost of health care with longer life spans.  End of life care 
is a significant source of health care cost expenditure, while the research and 
development poured into increasing lifespan has met with diminishing returns in recent 
years (Callahan 1987, 1999).  Callahan targets developed countries rather than 
undeveloped or underdeveloped countries because in much of the world, increases in 
lifespan are achievable through public health works such as clean drinking water, sewage 
treatment, and other measures related primarily to increases in quality of life rather than 
life extension for the sake of life extension. 
Callahan calls for a moratorium on research for low-birthweight newborns, 
classified as 450-500 grams.  As at the end of life, the care of low-birthweight newborns 
is expensive.  Rather than cut back on care for low-birthweight babies, Callahan merely 
calls for a halt to research involving saving babies of even lower-birthweight—an 
important distinction, perhaps because such measures would incur less backlash from 
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patients and the population as a whole.  In recent years, though, more dollars have been 
spent on such research.  Small gains in successfully lowering the weight at which a 
newborn can survive have been associated with greater and greater costs. 
The obligation to educate patients and encourage them to accept personal 
responsibility for health and a recognition that they will die at the end of a biological 
lifespan stems from the need for patients to tolerate the limits of the health care offered 
by Callahan’s vision of sustainable medicine.  There is a limitation of choice imposed 
when operating within the finitudes of a sustainable medicine.  Callahan writes that “the 
limits may be on the treatments that physicians may use, or for which insurance coverage 
may be provided, or on the availability of some treatments at all” (1999, 251).  Still, he 
also argues that a sustainable medicine must maintain enough choice to allow patients the 
comfort and security necessary for seeking out and maintaining care. 
Lastly, Callahan discusses the necessity for the maintenance of decent basic care.  
Insofar as his vision of sustainable medicine is a steady state medicine, those aspects 
which currently make medicine unsustainable must be curtailed.  The highest levels of 
care will no longer be offered because there is no obligation to pursue unlimited 
progress—the only obligation is to provide care that is equitable, gives a good quality of 
life, and ensures a reasonable life span for most people. 
To a large extent, I agree with Callahan’s approach.  His assessment of 
technology, including the benefits and costs of its progress and use, are largely correct.  
He is also correct to point out that sustainable medicine will require a movement toward 
public health initiatives and personal responsibility for our own health.  My largest 
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disagreement with him pertains to equal access to care.  Callahan defines equitable access 
to care as “the availability of affordable health care to a population as a whole, where all 
citizens have a (1) statistically good chance of receiving, over their lifetime, the kind of 
health care they need to (2) reduce the likelihood of premature death and of physical and 
mental disability” (1999, 241).   
There are, however, several different ways to measure equity of access to care.  It 
is not clear that Callahan’s definition of equitable care is equitable in some ways that may 
be important.  Care is only made available, but not necessarily taken advantage of.  That 
is, though the care is available and there are no formal barriers to care, some populations 
may not avail themselves of care for a variety of reasons.  For example, a population may 
have a stigma against health care because of religious faith or other belief, and so 
although care may be available and affordable, they may nonetheless opt not to use health 
care services.  One example of the refusal of such affordable services is those that refuse 
vaccinations on the basis of religious belief.  Though problematic, we should ask the 
question whether such refusal violates equitable access to care based upon disparities in 
health outcomes for vaccinated populations versus health outcomes for unvaccinated 
populations.  Health care is just despite inequalities in the use of available services, but 
where inequalities in the use of available services exists, good justification is necessary 
for inaction pertaining to the resolution of inequitable use of available services. 
If unvaccinated populations have worse health outcomes, and vaccinations are 
available and affordable, then there is a serious question as to whether the refusal should 
be tolerated, even on the basis of religious belief.  In essence, though one can make the 
decision to take the risk of not being vaccinated on the basis of religious belief, doing so 
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may affect others if illness strikes, including those too young to make such decisions on 
their own.  The effects of one’s religious belief involve others who are not represented in 
the decision making process directly, or are only represented paternalistically, e.g. 
children.  An example is the recent record-setting outbreak of measles in Ohio was 
caused by Amish missionaries who opted out of vaccinating their children on religious 
grounds despite there being no rule in the Ordnung forbidding the use of vaccinations.  
The missionaries traveled to the Philippines and brought the disease back to their 
community.  No choice is given as to whether one remains Amish until the age of 16, 
during the Rumspringa.  At this time, an Amish youth may decide whether to remain part 
of the community, or join the outside world and be shunned (Amish Studies).  
Vaccinations would then be a possibility, but sixteen years of vulnerability exist before 
they may choose. 
Non-religious examples abound as well.  A 2011 outbreak of measles in 
Minnesota began when one unvaccinated two-year old child traveled abroad to Kenya.  
The child came home carrying the illness, contacting friends, family, and members of the 
public who were unaware that he carried the illness.  In total 19 children and two adults 
contracted the measles; 3,000 were exposed to the virus.  Nine were old enough to have 
been vaccinated but had not been (CDC 2011).  The decision not to vaccinate affected 
others who had decided not to become vaccinated, but ten children were also affected 
who were too young to receive the vaccination, had little choice in the matter, and who 
were likely not considered when the decision to forego vaccinations was made.  
According to one study, exemptors were 35 times more likely to contract the measles 
than those who received a vaccination, while “if the number of exemptors doubled, the 
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incidence of measles infection in nonexempt individuals would increase between 5.5% 
and 30.8%.  Disease in non-exempt individuals could be a result of a lack of vaccination 
for a reason other than non-medical exemptions or vaccine failure” (Salmon 2).  Trusting 
individuals to take personal responsibility for health is at the heart of vaccination 
exemption, yet it puts everyone at risk. 
Another objection to Callahan’s proposal is worth mentioning.  Giving a 
population a statistically good chance at receiving the care they need over the course of 
their lifetime to the end of reducing the likelihood of premature death and mental or 
physical disability may only be achievable in developed nations.  If medicine is to 
operate within the boundaries of sustainability, then it may not always be possible to 
ensure that medicine will be able to reduce the likelihood of premature death or mental 
and physical disability.  For example, in some areas of Iraq it is well documented that the 
ammunition and other materials during the first Iraq war that the United States was 
involved in have greatly increased the instance of birth defects (Al-Sabbak et al. 2012).  
One study notes that 
Mercury and Pb, two toxic metals readily used in the manufacture of present-day 
bullets and other ammunition, were 6 and 5 times higher in hair samples from 
Fallujah children with birth defects compared to Fallujah children who appeared 
normal… Though statistically not significant, the hair of parents of children with 
birth defects had more uranium, Pb and Hg than the hair of parents of normal 
children (Al-Sabbak et al. 2012). 
The population of this area would put a significant burden on the health care institutions 
in the area and their government if the health care equity that Callahan advocates is to be 
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attainable.  This population surely falls outside the majority and so outside of the realm of 
those covered under Callahan’s version of sustainable medicine insofar as expensive, life-
saving and life-altering services are concerned.  Still, it seems a violation of our sense of 
justice to allow this population to suffer simply because the region has “exotic” health 
care needs, even though the need is common for that region.  A greater sense of regional 
sensitivity to diverse health care needs is necessary.  
My strategy on the reduction of inequality also differs from Callahan’s.  While 
Callahan focuses on inequality as pertains to medicine, the inequalities he focuses on are 
inequities of access to health care and levels of care.  There is no mention of how 
socioeconomic inequalities affect health, or a recognition of how health, the environment, 
and inequality affect each other and reinforce the negative effects of one another, as 
outlined in chapter three. 
 Callahan addresses the problem of how to implement sustainable medicine by 
focusing on personal responsibility for care, but as I outlined in chapter two, it is unclear 
that personal responsibility will remain a point of primary concern when faced with life 
threatening illness.  If there are not mechanisms in place to prevent our decisions from 
undermining sustainable health care, then history shows that we will make the decisions 
in our own best interest or the interest of our loved ones more often than not, even at the 
cost of others.    
4.5 Population 
 
 One final note of worry that applies to both Callahan’s approach and to Jameton 
and Pierce’s approach is necessary.  In any discussion of levels of care, population should 
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play a central role.  In chapter two I noted that as population increases, the demands on 
resources increase as well; in a world of limited resources, increasing resource demands 
will eventually result in fewer resources available for each individual on average absent 
innovations that make the resources in question no longer relevant, or make our use of the 
resource in question more efficient.  Critics of concern over resource use argue that 
technological innovation has avoided the catastrophic failure of resources in the past.  
Famous among predictions foiled due to innovation are the predictions of Thomas 
Malthus, who failed to predict innovation in farming practices and technology that 
increased the production of food each farmer was capable of.  These innovations are 
widely credited as the reason why Malthus did not end up correct in his prediction of 
widespread famine due to an increasing population and the environmental limits to 
growth.  My concerns here are about a burgeoning population worldwide and the 
resulting resource depletion.  It is not out of some misanthropic sense that I say we must 
reduce the population—it is out of compassion for those who will live in a world of 
depleted resources if we do nothing. 
Paul Ehrlich and Julian Simon engaged in a bet during the 1980’s concerning 
whether resource depletion was a legitimate concern.  They bet a total of $1,000 on five 
different metals; copper, chromium, nickel, tin, and tungsten.  Ehrlich bet that the cost of 
all five would increase based upon the idea that as the population continued to grow 
resource scarcity would drive prices upward , while Simon bet that all five would 
decrease because there was no resource scarcity in the first place.  The winner would pay 
the difference in prices for purchasing $200 of each metal at the time of the wager.  
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Ehrlich sent Simon a check to settle the debt, having lost on all five commodities 
(Schneider n. pag.). 
 Though Ehrlich lost the bet for the decade spanning the 80’s, the bet only covered 
5 measurable commodities.  What Ehrlich’s concerns are really about, however, are that 
the population will grow to a point that exceeds the carrying capacity of the Earth.  His 
original predictions were often labeled alarmist, and his critics cite that his “doom and 
gloom” predictions never came to pass; a global die-off due to overpopulation that results 
in massive starvation on neo-Malthusian scales unless we limit population has never 
come to pass (Ehrlich 1968). 
 Julian Simon, it seems, was the victor who in the end was correct with regard to 
the bet.  Food supply is not the problem (it’s largely distribution and politics) and 
commodities are as cheap as ever in general, though oil has risen substantially in price.  
The problem is the scale at which goods and services are needed; if there were fewer 
people, consumption and pollution would not be the problems that they are today.  Even 
if civilization doesn’t experience a massive die-off because of resource shortages, the 
basic premise of his argument may remain true.  Population still results in an altering of 
conditions on Earth that are symptomatic of exceeding the carrying capacity of the planet 
for the standards of living involved.  Let’s examine this empirical claim. 
 Limits on the availability of resources like fresh water and arable land are some of 
the most likely limiting factors that may determine the carrying capacity of the earth.  
Groundwater depletion, a measure of how quickly we deplete reserves of groundwater 
faster than it is replaced, rose 25% between 2001 and 2008 in the U.S. alone according to 
a survey of groundwater depletion from 1900-2008 (USGS 2013).  The largest aquifer in 
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the U.S., the Ogallala Aquifer, has decreased 14.2% since we began drawing from it for 
widespread irrigation, (or what they call predevelopment) with increasing pressure put on 
the resource in recent years (USGS 2011, 13).  The period between 2001 and 2008 is 
reported to be 32% of the total depletion since predevelopment (USGS 2013).   
Globally the situation is bleak.  The population more than tripled during the last 
century while water usage has grown at twice the rate of population growth (FAOUN 
2007).  While technology may alleviate many apparent scarcities with technological 
innovations that allow for more efficient resource use, relying on the development of 
such technology is dubious business because its development is not guaranteed.  Consider 
an extreme example that is clear enough but an obvious oversimplification; if population 
growth is 2.1 children for every woman, then on a long enough time scale the biomass of 
people would be larger than the Earth itself.  But prior to that point, there is a point where 
we are likely unable to produce enough water or grow enough food to support such a 
massive number of people.  The carrying capacity is exceeded, but when? 
 Edward Wilson speaks of a bottleneck for population growth created by 
population and lifestyle.  In 2002, when the Earth’s population was roughly 6.2 billion 
people, he wrote that  
If everyone agreed to become vegetarian, leaving little or nothing for livestock, 
the present 1.4 billion hectares of arable land (3.5 billion acres) would support 
about 10 billion people. If humans utilized as food all of the energy captured by 
plant photosynthesis on land and sea, some 40 trillion watts, the planet could 
support about 16 billion people. But long before that ultimate limit was 
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approached, the planet would surely have become a hellish place to exist” 
(Wilson 2002). 
Why, you ask?  The reasons are already manifest.  If we look to Beijing, China, we can 
see the products of overpopulation when coupled with unsustainable development and 
consumption meant to sustain a rapidly growing economy—diminished clean water, air 
pollution, and reduced biodiversity to name just a few problems that become greater as 
population increases if factors like consumption and standards of living remain the same.  
Or we can look closer to home in the US, and see the declining Ogallala Aquifer in its 
decreasing capacity to fuel the breadbasket of America—or perhaps more worrisome, 
climate projections predicting that the Great Plains will be too hot and dry to produce 
grains.. 
If sustainable medicine is realized on a global scale, however, serious 
consideration must be given to population growth in order to address resource scarcity.  If 
poorer nations with higher growth rates see a decline in mortality rates because of 
improved health care, the population will grow—at least for a time.  Cultures are slow to 
react to changes in death rates and birth rates; observations of worldwide death rates and 
birth rates between 1875 and 1950 show that while death rates declined beginning in 
1875, birth rates did not decline until 1950 (Soubbotina 18).  The decrease in death rates 
is largely credited to modern medicine and the control of infectious disease (Soubbotina 
17).  Globally adequate health care would therefore exacerbate population problems and 
the resource issues that they entail. 
If health care needs must be adequately satisfied, there is a limit to the population 
possible due to the available resources.  The population limit has global and local aspects; 
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locally, population limits rely more heavily on regional and national resources and their 
sustainable use.  Global resources may affect a local population limit through the market, 
as countries import and export goods and materials necessary for maintaining standards 
of adequate health care.  Rare resources tend to be more costly than common resources 
when the market is allowed to fluctuate according to supply and demand, so a local 
population that is resource poor will have to import many resources for their medical care 
at a higher cost than if they were able to use resources of their own.  The role of the 
market in such a scenario should be minimal, however.  While demand for health care 
goods will always remain high, the limits on that demand are not market limitations, 
which tend to allow those with sufficient capital to consume almost as they please—the 
limitations are moral, and obligate us to restrain demand far more than what the market 
would bear. 
Tough choices must be made, but must not be arbitrary.  Many factors affect the 
sustainable population limit of a country, including life expectancy, levels of health care, 
and the distribution of resources.  Moral obligations to current and future generations 
require that societies make these decisions and implement policies to enforce them.  For 
example, if a society values high levels of health care (and whether they do or not), the 
amount of resources required to support those levels of health care entail a moral 
obligation to limit the population to sustainable levels.  If lower levels of health care are 
acceptable, then the population limit may be higher.  Exceptions to the relationship 
between health care levels and population size may be due to innovation and invention, 
where because of more efficient resource use, new technologies, new applications of old 
technology, or alternative medical practices increase health care levels without increasing 
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the resources used.  Alternatively, a population may opt to increase in size without raising 
levels of health care because of the same developments. 
In chapter one I mentioned that James Dwyer developed a metric for determining 
a just and sustainable life expectancy. Dwyer explicitly objects to anyone using a metric 
like his own to determine policy because while such metrics add perspective they are 
imperfect.  His metric is meant to facilitate deliberation on the issues surrounding life 
expectancy and sustainability rather than to substitute for public deliberation (Dwyer 
501).  He is correct that better metrics and indexes are necessary.  Calculations of 
ecological footprint are rough, largely because the variables involved in the calculation 
are difficult to measure, and because what variables should be included are a matter of 
intense debate.  Nonetheless, relatively few metrics are as intensely scrutinized or 
undergo as many revisions to increase accuracy as ecological footprint measurements.  
As a practical matter, although all metrics for measuring things life ecological footprints 
or just and sustainable life expectancy are imperfect, better options do not exist to the 
best of my knowledge. 
In calculating a just and sustainable life expectancy, Dwyer assumes that “a just 
or fair share of the Earth’s biocapacity is 1.8 gha per person” or the average amount that 
the current population could use so that the Earth provided enough resources for each 
person on the planet (Dwyer 501).   
The data for a nation’s life expectancy Dwyer uses comes from the 2008 WHO 
report entitled Life Table for WHO Member States, 2006 and is reported in Table 3.  The 
ecological footprint data used is from the 2006 Living Planet Report conducted by the 
World Wildlife Federation, available in Table 4.  Dwyer calculates a just and sustainable 
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life expectancy for each country listed by dividing the life expectancy for an individual of 
each nation by their average ecological footprint.  Each person, it is assumed, is entitled 
to resources equal to the resources necessary for all people on Earth to use the same 
amount of resources during their life expectancy—anymore and they are using the 
resources of another.  Table 5 shows the staggering results (Dwyer 2009).   
That countries like the United States or the United Arab Emirates are consuming 
an unjust share of resources or are outliving their just and sustainable life expectancy on 
average may seem obvious to some, but if we’re to take Dwyer’s index as a call to action 
and a basis for policy discussion, then decisions must be made to make medicine more 
sustainable, some of which involve population reduction tied importantly to what 
standards of living we choose to have. There is some research, notably from the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation using data from the World Bank, which suggests that as infant 
mortality rates decline population rates decline (Gates 2014, World Bank 2014).  Earlier I 
mentioned that if health care improved in poor nations, the decline in mortality rates 
would result in an increased population.  However, if mortality rates in general fall, the 
population will live longer, and this would result in at least a short term spike in 
population that we can expect to level out and fall according to historical precedent.  If 
this is true, then the case for sustainable health care is even stronger because 
sustainability could lead to slow population growth over time, or perhaps even a decline.  
Such conclusions are premature however, because the prevailing opinion has traditionally 
been that increasing health and saving lives would exacerbate population problems. 
One way to ameliorate population problems may be the widespread use of 
contraceptives, which would also increase the autonomy of women by allowing them 
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more control over reproduction.  No effective contraceptive for men is widely available at 
the time of this writing (though some are in the research phase), so the discussion of 
contraception focuses on women and usage of contraception.  In developing nations 
especially, an estimated 222 million women worldwide would either like to delay or 
prevent having children but do not currently use any form of contraception (WHO 2013).  
A reduction of inequality as proposed in chapter three would help women in situations 
cited in a WHO study done in 2011 that found a low rate of use of contraceptives among 
poor women in Africa (WHO 2011).  The study found that 
when childbearing intentions are controlled for, women in the richest wealth 
quintile appear to be more likely than women in the poorest wealth quintile to use 
long-term contraception, which is more expensive than short-term contraception 
and usually provided at clinics. Thus, closing this particular gap between the rich 
and the poor in developing countries will entail addressing women’s access to 
contraceptives and making all methods affordable (WHO 2011). 
While helpful to reduce population, contraception is most often used to space out children 
rather than to prevent births altogether, so the impact of contraceptives for controlling 
population should not be overstated.  However, if the use of contraceptives allows 
women to become more educated in developing nations by preventing untimely births, 
the resulting societal benefits of their contributions may lead to the development of their 
society.  Though developed nations tend to consume more resources per capita than 
undeveloped nations, birth rates also tend to be lower in developed nations in correlation 
with higher rates of the use of contraceptives (WHO 2013). 
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 The availability of abortions may also reduce population growth. S.D. Mumford 
and E. Kessel found in an observational study that any nation wanting to reduce its 
growth rate to 0% or 1% cannot hope to do so without abortion (1986).  The high birth 
rate in poverty stricken areas could be alleviated by making abortions available along 
with the use of contraceptives.  Perhaps the most effective means of controlling 
population through voluntary efforts is through developing nations, thus affording more 
opportunities for women outside of child rearing and educating women so that they may 
avail themselves of these opportunities.  These are some of the reasons cited as 
determinants of the reduced birthrate in developed nations (World Bank 2000).   
 We may, if we can reign in population growth, establish levels of care that we 
find appealing.  Public dialogue within and between societies is necessary to determine 
the levels of care a society deems acceptable, but levels must remain within the 
boundaries of sustainability.  The suggestions of Callahan and Jameton and Pierce are all 
parts of the puzzle, but do not go far enough in recognizing the human preference for the 
present when faced with problems.  By focusing on public health initiatives, population, 
and the reduction of inequality, I have envisioned a way for policy makers to enact 
legislation that will help make medicine more sustainable, and society more sustainable 
as well.  At the institutional level, I have developed a method for delineating between 
sustainable and unsustainable care and shown that the distinction is necessary and must 
be clear for policy makers and health care professionals.  In presenting my vision of 
sustainable medicine, I hope to have demonstrated a theoretical way forward.  In the next 
and final chapter, I offer some closing observations about this project and areas of future 
research that may aid in making health care sustainable. 
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CHAPTER V  
5.1 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
I have argued that health care contributions to environmental degradation frustrate 
the very ends that health care seeks to achieve.  To accomplish this task, sweeping 
changes must be made to health care, but those changes must remain sensitive to the 
contextual limitations of the areas becoming sustainable.  Though much will change, 
much will also remain the same.   
Human well-being is dependent upon well-functioning ecosystems relevant to 
human health.  Yet, without access to health care the full benefits of healthy ecosystems 
cannot be recognized effectively, because health problems will persist despite decreased 
risk factors.  Access to health care is only possible for everyone when it is economically 
affordable and available to everyone.  At the same time, while working to take care of 
ecosystems and individuals, we must also be sure not to undermine the ability of future 
generations to do the same.  Health care can accomplish this goal by reinforcing efforts to 
restore and maintain global ecosystems rather than participating in their degradation. 
My vision of sustainable medicine commits me to the view that health care is a 
positive right that everyone is entitled to, and therefore a moral obligation.  One might 
hold the position that health care, even adequate health care, is not a right and therefore 
not a moral obligation.  To the contrary, the provision of adequate health care is a moral 
obligation to one’s self as well as to others, pace arguments presented by Daniels in Just 
Healthcare and other works.  There is a long standing debate in biomedical ethics as to 
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whether health care is the kind of positive right that entails an obligation to provide 
health care for bearers of that right.  In my estimation, health care is a right for the global 
generation as well as for future generations.  We should not perform actions that deny 
people their right to health care.  If one denies that there is a right to health care, then 
they must accept the consequences of that view—namely, that at some time in their life, 
they will be faced with a medical crisis that they cannot afford for some reason, and that 
the severity of that crisis will determine whether they live, die, or become disabled.  Such 
consequences are not enough to dissuade all objectors however.  I wish the consequences 
of the objector’s view ended with only personal consequences, because then the question 
becomes a more practical matter of personal choice—one could opt into, or out of, health 
care providing services, so that through choosing to receive none they do not contribute 
to the care of others.  But the consequences are far reaching and require us to expect a 
different sort of care. 
One may question whether my vision of sustainable health care is synonymous 
with maximizing quality adjusted life years in order to make health care sustainable while 
ensuring that people have a high quality of life.  Making health care sustainable is not 
synonymous on my view with simply maximizing quality adjusted life years.  Quality 
adjusted life years (QALYs) are a tool of cost-utility analysis used to determine the ratio 
of the cost of any particular medical intervention to the number of healthy years gained as 
a result of the intervention.  Couching sustainable health care as a public health initiative 
does share some elements with QALY calculations.  In particular, medical practices that 
are cost-effective and yield quality care within the limits of sustainability are permissible 
according to my vision of sustainable health care.  However, being constrained only by 
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cost-utility analysis to determine ratios of quality adjusted life years could undermine 
efforts at making health care sustainable because the calculation does not typically 
include environmental considerations in the cost.  Even where it does, it is very difficult 
to evaluate the value of some environmental goods like ecosystem services and 
biodiversity.  Less clear are efforts at translating goods not distributed and valued on the 
market but which must enter into cost-utility evaluations like the aesthetic value of 
natural areas.  Finally, my view is not reducible to cost-utility analysis because 
sustainability requires a wider array of considerations including societal influence and 
cultural differences, a critical view of technology and its use regardless of cost or benefit, 
and a just use of resources. 
A related concern of cost utility calculations and quality adjusted life years 
surrounds vulnerable populations.  If the most effective use of resources is the use that 
will give the highest payout, then the greater return on the investment of our resources 
will most likely come by treating the healthier person over the less healthy individual, 
many of whom are disabled or are otherwise part of a similarly vulnerable population.  A 
real concern is how to distribute scarce resources justly without unfairly targeting or 
discriminating against vulnerable populations.  I advocate the reduction of inequality due 
to its adverse effects on health outcomes, ecological degradation, and opportunity range. 
Doctors should, wherever possible, remain steadfast advocates of their patients.  Policy to 
reduce inequality should include consideration for vulnerable populations and the 
circumstances affecting their range of opportunity.  In order to reduce inequality, it will 
sometimes be necessary to provide care that would normally not be offered under my 
vision of sustainable health care precisely because without providing that care we 
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reinforce the very cycle of inequality, decreased opportunity, ecological degradation and 
worse health outcomes that undermine sustainability.  For example, while a costly lung 
transplant may be considered unsustainable depending on circumstance; even if it were 
unsustainable it may be in the best interest of keeping health care sustainable to give a 
lung transplant to a coal miner in the mountains of Virginia.  Suppose the miner has a 
family and no other choice for employment.  Without providing care the miner will not 
be able to support his family.  Every member of his family would experience decreased 
opportunity and will be unlikely to have the means to move out of the area, subjecting 
them further to the negative health and environmental effects of living near coal mines 
and continuing or beginning a cycle of poverty and negative health outcomes.  Instead of 
denying these procedures outright, initiatives must be taken to ensure that the provision 
of these services does not impair the ability of future generations to meet their health care 
needs adequately. 
Unfortunately, for those who are poor, both health inequalities and the health of 
many individuals both poor and not poor will worsen in a vicious cycle, as outlined in 
chapter three.  Some will have the inability to pay for important health care services, and 
the system would have fewer healthy people paying to subsidize the care of the sick.  
Fewer treatments will be paid for, or each treatment will be paid for less.  There will be 
many who have worse health problems and a lower quality of life due to an inability to 
afford basic preventative medical services earlier in life, which will result in worse health 
outcomes later in life.  The opportunities lost as a consequence of suboptimal health will 
cause income inequality to worsen—a factor which many studies have shown to worsen 
the health outcomes of the general population.  There is a strong case for the provision of 
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some form of health care to all, argued in the literature and supported throughout my 
position. 
 However, there is a related concern in the provision of health care.  Suppose there 
were a disease predicted that would significantly threaten human populations in the 
distant future.  The disease could be an unintended, long-term consequence of health 
care; as more people have health care, those who would not have lived to pass on their 
genes due to genetic disease may live long enough to do so, and over time weaken the 
gene pool.  The current generation must decide what to do about this foreseeable 
consequence.  According to my vision of sustainable health care, so long as the current 
generation does not impair the ability of future generations to adequately meet their 
health care needs, the current generation fulfills their obligation to future generations. 
Does the current generation need to do anything about this foreseeable 
consequence?  The responsibility of the current generation is to ensure that they do not 
impair the ability of future generations to meet their health care needs adequately.  The 
second criterion implies that the current generation has negative obligations toward future 
generations, but it does not imply any positive obligations to benefit future generations.  
However, acting upon negative obligations may result in a benefit to the party the 
obligation is held to (future generations).  In the example of a weakening gene pool, the 
current global generation must take positive steps to ensure that their health care is not 
impairing the ability of future generations to meet health care needs adequately.  These 
positive steps may be research and development or the enactment of policies aimed at 
preventing foreseeable consequences of current health care practice that would result in 
an impairment of future generations to adequately meet their health care needs.  Such 
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policies could include gene therapies designed to fix defective DNA in a living 
individual, germ-line therapies designed to pass along DNA that does not carry disease 
(or as much disease) to future generations, and genetic screening to determine which 
couples are in danger of passing along diseases to future generations and assist couples in 
determining how they might best procreate while passing on as few as possible genetic 
diseases.  
5.1.2 Suggestions for Further Research 
 
Genetic modification, in all its controversy and the misgivings over the use of 
such technology carries great potential for making health care sustainable in the long 
term.  Different procedures exist for altering the human genome with the intent of 
eradicating disease and illness.  Regardless of the procedure, the potential for genetic 
modification to alleviate disease and illness cannot be discounted.  Current gene therapy 
focuses on treating the individual, by attempting to replace an abnormal gene for a 
normal gene.  This use of gene therapy is still in the experimental stage at the time of this 
writing, though many successes have been reported (University of Utah Health Sciences 
2014). 
Another, even more promising yet controversial therapy exists.  Through germ-
line therapy, illnesses can be identified and the responsible genes treated so that the 
modification can be passed on to future generations.  The benefits of such a modification 
are clear, but the potential dangers are very real and worthy of scrutiny.  More research is 
needed on not only the science of germ-line gene therapy but also the morality of such 
modifications.  The most obvious benefit, however, would be an overall increase in 
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human welfare.   Germ-line therapy is currently illegal in the U.S. and will remain so for 
the foreseeable future, but the responsibility to make civilization sustainable means that 
we have a moral obligation to consider all options, whether they are adopted or not. 
Another avenue of further research necessary to make health care sustainable 
pertains to life cycle analysis for health care products.  According to the EPA, a life cycle 
analysis or assessment is LCA is a technique to assess the environmental aspects and 
potential impacts associated with a product, process, or service, by: 
 Compiling an inventory of relevant energy and material inputs and 
environmental releases 
 Evaluating the potential environmental impacts associated with identified 
inputs and releases 
 Interpreting the results to help you make a more informed decision (EPA 
2012). 
Performance of life cycle analysis on health care practices is essential to provide the 
empirical data necessary to determine whether each practice is sustainable.  Furthermore, 
without the requisite empirical data moral judgments cannot be made regarding whether 
one practice or another is permissible within the confines of any vision of sustainability, 
including my own.  Though life cycle analysis of health care practices is a daunting task, 
it is not impossible, and it is necessary if health care is to become truly sustainable. 
 Ongoing research into the variables dependent on inequality is also essential for 
both making health care sustainable and for continuing sustainability once it is achieved.  
Psycho-social factors with social gradients are dynamic and change over time, becoming 
more or less worrisome and more or less detrimental to sustainability.  Ongoing research 
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is necessary to not only understand these mechanisms but also to figure out how to best 
address these problems within the confines of sustainability.  
5.1.3 Concluding Remarks 
 
 Although I have outlined a vision of sustainable medicine, it is up to us all, as part 
of the global generation, to make any vision of sustainable health care, and sustainability 
more generally, a reality.  Buchanan mentions a way forward through public dialogue, 
but in many countries public dialogue isn’t permitted, or is inefficacious.  We must not 
only ensure that health care is made sustainable within our own country, but we are 
obligated as part of the global generation to support the efforts of others to make health 
care sustainable in their countries as well.  We are increasingly, as Peter Singer writes, 
part of one global community.  The time is past for recognizing our role as citizens of that 
community, both individually and collectively.  The future will be better for us all if we 
do. 
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Japan 47.5 6.1 83.4 4.2 
Hong Kong 37.5 5.6 82.8 5.8 
Switzerland 50.3 7.5 82.3 5.0 
Italy 46.4 6.4 81.9 4.5 
Australia  42.0 7.4 81.9 6.7 
Iceland  40.2 6.9 81.8 6.5 
Israel  55.2 7.4 81.6 4.0 
France  46.5 6.8 81.5 4.9 
Sweden  46.2 7.5 81.4 5.7 


















Sierra Leone  28.8 4.1 47.8 1.1 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of the  30.5 4.0 48.4 0.8 
Central African Republic  25.3 3.6 48.4 1.4 
Afghanistan  36.8 4.8 48.7 0.5 
Zambia  37.7 5.3 49.0 0.8 
Chad 24.7 3.7 49.6 1.9 
Mozambique 35.7 4.7 50.2 0.8 
Burundi  30.5 3.8 50.4 0.8 
Angola  33.2 4.2 51.1 0.9 
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Costa Rica 78.2 
Cuba 78.0 
USA 78.0 




Côte d'Ivoire 52.5 





Table 4: Living Planet Report 
Country 
 
Footprint in gha Footprint in earths 
Cambodia 0.7 0.4 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.7 0.4 
Sierra Leone 0.7 0.4 
India 0.8 0.4 
Cuba 1.5 0.8 
China 1.6 0.9 
Costa Rica 2.0 1.1 
Japan 4.4 2.4 
Sweden 6.1 3.4 
Canada 7.6 4.2 
USA 9.6 5.3 
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Just and Sustainable 
Cuba 78 0.8 78 
China 73.4 0.9 73 
Costa Rica 78.2 1.1 71 
India 62.8 0.4 63 
Cambodia 62.0 0.4 62 
Côte d'Ivoire 52.5 0.4 53 
Sierra Leone 40.4 0.4 40 
Japan 82.6 2.4 34 
Sweden 80.9 3.4 24 
Canada 80.6 4.2 19 
USA 78 5.3 15 
United Arab Emirates 77.8 6.6 12 
. 
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Figure 1: Examples of Sets of Capabilities That Citizens Consider Valuable 
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